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Article
The Evolving Temporality of Lawmaking
ANDREW J. WISTRICH
Conventional wisdom suggests that law is past-oriented. That view
always has been incomplete and is no longer as accurate as it once was.
In fact, law always has been more future-oriented than is widely
recognized. Additionally, during the last century, fundamental changes
took place in attitudes about the nature and sources of law, as well as in
the ways in which law is made. Predominately future-oriented methods of
lawmaking-such as statutes, treaties, and administrative regulations-
have expanded, while predominately past-oriented modes of lawmaking-
such as the common law-have contracted. As a result, lawmaking has
become even more future-oriented, and law's memory of past law now
plays a smaller role than it used to in determining the content of legal
rules. Although this evolving temporality of lawmaking offers advantages,
humans are not adept at predicting the future. Therefore, we should be
cautious about projecting far into the future when making law, and we
should minimize entrenchment of the law we make.
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The Evolving Temporality of Lawmaking
ANDREW J. WISTRICH'
"Law changes not only from place to place but also from
time to time. '
"Law is the projection of an imagined future upon
reality.",
2
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Past in Life and Law
The past plays an important role in life. Our memories make us who
we are.4  What we remember limits our cognitive horizons, coloring our
understanding of the present and shaping our expectations of the future.'
Even when we break free from the grasp of the past and recognize the
desirability or necessity of change, our previous choices restrict our future
options.6 Our past is so "omnipresent ' 7 that we can never really put it
. Magistrate Judge, United States District Court, Central District of California. The insightful
comments of J. T. Fraser and Tyler T. Ochoa are gratefully acknowledged.
1Hans W. Baade, Time and Meaning: Notes on the Intertemporal Law of Statutory Construction
and Constitutional Interpretation, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 319, 330 (1995).
2 Robert M. Cover, Essay, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1604 (1986).
3 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 2, sc. 2 (Cyrus Hoy ed., W. W. Norton & Co. 1963)
(1604) ("Purpose is but the slave to memory ... ").
4 LARRY R. SQUIRE & ERIC R. KANDEL, MEMORY: FROM MIND TO MOLECULES, at ix (2000)
("We are who we are because we can remember what we have thought about.... Memory is the glue
that binds our mental life, the scaffolding that holds our personal history .. "); see also A. A.
MENDILOW, TIME AND THE NOVEL 223 (1972) ("[W]e are at any moment the sum of all our moments,
the product of all our experiences.").
5 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARv. L. REv. 443, 444 (1899)
("[C]ontinuity with the past is only a necessity and not a duty.... That continuity simply limits the
possibilities of our imagination, and settles the terms in which we shall be compelled to think."); see
also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 24 (1975) ("The visions of good and evil,
the [moral] denominations to be computed-these a society draws from its past and without them it
dies."); J. T. FRASER, TIME, CONFLICT, AND HUMAN VALUES 66 (1999) ("In animals and in humans, as
far as their biological functions go, the past is the source of the inherited or learned traits that direct
teleonomic behavior.").
6 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE USE AND ABUSE OF HISTORY 5 (Cosimo, Inc. 2010) (1873)
("[Man] ... cannot learn to forget, but hangs on the past: however far or fast he runs, that chain runs
with him."); OSCAR WILDE, AN IDEAL HUSBAND, act I, at 54 (London, Leonard Smithers & Co. 1899)
("One's past is what one is.").
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behind us.
The past also plays a significant role in law. 8 Law is subject to all of
the influences that the past exerts on the rest of life. Those influences,
which overlap to some degree, include: (1) respect for tradition;9 (2) status
quo bias;'0 (3) path dependence;" (4) escalation of commitment; 12 (5) a
desire to avoid the responsibility of making tough decisions; 13 (6) a
reluctance to invest in improving upon past solutions to similar problems;
14
7 DAVID LOWENTHAL, THE PAST IS A FOREIGN COUNTRY, at xv (1985); see also WILLIAM
FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN, act 1, sc. 3 (1950) ("The past is never dead. It's not even past.").
8 Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Critique of History in Adjudication and
Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHii. L. REV. 573, 585 (2000) ("The modem law is full of vestiges of early
law. If we were starting from scratch, we could design and (even with due regard for political
pressures) would adopt a more efficient system, and this implies that there must be formidable
obstacles to changing the existing one.").
9 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 167 (1986) ("[T]he past must be allowed some special
power of its own .... ); Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1031-32
(1990) (asserting that the past deserves to be respected merely because it is the past); see also RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 113 (1977) ("A precedent is the report of an earlier political
decision; the very fact of that decision, as a piece of political history, provides some reason for deciding
other cases in a similar way in the future.").
10 JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 468 (3d ed. 2000) ("People tend to stick to the
old, even when they would choose the new if they were starting afresh."); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 223 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1980) (1690) ("People
are not so easily got out of their old forms, as some are apt to suggest. They are hardly to be prevailed
with to amend the acknowledged faults in the frame they have been accustomed to. And if there be any
original defects, or adventitious ones introduced by time, or corruption; it is not an easy thing to get
them changed, even when all the world sees there is an opportunity for it.").
" Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813, 813 (1998)
("Where lock-in occurs, history matters. The selection of a prior path, for whatever reason, determines
current behavior-notwithstanding that the initial path was selected for reasons unrelated to current
conditions .. "); see id at 817 (offering typewriter keyboards and computer operating systems as
examples); Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change
in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 605 (2001) (noting that judicial decisions are "path
dependen[t]" in the sense that "courts' early resolutions of legal issues can become locked-in and
resistant to change" due to a variety of factors, including stare decisis, even when change in legal rules
is needed to "respond to changing underlying conditions"). But see Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited
Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 903, 909 (2005) (contending that the common
law is only weakly path dependent).
12 ELLIOT ARONSON, T. WILSON & R. AKERT, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 114 (2004) ("Escalation is
self-perpetuating. Once a small commitment is made, it sets the stage for ever-increasing
commitments. The behavior needs to be justified, so attitudes are changed; this change in attitudes
influences future decisions and behavior."); Rafael Gely, Of Sinking and Escalating: A (Somewhat)
New Look at Stare Decisis, 60 U. Prl-r L. REV. 89, 110 (1998) ("[T]he use of precedent.., presents a
sunk costs problem. The manner in which case law develops under our judicial system fits the
escalation of commitment prototype.").
13 Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177, 179 (1993) ("To the extent that
traditions represent judgments that others in other times have made, they can provide an attractive
resource to those uncomfortable with making judgments of their own."); see also Roger Ormrod,
Judges and the Process of Judging, in JUBILEE LECTURES CELEBRATING THE FOUNDATION OF THE
FACULTY OF LAW UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM 192 (1981) ("The stronger the adherence to precedent,
the narrower the scope for choice, which reduces the risk and makes the anxieties more supportable.");
Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1038 (1981) ("The
uneasiness, often the agony, and always the responsibility that accompany a difficult choice are
softened by the belief that real choice does not exist.").
14 Bumet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[lUn
[Vol. 44:737
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(7) a preference for intertemporal consistency; I5 (8) an inclination to follow
the example of others; 16 and (10) a penchant for precommitment. 17  In
addition, law contains features that systematically weigh the past more
heavily than the present18 and the future. Those features include: (1) a
grounding in ancient religion and moral philosophy; 19 (2) a written
constitution that is difficult to amend; 20 (3) entrenched statutes that
sometimes outlive their transitory purposes; 21 (4) the doctrine of stare
most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.");
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921) ("[T]he labor of judges
would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every
case...."); Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1173,
1177 (2006) ("[lIt saves time and trouble to rely on earlier decisions.").
15 ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 95 (4th ed. 2001) ("Psychologists
have long recognized a desire in most people to be and look consistent within their words, beliefs,
attitudes, and deeds."); RUPERT CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 4 (3d ed. 1977) ("It is a basic
principle of the administration of justice that like cases should be decided alike."); John E. Coons,
Consistency, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 60 (1987) ("[C]onsistency prescribes like treatment for successive
cases governed by the same rule of law or morality."); Karl N. Llewellyn, Case Law, in 3
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 249, 249 (Edwin R. A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds.,
1930) (noting "that curious, almost universal sense of justice which urges that all men are properly to
be treated alike in like circumstances" regardless of differences in time).
16 See CIALDINI, supra note 15, at 100 ("We view a behavior as correct in a given situation to the
degree that we see others performing it.") (emphasis omitted); THE FEDERALIST NO. 61 (Alexander
Hamilton) ("There is a contagion in example which few men have sufficient force of mind to resist.");
Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 26 (1945) ("While ... the power of the precedent is only 'the power of the beaten track,' still
the mere fact that a path is a beaten one is a persuasive reason for following it.") (footnote omitted).
17 See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND
CONSTRAINTS 1 (2000) (explaining that precommitment strategies include "removing certain options
from the feasible set, by making them more costly or available only with a delay, and by insulating
themselves from knowledge about their existence"); Jon Elster, Don 't Burn Your Bridge Before You
Come to It: Some Ambiguities and Complexities of Precommittment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1754
(2003) ("When precommitting himself, a person acts at one point in time in order to ensure that at some
later time he will perform an act that he could but would not have performed without that prior act.").
's If I seem to neglect the present, that is because I view it as an artificial construct possessing a
very brief duration. See BARBARA ADAM & CHRIS GROVES, FUTURE MATTERS: ACTION,
KNOWLEDGE, ETHICS 123 (2007) ("[T]he present as such is more a construct than a basic reality.");
PAUL J. NAHIN, TIME MACHINES: TIME TRAVEL IN PHYSICS, METAPHYSICS, AND SCIENCE FICTION 287
(1993) ("The present is the knife edge on which the past and future balance."); BLAISE PASCAL,
PENStES NO. 172 (1670) ("If anyone examine his thoughts, he will find them entirely taken up with the
past or the future. We hardly think of the present at all, and if we do we give it a thought, it is only to
borrow a light from it to direct the future.").
19 JOSEPH STORY, MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 702-03 (William W. Story ed.,
1972) (1852) ("[Pirinciples of natural justice... constitute the basis of much of the common
law .... ); Wesley G. Skogan, Judicial Myth and Judicial Reality, 1971 WASH. U. L.Q. 309, 313
(describing how primitive religious practices evolved into natural law).
20 See U.S. CONST. art. V (requiring multiple supermajorities for the adoption of amendments);
John Ferejohn & Lawrence Sager, Commitment and Constitutionalism, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1954
(2003) ("Article V is the Constitution's constitution. Its resistance to change is what cements the
external, institutional commitments of the Constitution in place.").
21 See GUDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 2 (1982) (describing "the
problem of legal obsolescence" caused by laws which no longer fit but still govern); GRANT GILMORE,
THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 95 (1977) ("One of the facts of legislative life, at least in this country in
this century, is that getting a statute enacted in the first place is much easier than getting the statute
revised so that it will make sense in the light of changed conditions.").
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decisis;22 (5) the Ex Post Facto Clause;23 (6) the presumption against
statutory retroactivity; 24 (7) statutes of limitation; 25 (8) originalist and
textualist approaches to constitutional interpretation; 26 and (9) the finality
of court judgments.27 Each of these features restrains the nature and pace
of legal change, and represents a way in which law remembers and honors
its past.
The ways in which the past affects life must be combined with the
ways in which the past affects law to correctly assess the role of the past in
law. Their interaction, however, is not merely additive. Some past-
oriented features of law are specific to law, but others are derived from
more general considerations-such as respect for tradition, path
22 See FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 679-80 (5th ed. 2001) ("The doctrine of
stare decisis is a mandate that courts should give due weight to precedent. It holds that an already
established point of law should be followed without reconsideration, provided that the earlier decision
was authoritative."); W. Barton Leach, Revisionism in the House of Lords: The Bastion of Rigid Stare
Decisis Falls, 80 HARV. L. REV. 797, 803 (1967) ("Stare decisis is a habit of mind in all walks of life-
the professions, business, family life. One does what one has done before in similar circumstances.");
Alexander M. Sanders, Jr., Speech, Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Judges but Were
Afraid to Ask, 49 S.C. L. REV. 343, 347 (1998) ("It is barely possible for lawyers to persuade most
judges of the validity of anything they have to say unless they can first persuade those judges that some
other judge has already said it. We embrace, therefore, a sort of institutionalized nostalgia. We call it,
quaintly enough, stare decisis."); cf ALGERNON CHARLES SWINBURNE, A Word From the Psalmist, in
A MIDSUMMER HOLIDAY AND OTHER POEMS 176, 179 (3d ed. 1889) ("Is not Precedent indeed a king
of men?").
23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (prohibiting the passage of federal ex post facto statutes); U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 6 (prohibiting the same with state statutes); see also Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (I
Cranch) 87, 138 (1810) ("An ex post facto law is one which renders an act punishable in a manner in
which it was not punishable when it was committed.").
24 See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994) ("[T]he presumption against
retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries
older than our Republic."); Robert G. Natelson, Statutory Retroactivity: The Founders' View, 39 IDAHO
L. REV. 489, 527 (2003) ("[T]he policy against statutory retroactivity was a major force behind the
adoption of the U.S. Constitution.").
25 See Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of Limitation, 28
PAC. L.J. 453, 457 (1997) (cataloging and analyzing the purposes of statutes of limitation); Andrew J.
Wistrich, Procrastination, Deadlines, and Statutes of Limitations, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 607, 617
(2008) (identifying promoting repose and avoiding the retrospective application of contemporary
standards as two of the four principal purposes of statutes of limitation).26 See Brown, supra note 13, at 178 ("Originalists look to the way things have been done to see
what the Framers intended. Textualists look to the way things were done to determine what the all-
important words meant to the community for which they were written."); see also Mitchell N. Berman,
Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 15 (2009) (proposing that an interpreter should look
differently at the originalist object on structural questions than rights questions, and differently at the
provisions of the 1787 Constitution than later amendments); John F. Manning, Textualism and
Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 420 (2005) (describing textualism as the "basic proposition that
judges must seek and abide by the public meaning of the enacted text, understood in context (as all
texts must be)").27 See JAMES ET AL., supra note 22, at 673 (explaining that once a court enters a final judgment in
a particular case, "the judgment establishes legal barriers against relitigating the matters involved in the
action" in subsequent cases); see also JOHN V. ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY I n.1
(2003) ("[T]he dispute-resolution effect of a judicial decision is labeled res judicata: once finally
resolved, an individual dispute becomes a 'thing adjudged' and may not be relitigated. The rule-
making effect is called stare decisis: the judges 'stand by the decision' in prior cases and apply the
same rule in the future.").
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dependence, and consistency-that affect both life and law, so simply
adding the two sets of influences would be a sort of double-counting that
would overestimate the importance of the past in law.
Not surprisingly, law's memory of past law while crafting legal rules
has seemed central to many. In 1790, for example, Edmond Burke noted
that English lawyers and legislators exhibited a "powerful prepossession
toward antiquity." 28  Sixty years later, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote that
"[t]he first thing an English or American lawyer looks for is what has been
done . ... ,29 Roughly one century ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
observed that "if we want to know why a rule of law has taken its
particular shape, and more or less if we want to know why it exists at all,
we go to tradition. 30  Even today, conventional wisdom holds that the role
of the past in law is very significant, and certainly more important than the
role of the future. 31 As Richard Posner recently said:
Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the
most backward-looking, the most "past-dependent," of the
professions. It venerates tradition, precedent, pedigree,
ritual, custom, ancient practices, ancient texts, archaic
terminology, maturity, wisdom, seniority, gerontocracy,
and interpretation conceived of as a method of recovering
history. It is suspicious of innovation, discontinuities,
"paradigm shifts," and the energy and brashness of
youth.32
Indeed, law has been ridiculed for precisely this reason.33
28 EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 28 (J. G. A. Pocock ed., 1987)
(1790).
29 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 267-68 (1850) (J.P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., 1969); see also id. at 268 ("[T]he English lawyer values laws not because they are
good but because they are old ....").
30 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,469 (1897).
31 See, e.g., Kronman, supra note 9, at 1044 ("[T]he authority of the past continues, perhaps, to
exert a greater influence in the law than in other spheres of life .... ); Gerald J. Postema, On the
Moral Presence of Our Past, 36 MCGILL L.J. 1153, 1156-57 (1991) ("Law is essentially historical, not
just in the sense that the life stories of legal systems can be chronicled, but more importantly in the
sense that it is characteristic of law to anchor justification to the past."); see also Larry D. Kramer, The
Pace and Cause of Change, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 357, 357 (2004) ("[L]egal training nurtures a
predisposition to preserve the familiar, while providing assorted tools with which to do so.").
32 Posner, supra note 8, at 573. Posner's statement is probably true in the sense that law likely is
more past-oriented than some other professions, such as medicine or engineering.
33 See JONATHAN SwIFT, GULLIVER'S TRAVELS AND OTHER WRITINGS 203 (Ricardo Quintana
ed., 1958) ("It is a Maxim among these Lawyers, that whatever hath been done before, may legally be
done again: And therefore they take special Care to record all the Decisions formerly made against
common Justice and the general Reason of Mankind. These, under the Name of Precedents, they
produce as Authorities to justify the most iniquitous Opinions; and the Judges never fail of directing
accordingly.").
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Although the past's role in law is, and will continue to be, significant,
its importance has been exaggerated. The temporality of legal rules is not
that simple. Among its other shortcomings, the simplistic view of the law
as highly past-oriented ignores the importance of the future in life and law.
B. The Future in Life and Law
For humans, "the fundamental phenomenon of time is the future. 34
According to Immanuel Kant:
Men are more interested in having foresight than any
other power, because it is the necessary condition of all
practical activity and of the ends to which we direct the
use of our powers. Any desire includes a (doubtful or
certain) foresight of what we can do by our powers. We
look back on the past (remember) only so that we can
foresee the future by it; and as a rule we look around us, in
the standpoint of the present, in order to decide on
something or prepare ourselves for it.35
Elaborating on Kant's insight, Charles Sherover provided a detailed
description of how the future-orientedness that is inherent in the nature of
human beings shapes our lives. In his view,
human reasoning is prudential: it is teleologically
organized; human rational activity, whether individual or
communal, is to be understood as goal-oriented behavior.
This is to say that all rational activity is temporally
34 MARTIN HEIDEGGER, THE CONCEPT OF TIME 14E (William McNeill trans., 1992) (emphasis
omitted); see also CHARLES M. SHEROVER, ARE WE IN TIME? AND OTHER ESSAYS ON TIME AND
TEMPORALITY 89 (Gregory R. Johnson ed., 2003) ("Our basic concerns on every level, trivial or
profound, are concerns about the future."); 7 Jose Ortega y Gasset, What Is Philosophy?, in COMPLETE
WORKS 420 (Espasa-calpe 1946) ("It is not primarily in the present nor in the past that we live. Our
life is an activity directed towards what is to come. The significance of the present or the past only
becomes clear afterwards, in relation to the future. Human life is 'futurian,' largely determined by
what is not as yet realized.").
35 IMMANUEL KANT, ANTHROPOLOGY FROM A PRAGMATIC POINT OF VIEW 59 (Martinus Nijhoff
ed., Mary J. Gregor trans., 1974) (1798); see also I JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of the Civil Code, in
THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTH-AM 297, 308 (Russell & Russell 1962) (1843) ("[M]an is not like the
brutes, limited to the present time, either in enjoyment or suffering, but.. . he is susceptible of pleasure
and pain by anticipation .... This disposition to look forward, which has so marked an influence upon
the condition of man, may be called expectation--expectation of the future."); David A. Armor &
Shelley E. Taylor, When Predictions Fail: The Dilemma of Unrealistic Optimism, in HEURISTICS AND
BIASES 334, 334 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) ("[M]any of the decisions people make, most of
their choices, and virtually all plans are based on expectations about the future ...."); A.R. Ammons,
Boon, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 1, 1988, at 48 (stating that human life consists largely of "being
about.., to be").
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structured: it is animated by the present perception of
possibilities of the future which are not yet actualized but
are nevertheless presently seen as obtainable by
appropriate human effort ....
... [W]hatever may be the rhythm of my lived time,
whether it is punctuated by a mechanical clock which ticks
off its seconds, or follows the more leisurely flow of a
chess game or a picnic, my temporality. . . is marked by a
priority of future considerations .... [W]hether my task is
winning a chess game, writing a paper, finishing a book,
embarking on a journey, or just loafing around, my lived
present is future-oriented in its structure. My
comprehension of my present situation is interpreted by
me in terms of what seems possible to do henceforth; by
the light of the alternatives I interpret the situation as
presenting to me, I will retrieve from past experience
whatever guidance I deem germane to my present
prospect.
36
Of course, Kant and Sherover are right. However much we respect
and are influenced by the past, we understand that focusing our attention
on it would be futile. The past has happened and cannot be changed. 37 We
can only affect the future.3" "It is the future with which we have to deal. 39
Even popular sayings that exhort people to stop worrying about the future
consequences of their actions, and to enjoy the present instead, merely
36 SHEROVER, supra note 34, at 164, 167; see also GARY EBERLE, SACRED TIME AND THE
SEARCH FOR MEANING 171 (2003) ("We are too busy thinking about the future to worry about the
past."); FRASER, supra note 5, at 77 ("Man's awareness of time renders him incapable of complete
immersion in present experience; it causes him ever to be looking ahead beyond the immediate
moment ...."); Eugene M. Caruso et al., A Wrinkle in Time: Asymmetric Valuation of Past and Future
Events, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 796, 797 (2008) (concluding that "people value events in the future more than
equivalent events in the equi-distant past"). Even non-human forms of life exhibit this characteristic.
ADAM & GROVES, supra note 18, at 129 ("[O]rganisms (including human beings) maintain themselves
by sustaining conditions that are favorable to them through their powers of adaptation and
anticipation.").
37 ADAM & GROVES, supra note 18, at 31 ("[T]he past is closed to influence, thus open to factual
knowledge while the future is open to choice and efforts to colonize and control, and thus closed to
factual inquiry."); SHEROVER, supra note 34, at 81 ("Moral decisions are not about the past, which
cannot be changed, or about the present moment which is fleetingly actual, but only about the future.").
3 BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL, THE ART OF CONJECTURE 5 (Nikita Lary trans., 1967) ("We can act
only on the future.").39 OSCAR WILDE, THE SOUL OF MAN UNDER SOCIALISM AND SELECTED CRITICAL WRITINGS (L.
Dowling ed., Penguin Classics 2001) (1891).
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confirm humans' future-orientedness. 4° If people were not so focused on
the future, there would be no need to urge them to redirect their attention
elsewhere.
Because of the accelerating rate of change, people are more focused on
the future now than at any previous time. The quickening pace of events
today carries the future upon us like a tidal wave, flowing faster than ever
before,41 and threatening to overwhelm US.4 2  Understandably, we find
ourselves spending even more time contemplating the future, and looking
farther ahead than we used to.
43
Americans seem especially future-oriented. James Madison evidently
thought so. As he asked rhetorically:
Is it not the glory of the people of America, that, whilst
they have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former
times and other nations, they have not suffered a blind
veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to
40 See WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY 401 (1953) ("It is a mistake to look too
far ahead. Only one link in the chain of destiny can be handled at a time."); Matthew 6:34 ("Therefore
do not be anxious about tomorrow, for tomorrow will be anxious for itself. Let the day's own trouble
be sufficient for itself.") (internal quotation marks omitted).41 JAMES GLEICK, FASTER: THE ACCELERATION OF JUST ABOUT EVERYTHING 9 (1999) ("We are
in a rush. We are making haste. A compression of time characterizes the life of the century now
closing."); MARY SETTEGAST, MONA LISA'S MOUSTACHE: MAKING SENSE OF A DISSOLVING WORLD 9
(2001) ("[O]ur everyday perception is that time itself has accelerated while space has shrunk. The pace
of life seems to be racing, and the entire geographical world is suddenly 'here' as the barriers of
conventional space are overcome by the communications technology."); Ellen Dunham-Jones,
Temporary Contracts: On the Economy of the Post-Industrial Landscape, HARv. DESIGN MAG., Fall
1997, at 2 ("The social contracts that supported [our] grandparents have been ruptured. Marriage vows,
the homestead, corporate stability, and job security-all have suffered in the ever-evolving, non-stop
world of GATT and NAFTA, of cyberspace, freeways, twenty-four-hour convenience marts and other
manifestations of post-industrialism.").
42 JOHN DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION 57 (1935) ("The fact of change has been so
continual and so intense that it overwhelms our minds. We are bewildered by the spectacle of its
rapidity, scope, and intensity."); Lester R. Brown, The Acceleration of History, in STATE OF THE
WORLD, 1996: A WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE REPORT ON PROGRESS TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY,
3, 3 (Linda Starke ed., 1996) ("The pace of change in our world is speeding up, accelerating to the
point where it threatens to overwhelm the management capacity of political leaders.").43 NICHOLAS RESCHER, PREDICTING THE FUTURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF
FORECASTING 5 (1998) ("[W]ith the passage of centuries the future has come to loom ever larger in our
lives. The ration of time and resources a person spends on average in attending to the immediacies of
the day as against making provisions for the more distant future has continually decreased over the
ages...."); see also ALVIN TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK 23 (1970) (quoting the novelist and scientist C.
P. Snow as saying that "[u]ntil this century ... social change was so slow, that it would pass unnoticed
in one person's lifetime. That is no longer so. The rate of change has increased so much that our
imagination can't keep up."); Daniel Bell, Twelve Modes of Prediction-A Preliminary Sorting of
Approaches in the Social Sciences, 93 DAEDALUS 845, 869 (1964) ("This is an era in which society has
become 'future-oriented' in all dimensions: a government has to anticipate future problems; an
enterprise has to plan for future needs; an individual is forced to think of long range career choices.
And all of those are regarded as possible of doing.").
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overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the
knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of their
own experience?44
David Brooks agrees. He recently argued that there is a distinctly
American cast of mind, which he called the "Paradise Spell." He defined it
as
the capacity to see the present from the vantage point of
the future. It starts with imagination-the ability to see a
vision with detail and vividness, as if it already existed.
Then the future-minded person is able to think backward
from that vision; to ask, "What must I do to take the future
that is in my head and make it exist in the world?" That
person is more emotionally attached to the glorious future
than to the temporary and unsatisfactory present. Time
isn't pushed from the remembered past to the felt present
to the mysterious future. It is pulled by the vivid future
from the unsatisfactory present and away from the dim
past.45
According to Brooks, the Paradise Spell is what makes Americans
"heedless of the past, disrespectful toward traditions, short on
contemplation, wasteful in our use of the things around us, impious toward
restraints, but consumed by hope, driven ineluctably to improve, fervently
optimistic, relentlessly aspiring, [and] spiritually alert .... If Brooks is
right about the American character, then we should expect American
lawmaking to be future-oriented, and given the demands of today's
environment, rapidly becoming even more so.
It is only natural that law should share this future-oriented perspective.
Law is a practical discipline. It affects and is affected by the world.47 If
44 THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison).
45 DAVID BROOKS, ON PARADISE DRIVE: How WE LIVE Now (AND ALWAYS HAVE) IN THE
FUTURE TENSE 263 (2004); see also id. at 123, 255 ("An American is thus imbued with a distinctive
orientation: future-mindedness .... From the start, Americans were accustomed to thinking in the
future tense. They were used to living in a world of dreams, plans, innovations, improvements, and
visions of things to come."); JAY GRIFFITHS, A SIDEWAYS LOOK AT TIME 82 (1999) ("In America,
news is preferred to history, the present to the past. Novelty is rated; the old is discarded. The new is
privileged over the old.").
46 BROOKS, supra note 45, at 269.
47 See, e.g., MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM,
1890-1916 89 (1988) (noting that when economic conditions "are undergoing substantial change, so
will the law"); J. Thomas Greene, The Rule of Law-Endangered?, 225 F.R.D. 29, 30 (2004) ("[A]s
our culture evolves and matures, so must the law evolve and change to meet and solve current needs of
modem man and his society.").
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people constantly look ahead in their daily living, law unavoidably will do
so as well.48
Consider, for example, criminal law. Because a defendant's past
misconduct is an important determinant of his or her future status, and
because a defendant's conduct is measured exclusively against pre-existing
rules, criminal law superficially seems very past-oriented. Looking at
criminal law from another perspective, however, reveals a different aspect.
Most agree that there are five key objectives of criminal prosecution and
punishment: retribution, general deterrence of all potential offenders,
specific deterrence of the particular offender, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation.49  Of those five, only retribution focuses on remembering
the past.50  The others are concerned with the likely future conduct of the
wrongdoer or others, and the effect of that future conduct on society. This
imbalance reflects our belief that remembering the past by punishing
wrongdoers is usually a poor second best to maximizing social welfare by
preventing future wrongdoing. 5' The same philosophy is reflected in other
aspects of criminal law, such as sentencing, parole, pretrial detention,52 the
criminalization of attemptsj and the recent emphasis on prevention.54
48 See SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 119 (2011) ("[T]he fundamental rules of legal systems are
plans."); Andrew E. Taslitz, Fortune-Telling and the Fourth Amendment: Of Terrorism, Slippery
Slopes, and Predicting the Future, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 195, 197 (2005) ("Most legal rules,
constitutional or otherwise, are justified by preventing future harms or obtaining future benefits.").49 See, e.g., PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY 1, 53-54, 101, 181
(Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 1992); see also CASSIA C. SPOHN, How Do JUDGES
DECIDE?: THE SEARCH FOR FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE IN PUNISHMENT 6-7 (2002) (suggesting another
purpose for criminal punishment, namely, "restoration," "a utilitarian justification for punishment that
emphasizes repairing harm and rebuilding relations among victims, offenders, and communities").
50 SPOHN, supra note 49, at 6-16 (explaining that while retribution "look[s] backward to the crime
and the criminal," the other rationales for criminal punishment are utilitarian and "look forward to
future consequences or results").
' See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES '248-49 ("And indeed, if we consider all
human punishments in a large and extended view, we shall find them all rather calculated to prevent
future crimes, than to expiate the past .... ); Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law,
92 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 326 (2004) ("[O]ne of the main purposes of the criminal law remains the
instrumental one of reducing harmful wrongdoing."); Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Modern
Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1105 (1952) ("[W]hile invocation of a penal sanction necessarily
depends on past behavior, the object is control of harmful conduct in the future.").52 See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN
AN ACTUARIAL AGE 188 (2007) ("Today, the criminal sentence is related, primarily, to prior criminal
history as a proxy to future offending . . . .The prediction of future dangerousness has begun to
colonize our theories of punishment."); id. at 187 ("In the parole context, we observe a delicate shift
from using the new science of crime to find the right rehabilitative treatment to using probabilities to
predict success and failure on parole."); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (2006) (authorizing pretrial
detention based on the risk of future flight from prosecution or future danger to the community).
53 See Barbara Baum Levenbook, Prohibiting Attempts and Preparations, 49 UMKC L. REV. 41,
63 (1980) (advocating criminalizing preparations as well as attempts).
54 See Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal
Justice, 114 HARv. L. REv. 1429, 1429 (2001) ("[D]uring the past several decades, the justice system's
focus has shifted from punishing past crimes to preventing future violations through the incarceration
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Other areas of law, such as tort law55 and contract law, 56 display equally
fundamental orientations toward the future.
We also tend to overlook the future-orientednesss of the tasks most
lawyers perform much of the time. Although we usually imagine lawyers
making closing arguments or cross-examining witnesses at trial, those
activities are actually rather rare, except on television.57 Many lawyers
spend the bulk of their time providing advice about non-litigation matters.
Their clients are Holmesian "bad men" who want to know if they can do
something that they would like to do without getting themselves into
trouble. As Max Radin put it, lawyers' "business is prophecy .... ,8 This
is true not just of business and regulatory lawyers, but also of litigators,
both civil and criminal. While litigators spend some time consulting
precedents and attempting to reconstruct past facts, their predictions about
what courts will do drive their choices about how to present a case and
whether to recommend a compromise. Thus, in many aspects of the law,
and in many of the tasks that lawyers perform, the future has always played
a larger role than is widely assumed.
Therefore, although its influence is frequently underestimated, the
future has always played a powerful role in law. Moreover, the
prominence of that role has grown dramatically during the past century,
especially with respect to lawmaking.
and control of dangerous offenders."); Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98
NW. U. L. REV. 1, 62 (2003) ("Preventive detention is a pervasive, routine occurrence in our society.").
" See John C. P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 544 (2003)
(surveying various theories of tort law and noting that economists believe that "the purpose of tort law
is to promote overall social welfare by deterring accidents in the future"); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Misunderstanding Ability, Misallocating Responsibility, 68 BROOK. L. REv. 1055, 1056 (2003) (noting
that one of the two purposes of tort law is to deter "socially undesirable conduct by forcing people to
pay for the harm caused by actions with excessive social costs").56 See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 239 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
1963) ("Contracts are dealings between men, by which they make arrangements for the future."); Ian R.
MacNeil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 712-13 (1974) ("[C]ontract. . . is
the projection of exchange into the future ...."); Julie M. Philippe, French and American Approaches
to Contract Formation and Enforceability: A Comparative Perspective, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
357, 398 (2005) ("Contract making is future-oriented.").
57 See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2004, at 3, 3 ("[T]he
portion of dispositions ... by trial today (1.8 percent) is less than one sixth of what it was in 1962.").
58 Max Radin, The Theory of Judicial Decision: Or How Judges Think, 11 A.B.A. J. 357, 362
(1925); see also Joseph W. Bingham, What Is the Law?, II MICH. L. REV. 1, 15 (1912) ("As lawyers
we endeavor to forecast potential legal consequences of particular causal facts ...."); Marjorie Anne
McDiarmid, Lawyer Decision Making: The Problem of Prediction, 1992 WiS. L. REV. 1847, 1848
("[A]II transactional legal matters and the vast majority of legal disputes are settled not through the
intervention of any state apparatus, but rather through the decision making and concomitant advice-
giving activity of lawyers.") (footnote omitted).
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C. The Multi-Faceted Temporality of Lawmaking
The relationship between past and future in the development of legal
doctrine is complicated. Law is made by several different methods. Those
methods include written constitutions, judicial decisions, statutes, treaties,
administrative rulemaking, and administrative adjudication. Each of those
methods possesses its own distinctive temporality.
The product of a particular method of lawmaking can vary along at
least five temporal dimensions, each of which can be conceived of as a
continuum. The first dimension concerns a law's direction, that is,
whether it applies retrospectively (such as the common law) or
prospectively (such as constitutions). The second dimension concerns a
law's duration, that is, whether it is enduring or transient.5 9 While there is
some variation within each type of law,60 some types of law (such as
constitutions) generally endure longer than other types of law (such as
administrative adjudications) because the products of some lawmaking
processes are either better adapted to long-term needs or more resistant to
change. Relatively more enduring law might be said to possess a
characteristically longer half-life. 61  The third dimension concerns the
speed with which a law is made, that is, whether it is made quickly, or
whether it is the product of a gradual or drawn out process. Some types of
law (such as the common law) are made by evolutionary processes and
others (such as constitutions) are made by avulsive revolutionary
processes. The fourth dimension concerns the basis, or raw material, on
which a law is made, that is, whether it principally rests on information
gleaned from the past (such as the common law) or on predictions about
the future (such as statutes). Finally, the fifth dimension concerns a law's
purpose, that is, whether it is intended to preserve the past by remedying
something that has occurred (such as the common law), or to influence the
future (such as administrative regulations). Arguably, the fifth dimension
is the most important dimension of the temporality of lawmaking because
it influences the lawmakers' choices about each of the other four
59 See Liaquat Ali Kahn, Temporality of Law, 40 MCGEORGE L. REv. 55, 65 (2009) ("Laws are
enacted either for definite or indefinite durations .... Most laws prescribe no date for their expiration;
they continue to exist and function for an indefinite duration ... until specifically repealed. Some laws
exist but are no longer used. Laws not used for a long duration may lose their validity, a circumstance
known as desuetude.").
60 As an example, some precedents may be viewed as more binding and resistant to change than
others. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, The Dred Scott Decision, in THE LANGUAGE OF LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 211, 214 (Joseph R. Fornieri ed., 2009) ("Judicial
decisions are of greater or less authority as precedents, according to circumstances."); see also Michael
J. Gerhardt, Essay, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REv. 1204, 1205 (2006) (contrasting the legal status
of "super precedent" with that of "super statutes").
61 The term "half-life" refers to "[tihe time in which the quantity of a substance (or the number of
similar objects) in a sample decreases by half .. " 6 OXFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1037 (2d ed.
1991).
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dimensions.
Some aspects of each method of lawmaking are backward-looking and
others are forward-looking. For example, statutes that are intended to
regulate future conduct, and that operate only prospectively, may have
been enacted because of a problem that occurred in the past, or may have
been modeled on a measure previously adopted by a different polity. As a
further example, court decisions that are focused on resolving a particular
dispute that arose in the past rely on earlier court decisions, or other pre-
existing sources of law, and formally operate only retrospectively.
Nevertheless, they may guide later courts in resolving disputes that will
arise in the future. Similarly, a statute may be future-oriented in the sense
that it is based on a prediction about what will be most conducive to future
societal welfare but, paradoxically, may lock in that future-oriented rule for
a long period of time so that the rule stays in effect even when the
prediction about the future on which it is based becomes obsolete.
Moreover, law is made by a system. No method of lawmaking is
exclusive; instead, we utilize a blend.62 For example, legislatures enact
general rules by statutes ex ante, then agencies elaborate on them and
reshape them by promulgating regulations ex ante, and finally courts make
these forward-looking types of rules more specific by performing case-by-
case adjudication ex post. Similarly, the avulsiveness of legislative
transformation may be softened by post-enactment common law
interpretation, elaboration, and application. The adoption of a forward-
looking legal rule often is only the first step in the lawmaking process.
That rule then must be applied to specific past situations by courts or
agencies. As a part of that process, ambiguities or gaps in the rule may be
exploited by courts or administrative law judges to subtly change the
content of the rule in order to make it more suitable for solving past
problems, thus tempering the rule's future-orientedness with a small dose
of past-orientedness.63 If the result is undesirable, then the legislature may
step in again. To some extent, then, the strengths and weaknesses of one
method of lawmaking may be offset by the strengths and weaknesses of the
others. In addition, it is possible to rebalance the blend of lawmaking
methods from time-to-time as circumstances warrant.64
62 See Peter L. Strauss, Essay, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 225, 252
(1999) ("Legislators and judges are partners in the work of government.").
63 See Linda Hamilton Krieger, Afterword, Socio-Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 476, 485 (2000) (arguing that courts can undermine a transformative statute's effectiveness by
interpreting ambiguities in a manner consistent with the familiar pre-transformation attitudes which the
statute was intended to replace).
6 Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the
Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARv. L. REV. 1035, 1070 (2006) ("Legislators who
delegate interpretative power must pick the agent to whom they will delegate .... One of the most
basic decisions a legislator must make in this regard is whether to delegate to an administrative agency
or to the courts.").
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On balance, though, each method of lawmaking can appropriately be
characterized as either predominantly past-oriented or predominantly
future-oriented. As it happens, the predominantly future-oriented methods
of lawmaking have become increasingly numerous and important. We
now make law with a very different attitude, and in very different ways,
than we used to. Specifically, the roles of statutes, treaties, and
administrative regulations have expanded, while the roles of constitutional
text and the common law have shrunk. In addition, the common
law-arguably the most past-oriented method of lawmaking-has been
recast and deployed in new ways calculated to emphasize its future-
oriented aspects. The overall trend is clear: in lawmaking of every sort,
and in the relative proportions in which the methods of lawmaking are
employed, the role of the past is waning, and the role of the future is
waxing. The common law has been dethroned, and statutes, treaties, and
regulations have been enthroned in its place. As a consequence, law today
is surprisingly future-oriented, and it is rapidly becoming more so. Law's
memory of past law still matters, of course, but the influence of the past in
the lawmaking process is declining.
II. THE INCREASING FUTURE-ORIENTEDNESS OF LAWMAKING
A. The Shift from Natural Law to Pragmatism
Perhaps the best definition of natural law is the one offered by Cicero:
True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of
universal application, unchanging and everlasting .... It is
a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to
repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it
entirely. We cannot be freed from its obligations by senate
or people, and we need not look outside ourselves for an
expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be
different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws
now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable
law will be valid for all nations and all times, and there
will be one master and ruler, that is, God, over us all, for
he is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its
enforcing judge. Whoever is disobedient is fleeing from
61himself and denying his human nature ....
65 CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA DE LEGIBUS 211 (Clinton Walker Keyes trans., Harvard Univ. Press
1961) (1928); see also Calvin's Case, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B.) 392; 7 Co. Rep. la, 12b ("The
law of nature is that which God at the time of creation of the nature of man infused into his heart, for
his preservation and direction; and this is lex oeterna, the moral law, called also the law of nature.");
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Natural law has been an enduring and influential legal theory. It can
be traced back as far as Heraclitus, who spoke of "a divine law" by which
"all the laws of men are nourished. 66  It was the nurse maid of the
common law, 67 Blackstone endorsed it,68 and it still has adherents today.
69
By the beginning of the twentieth century, if not before, however, this
theory of law had been largely cast aside.7° What had been a system of
rules based upon natural law-a system in which nature, as reflected in
religion and ancient moral philosophy, provided the controlling legal
principles-was replaced 71 by a system of law based upon pragmatism.
72
This new approach resulted from enthusiasm for science and acceptance of
the notion that law could be used to promote and to regulate economic
activity.73 It looked less to what had been done in the past and more to
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 182 (1961) (defining natural law as the theory "that there are
certain principles of human conduct, awaiting discovery by human reason, with which man made law
must conform if it is to be valid").
66 G. S. KIRK & J. E. RAVEN, THE PRESOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS 213 (1957).
67 See Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69, 73 (1853) ("The common law adopts the principles of natural
law ... ").
68 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at '41 ("This law of nature, being... dictated by God himself,
is of course superior in obligation to any other.").69 E.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 59, 85-90 (1980) (describing seven
basic forms of "human good," and noting that there are "countless objectives and forms of good"
whose pursuit is made possible by the "inclinations and urges of one's nature").
70 See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 34, 36 (1930) (observing that for centuries
"law was felt as something ordained of God, or even as something inherently right in the order of
nature," but describing that view as "superstition"); BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., AMERICAN
INTERPRETATION OF NATURAL LAW 276 (1931) (explaining that "the concept of natural law was
generally discarded, and frequently explicitly repudiated, by American political theorists after the Civil
War," but nevertheless continued to influence judicial decision-making for the rest of the nineteenth
century).
71 See JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 302-03 (2d ed. 1921)
(1909) (stating that rules of law impose "lines of conduct to be followed without regard to their moral
character"); HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 16 (1861) ("[T]he severance of law from morality,
and of religion from law, [belongs] very distinctly to the later stages of mental progress."); HERBERT
W. TITUS, GOD, MAN AND LAW: THE BIBLICAL PRINCIPLES 1-10 (1994) (describing the erosion of
Christianity's influence on American jurisprudence and attributing it to Darwin, Holmes, Langdell, and
Eliot, among others).72 BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END 1 (2006) ("Today, law is widely viewed
as an empty vessel to be filled as desired, and to be manipulated, invoked, and utilized in the
furtherance of ends. A few centuries ago, in contrast, law was widely understood to possess a
necessary content and integrity that was, in some sense, given or predetermined."); see also ROBERT
SAMUEL SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 23-26 (1982) (arguing that
"pragmatic instrumentalism" was the dominant force in American legal thought during the twentieth
century); CORNELL WEST, THE AMERICAN EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY: A GENEALOGY OF PRAGMATISM
5 (1989) (describing pragmatism as "a future oriented instrumentalism").
73 MORTON J. HORWrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF
LEGAL ORTHODOXY 112 (1992) ("As law became increasingly implicated in the process of promoting
economic growth, the earlier natural rights justifications for the judicial function began to be
overwhelmed by the overtly instrumental use of private law to advance utilitarian objectives."); see
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what it would make sense to do for the future.74 Gradually, law came to be
seen as possessing only a loose connection to religion or morality, and as
having less to do with "ought," than with "is" (or, perhaps, with "will
be").75 As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. observed nearly a century ago,
"[t]he common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the
articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be
identified." As a result of this shift in attitudes about the nature and
sources of law, a great deal of early law-and early theory about law and
lawmaking-was rendered obsolete.
With the passage of years, the Blackstonian notion that judges merely
"declare" or "find" pre-existing law rather than create new law77-- once a
mainstay of jurisprudence that would make perfect sense to a natural law
theorist for whom legal rules are immutable and eternal-began to seem
quaint, or even a bit ridiculous. As one English judge joked:
There was a time when it was thought almost indecent
to suggest that judges make law-they only declare it.
Those with a taste for fairy tales seem to have thought that
in some Aladdin's cave there is hidden the Common Law
in all its splendour and that on a judge's appointment there
descends on him knowledge of the magic words Open
Sesame. . . .But we do not believe in fairy tales any
more.
78
also HOLMES, supra note 56, at 40 ("[T]he law does undoubtedly treat the individual as a means to an
end, and uses him as a tool to increase the general welfare at his own expense.").
74 Richard A. Posner, Book Exhange, Legal Pragmatism Defended, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 683, 684
(2004) ("Legal pragmatism is forward-looking, regarding adherence to past decisions as a (qualified)
necessity rather than as an ethical duty."); see also RICHARD G. SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING
BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT 16 (1979) ("The crux of this philosophy is the offender's future
actions, and the future actions of others, not their past actions .... [T]he orientation of the utilitarians
is the future ....").
75 See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 5 (1945) (arguing that the science of
law has nothing to do with justice or morality). This is illustrated by, among other things, the wild
proliferation of regulatory offenses and other malum per se crimes.
76 S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting), superseded by statute,
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (2006).
77 See I BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at '69 (stating that courts are "not delegated to pronounce a
new law, but to maintain and expound the old one").
76 Lord Reid, The Judge as Law Maker, 12 J. SOC'Y PUB. TCHRS. L. (n.s.) 22, 22 (1972); see also
2 JOHN AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 655 (Robert Campbell ed., London, John Murry, Albemarle Street,
4th ed. 1873) (referring to the Blackstonian "childish fiction ... that judiciary or common law is not
made by judges], but is a miraculous something made by nobody, existing, I suppose, from eternity,
and merely declared from time to time by the judges"); Kermit Roosevelt Ill, A Little Theory Is a
Dangerous Thing: The Myth ofAdjudicative Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075, 1076 (1999) ("Once
it was believed that the common law had a positive source independent of judicial decisions, but this
view has no modem adherents.").
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In an era dominated by the common law and by a relatively small
number of loosely worded statutes, how judges interpreted and applied
precedents and legislation in particular cases involving novel issues
presented by a rapidly evolving society was what mattered. History and
formalism were downplayed. 79  Eventually, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
defined law simply as predictions about what judges are likely to do. In
his words:
[A] legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a
man does or omits certain things he will be made to suffer
in this or that way by judgment of the court;-and so of a
legal right .... The object of our study, then, is prediction,
the prediction of the incidence of the public force through
the instrumentality of the courts. . . . The prophecies of
what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more
pretentious, are what I mean by the law.8°
Others followed his lead,81 and broadened his notion to include all
officials, not merely judges, since some non-judges had in the meantime
become important lawmakers.82
This development represented a momentous shift in attitudes about
law: from eternal to transitory, from God-given to man-made, and from
79 A related change in the attitude about law was the abandonment of historical jurisprudence.
"Historical jurisprudence" is the theory that law "is first developed by custom and popular faith, next
by jurisprudence--everywhere, therefore, by internal silently-operating powers, not by the arbitrary
will of a law-giver." FREDERICK CHARLES VON SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR
LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE 30 (Abraham Hayward trans., photo. reprint 1975) (1831). An
important strain of legal thought in the nineteenth century, I ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 63
(1959), and an intermediate step between natural law and pragmatism, historical jurisprudence had
been consigned to the dustbin by the beginning of the twentieth century. Harold J. Berman, Toward an
Integrative Jurisprudence: Politics, Morality, History, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 779, 794-96 (1988).
go Holmes, supra note 30, at 457, 458, 461; see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Book Notice, 6
Am. L. REV. 723, 724 (1872) ("The only question for the lawyer is, how will the judges act?"); Max
Radin, Case Law and Stare Decisis: Concerning Prajudizienrecht in Amerika, 33 COLUrM. L. REV. 199,
211 (1933) ("[L]aw essentially is an expectation."); Wesley G. Skogan, Judicial Myth and Judicial
Reality, 1971 WASH. U. L.Q. 309, 310 ("In reality, law is then merely a set of expectations about
judicial behavior.") (citing HEINZ EULAU & JOHN SPRAGUE, LAWYERS IN POLITICS 81 (1964)).
81 E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 225 (1990) ("The law is not a
thing [judges] discover; it is the name of their activity. They do not act in accordance with something
called 'law'-they just act as best they can .... The important thing is that law is something that
licensed persons, mainly judges, lawyers, and legislators, do .... ") (footnote omitted); Jerome Frank,
Are Judges Human? Part 11: As Through a Class Darkly, 80 U. PA. L. REv. 233, 236 (1931) ("For the
rights and duties of his client under any legal document a lawyer drafts or on which he gives advice are
nothing more and nothing less than what may in the future be decided by some court in a lawsuit
involving those rights.").
82 See Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 456
(1930) ("[T]he center of law, is not merely what the judge does ... but what any state official does,
officially.").
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inherently knowable to something that can only be guessed at (or, more
optimistically, predicted). The past remained relevant to some extent, but
only as a means to an end, and conformity to the past was no longer
viewed as an end in itself.83 That shift in attitude helped to free the legal
system to make law in new ways that were more future-oriented than past-
oriented.84
B. The Displacement of Constitutional Text by Common Law
Interpretation
Because the creation of a constitution generally precedes all other
forms of lawmaking within a polity, and because constitutions are intended
to be permanent,85 and may endure for lengthy periods,86 constitutions are
generally thought of as backward-looking. 87  By their nature, however,
constitutions are inherently forward-looking. A constitution typically is
not written unless there is a desire to begin afresh, to break from the past,
and to establish new principles or a new set of institutional arrangements
deemed better suited to the demands of the future. "Its goal is to set in
motion a new nation with a spirit of its own, a tool for progressing toward
some goal-'a more perfect Union,' perhaps. It looks forward. It
contemplates progress from the less perfect toward the more perfect."88
'3 See CARDOZO, supra note 14, at 102 ("Not the origin, but the goal, is the main thing.");
Holmes, supra note 30, at 474 ("[O]ur only interest in the past is for the light it throws upon the
present.").
84 See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 73, at 2 ("As judges began to conceive of common law
adjudication as a process of making and not merely discovering legal rules, they were led to frame
general doctrines based on a self-conscious consideration of social and economic policies."); Henry P.
Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 388 (1981) (characterizing the "general
decay of stare decisis" as "the manifestation in legal thought of the marked, accelerating, and
apparently irreversible decline in the belief of permanent ordering"); see also ADAM & GROVES, supra
note 18, at 202 ("When human beings begin to assume ownership of the future and start to shape it to
their design, the belief in providence tends to be deposed from its dominant cultural position and
displaced by the pursuit of progress.").
85 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 387 (1821) ("[A] constitution is framed for
ages to come, and is designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach
it."); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (explaining that because the creation of a
constitution is "a very great exertion" that cannot be "frequently repeated," constitutions "are designed
to be permanent").
8 Although the U.S. Constitution has endured for over two hundred years, the half-life of
constitutions throughout the world is shorter than one might expect-about seventeen years. ZACHARY
ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 129 (2009).
87 Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutional Failure, 2011 U. ILL. L. REv. 1243, 1280
("Constitutions do not emerge fully formed as from the head of Zeus. Nor are they properly analogized
to a chain novel. They are [an] accretion of devices, structures, and policies. Many of these structures
are path dependent; they reflect circumstances and conditions which time has often made anachronistic
or, in any event, unsuitable to modem needs.").
88 Brown, supra note 13, at 207; see also Kim Lane Scheppele, A Constitution Between Past and
Future, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1377, 1379 (2008) ("Because the explicit aim of constitutions
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The U.S. Constitution, which was designed to supplant the flawed Articles
of Confederation, exemplifies this future-oriented aspect of constitutions.8 9
Of course, constitutions are also intended to restrict the options of
future generations. 90  In fact, "[t]he very existence of written
constitutions ... is evidence of skepticism, if not outright pessimism, about
the moral fiber of future citizens ... ,91 As Henry Hazlitt has remarked,
this is an American obsession:
We are constantly trying to protect ourselves in advance
against what we may think of and do about a future
situation when it arrives and we actually know what it is.
In a whole network of constitutional restrictions,
traditions, and laws, the American people or their
representatives assume their own prescience at the time
that they impose the restrictions and their own future
incompetence. In brief, we impose our self-restrictions in
the mood of an inordinately self-confident father drawing
up the conditions of a will for what he assumes is to be a
certainly irresponsible and possibly idiotic son.92
Theoretically, then, the text of a constitution binds future generations
to an enduring set of broad principles and institutional arrangements.93 But
generally is to improve upon an existing condition, the faces of constitution drafters are almost
invariably imagined to be turned toward the future, bright with hope.").
89 See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (stating that its goal is to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity"); WILLIAM J. BRENNAN JR., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, in JUDGES ON JUDGING: VIEWS FROM THE BENCH 200, 204 (David M. O'Brien ed., 1997)
("Our Constitution was not intended to preserve a preexisting society but to make a new one ....").
90 Senator John Potter Stockton, addressing Congress during debate over the Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871, said: "Constitutions are chains with which men bind themselves in their sane moments that they
may not die by suicidal hand in the day of their frenzy." JOHN E. FINN, CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS 5
(1991); see also ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 40 (1997) ("It certainly cannot be said that a constitution naturally
suggests changeability; to the contrary, its whole purpose is to prevent change-to embed certain rights
in such a manner that future generations cannot readily take them away."); Michael C. Doff, The
Aspirational Constitution, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1631, 1631 (2009) ("[A] constitution burdens rather
than benefits future generations by limiting their political freedom to choose policies that, in their
judgment, best serve their interests."). For additional discussion, see Richard Albert, Constitutional
Handcuffs, 42 ARIz. ST. L.J., 663, 665-66 (2010) (defining entrenched constitutional provisions as
those that "are intended to last forever and to serve as an eternal constraint on the state and its
citizens"), and Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional
Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 697 (2011) (arguing that constitutionalizing legal rules
entrenches them against legal change).
91 Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 376 (1982).
92 HENRY HAZLITT, ANEW CONSTITUTION NOW 79 (2d ed. 1974).
93 JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15 (2005) ("The point of constitutional law is to hold the nation to its self-
2012]
CONNECTICUT LA WREVIEW
practically speaking, its ability to accomplish that objective is limited.
Even if a constitution is written and difficult to amend, later generations
will find ways to change it if they must. Moreover, after twenty or fifty
years have passed, some updating almost invariably will be needed.94 If a
constitution was well-designed, the restraints it imposes on change will be
loose enough to allow the polity to shift position slightly as time passes
and circumstances evolve. 95 Otherwise, a constitution that is difficult to
amend might either subjugate later generations to their ancestors, or
eventually be discarded as obsolete.96
Obviously, the more difficult it is to amend a constitution, the greater
the degree of restraint it imposes on succeeding generations' would-be
framers. The text of the U.S. Constitution is highly resistant to change. 97
Faced with evolving conditions and a founding document that was
supposed to be respected, but that could not be readily altered to adapt to
changing needs, courts assumed the responsibility for updating the
Constitution while interpreting and applying it by utilizing a species of
common law decision-making. 98  Although courts still mention the
given, fundamental commitments over time .... "); id. at 19 ("[Tlhe judiciary's essential task in
constitutional cases is to hold the nation to its constitutional commitments."); David A. Strauss,
Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 877, 880 (1996) ("Following a written
constitution means accepting the judgments of people who lived centuries ago in a society that was
very different from ours."); see also AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE ETHICS OF MEMORY 12 (2002) ("A
constitution is a constitutive part of the community's shared memory.").
94 See Richard S. Kay, Constitutional Chrononomy, 13 RATIO JuRIS 31, 41 (2000) ("Human
history tells us that sooner or later every constitution will begin to chafe.").
95 CARDOZO, supra note 14, at 83-84 ("A constitution states or ought to state not rules for the
passing hour, but principles for an expanding future. In so far as it deviates from that standard, and
descends into details and particulars, it loses its flexibility, the scope of interpretation contracts, the
meaning hardens. While it is true to its function, it maintains its power of adaptation, its suppleness, its
play."); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) ("A constitution, to
contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the
means by which they may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and
could scarcely be embraced by the human mind .... Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great
outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose
those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves."); Brown, supra note 13, at 218-19
(suggesting that the Framers (or the Founding Generation) were like good parents who convey sound
general principles that their children can apply on their own to guide their future conduct in particular
situations).
96 The risk of the latter is significant, especially in rapidly evolving times. See ELKINS ET AL.,
supra note 86, at 131, 137 ("[T]here is a decline in constitutional life spans after World War II.").
9 See J. ALLEN SMITH, THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 46 (Harv. Univ. Press 1965)
(1907) ("As a matter of fact it is impossible to secure amendments to the constitution, unless the
sentiment in favor of change amounts almost to a revolution."); Speeches of Patrick Henry in the
Virginia State Ratifying Convention, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST 293, 301 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1985)
(1788) ("The way to amendment, is, in my conception, shut.").
98 See Ferejohn & Sager, supra note 20, at 1961 ("Article V and a judiciary that has acquired the
authority of constitutional oversight . . . encourage a constitutional practice in which judges play a
major role .... "); Sandalow, supra note 13, at 1046 ("Reference to the 'important objects' of the
framers rather than their specific intentions is, no doubt, a necessity if the evolving needs of the nation
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Constitution in their opinions, today's decisions are driven less by the
words of the Constitution than by what courts have said those words mean.
As one scholar explained:
The tests brought to bear in determining the validity or
invalidity of challenged governmental action
are... formulated in terms that paraphrase or refine the
simpler and usually more general words of the
Constitution itself.
... The constitutional text is down there somewhere
under this massive overlay of case law development and
refinement, but the usual contest between advocates in the
Supreme Court, and more often than not between or
among the Justices, is the kind of contest that has
characterized the common law judicial process at least
since the days of Sir Edward Coke, a battle over cases and
what they should be taken to stand for.
... The literal text of the Constitution ... figures in
contemporary constitutional adjudication only at one
remove, that is, as the words of the original text have been
construed, expounded, and developed by successive
generations of Supreme Court Justices.
In the two centuries of our life as a constitutional
republic, a vast and intricate exegesis has been imposed on
the lean text of the original constitutional
document.... [T]he student or practitioner of
constitutional law, or the constitutional judge, is working
not just from the text but with an authoritative literature,
authoritative because the doctrine of precedent makes it
SO.
99
are to be served. The amendment process established by Article V simply will not sustain the entire
burden of adaptation that must be borne if the Constitution is to remain a vital instrument of
government."); see also JAMES BRYCE, CONSTITUTIoNs 22-23 (Oxford Univ. Press 1980) (1905)
(explaining how American judges overcome the rigidity of constitutional text by flexible
interpretation).
99 Harry W. Jones, Lecture, Precedent and Policy in Constitutional Law, 4 PACE L. REV. 11, 12-
14 (1983); see also Harry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUm.
L. REv. 723, 770-72 (1988) (explaining that in constitutional adjudication "the absolute primacy of text
over gloss" cannot be maintained; observing that "the case law overwhelms the text and historical
understanding"; and stating that "the Supreme Court is concerned not with the Constitution, but with
constitutional law, which consists largely (albeit not entirely) of case law"); Charles Evan Hughes,
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For example, the text of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
consists of forty-five words. It takes up one-tenth of a page in the latest
edition of the annotated United States Code. The one sentence summaries
of the cases applying it, by contrast, consume more than 2000 pages of fine
print in that same publication, and the collection of cases summarized there
is far from comprehensive. Based upon quantity alone, the constitutional
text is dwarfed by the court decisions interpreting and applying it. In the
realm of constitutional law, common law precedents are more dog than
tail. 00
Ironically, a written constitution actually leaves courts more freedom
to innovate than do other sources of law, such as statutes and common law
precedents.
Under the United States experience, contrary to what
has sometimes been believed when a written constitution
of a nation is involved, the court has greater freedom than
it has with the application of a statute or case law. In case
law, when a judge determines what the controlling
similarity between the present and a prior case is, the case
is decided. . . .And in interpreting legislation, when the
prior interpretation, even though erroneous, is determined
after a comparison of facts to cover the case, the case is
decided. But this is not true with a constitution. The
constitution sets up the conflicting ideals of the
community in certain ambiguous categories. These
categories bring along with them satellite concepts
covering the areas of ambiguity. . . .But no satellite
Speech of May 3, 1907, in THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 144 (David
J. Danelski & Joseph S. Tulchin eds., 1973) ("We are under a constitution, but the constitution is what
judges say it is...."). But see Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939) ("[T]he ultimate
touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it."); William
0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736 (1949) ("A judge looking at a constitutional
decision may have compulsions to revere past history and accept what was once written. But he
remembers above all else that it is the Constitution which he swore to support and defend, not the gloss
which his predecessors may have put on it."). For this reason, in most areas of constitutional law,
serious analysis begins not with the text of the constitution, but with the glosses and tests the Supreme
Court has engrafted upon it.
10. This discussion focuses on the U.S. Constitution, but some state constitutions are very
different. State constitutions tend to be more easily amended, see John Dinan, "The Earth Belongs
Always to the Living Generation ": The Development of State Constitutional Amendment and Revision
Procedures, 62 REV. OF POL. 645, 645 (2000) (noting that "the relatively flexible state procedures
(which have produced nearly 150 constitutions, as well as some 6000 amendments to the current
documents) have had a variety of harmful effects"), and more detailed, than their federal counterpart.
See Rodriguez, supra note 87, at 1262 n.103 ("State constitutions are famously verbose when
considered in comparison to the national Constitution."). When a constitution is both detailed and
easily amended, the pressure on the judiciary to update it by means of interpretation is diminished.
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concept, no matter how well developed, can prevent the
court from shifting its course, not only by realigning cases,
which impose certain restrictions, but by going beyond
realignment back to the over-all ambiguous category
written into the document. The constitution, in other
words, permits the court to be inconsistent. The freedom
is concealed either as a search for the intention of the
framers or as a proper understanding of a living
instrument, and sometimes as both.'01
Courts use the ambiguities inherent in the Constitution to overcome the
greater specificity of precedents interpreting the constitution."' This
allows the meaning of the Constitution to change without first clearing the
nearly insuperable obstacles to amendment. 103 Because one sort of change
(amendment of text) was allowed only a narrow scope, another sort of
change (reinterpretation of text) filled the gaps. This notion of a "living
constitution,"'04 though not without its drawbacks, is justifiable for a
variety of reasons. For one thing, if a constitution is too impervious to
modification, the result may be widespread social unrest or even
revolution. 05  More fundamentally, as the Founders themselves
.0 EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 7-8 (1949).
102 See id. at 61 ("The consequence of this is that a constitution cannot prevent change; indeed by
permitting an appeal to the constitution, the discretion of the court is increased and change made
possible."); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1366 (1997)
("Readings of the Constitution change. This is the brute fact of our constitutional past. The
Constitution is read at one time to mean one thing; at another to mean something quite different.").
'03 That the Constitution has been amended twenty-seven times would seem to weigh against the
characterization of the obstacles to its amendment as "nearly insuperable." It is noteworthy, however,
that the first ten amendments (which are known as the "Bill of Rights") were adopted in 1791,
essentially contemporaneously with the ratification of Constitution itself, that several of the remaining
seventeen amendments have been technical or uncontroversial in nature, and that only a tiny fraction of
the approximately 10,900 amendments proposed in Congress have been adopted. During the past two
hundred years, the Constitution has been amended just once in every thirteen years on average, and
during that time there have been eleven decades in which it was not amended at all. Interestingly,
however, the number of amendments proposed and adopted increased significantly during the 1900s as
compared to the 1800s (1676 and four for the 1800s, as compared to 8416 and twelve for the 1900s
(through the early 1990s only)). See JOHN R. VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, AND AMENDING ISSUES, 1789-2002, at 41, apps. B & C (2d
ed. 2003). Even though spectacularly unsuccessful, the recent explosion in the number of
constitutional amendments proposed in Congress is itself an indication of just how future-oriented our
attitude toward even the Constitution has become. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Address, Constitutional
Constancy: Why Congress Should Cure Itself of Amendment Fever, 17 CARDozo L. REv. 691, 691
(1996) (noting that Congress is considering more constitutional amendments than in recent memory).
104 See John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional
Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1695 (2004) ("[T]he 'living constitution' metaphor describes a range of
constitutional theories.").
105 See NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSE ON THE FIRST DECADE OF TITUS LIvIUS 12 (Ninian
Hill Thomson trans., London, Kegan Paul, Trench & Co. 1883) (1531) ("[M]en will accept no new law
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recognized, "[t]here ought to be a capacity to provide for future
contingencies as they may happen; and as these are illimitable in their
nature, so it is impossible safely to limit that capacity.' '0 6 The Founders
did not say, and it is unlikely that they intended, that we should allow
ourselves to choke to death on their words.10 7  After all, "[t]he
Constitution... is not a suicide pact."' '
Originalists and textualists deplore this approach to constitutional
adjudication,'09 but they have difficulty applying their own approaches
consistently."0  Their own interpretive techniques, although influential,
have been criticized,"' and appear not to have carried the day. 12 Some of
altering the institutions of their State, unless the necessity for such change be demonstrated; and since
this necessity cannot arise without danger, the State may easily be overthrown before the new order of
things is established.").
'06 THE FEDERALIST No. 34 (Alexander Hamilton); see also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,
433 (1920) ("[Wlhen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of
the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the development of which
could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters."); Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) ("Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.
Therefore a principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it
birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions."); Julliard v. Greenman (The Legal Tender Case), 110
U.S. 421, 439 (1884) ("A constitution, establishing a frame of government, declaring fundamental
principles, and creating a national sovereignty, and intended to endure for ages, and to be adapted to the
various crises of human affairs, is not to be interpreted with the strictness of a private contract.").
107 Some have argued that it is the intent of the ratifiers rather than the intent of the Founders that
is relevant. See, e.g., Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST.
COMMENT. 77, 79 (1988) (arguing that the authors of the Constitution rejected framer intent but were
hospitable to ratifier intent). They have a point, but the distinction is immaterial in the context of this
Article.
108 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963); see also Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
On the Social Contract or Essay About the Form of the Republic, in ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 157,
168 (Roger D. Masters ed., Judith R. Masters trans., 1978) (1762) ("[T]he general will that should
direct the State is not that of a past time but of the present moment ....").
109See Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321, 371 (1903) ("In countries whose
fundamental law is flexible it may be that the homely maxim, 'to ease the shoe where it pinches,' may
be applied, but under the Constitution of the United States it cannot be availed of to justify action by
Congress or by the courts.").
11 Stephen A. Plass, The Illusion and Allure of Textualism, 40 VILL. L. REV. 93, 100 (1995)
(referring to "patent interpretative inconsistencies" in Justice Scalia's decisions); All Things
Considered: Scalia Vigorously Defends a "Dead" Constitution, NPR (Apr. 28, 2008),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=90011526 (featuring Justice Clarence Thomas
declaring "I am a textualist, I am an originalist. I am not a nut.").
1 See, e.g., Baade, supra note 1, at 337 ("[N]either the 'Founding Fathers' nor the 'Founding
Generation' viewed their 'original intent' or the 'original understanding' of the Constitution prevailing
between 1787 and 1791 as binding on future generations faced with the task of constitutional
interpretation.") (footnote omitted); Terrance Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L.
REv. 1162, 1193 (1977) ("[T]he evolving content of constitutional law is not controlled, nor even
significantly guided, by the Constitution, understood as an historical document."); Theodore P. Seto,
Originalism v. Precedent: An Evolutionary Perspective, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2001, 2003 (2005) ("The
more a culture learns after the text becomes fixed, however, the more problematic originalism
becomes.").
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them essentially have conceded as much." 3
Therefore, even if it is concealed because courts (whether wisely or
not) are hesitant to admit it, and regardless of whether it is a good idea or a
bad idea, common law interpretation of the Constitution has largely
supplanted constitutional text as the de facto basis of constitutional law. 114
This development makes constitutional doctrine more future-oriented than
it otherwise would be.
C. The Erosion of Stare Decisis
Adjudication is inherently backward-looking. It addresses past events,
and it does so primarily in light of previously existing law. As Aristotle
observed, "a juryman [is] an example of one judging the past . . . . 'l
Jeremy Bentham said that judges make law after the fact "just as a man
makes laws for his dog. When your dog does anything you want to break
him of, you wait till he does it, and then beat him for it." 116 More recent
scholars agree that in "the judicial context ... the emphasis is upon doing
justice based upon events in the past."' 1 7 In particular, they have observed
112 See Norman Marsh, Law Reform in the United Kingdom: A New Institutional Approach, 13
WM. & MARY L. REV. 263, 266 (1971) ("[The law cannot stand still."); SCALIA, supra note 90, at 107
("[W]hen a student asked about the role of text in constitutional analysis, an American professor's
response was: 'Forget about the text!'); see also LOWENTHAL, supra note 7, at 70 ("[T]he most
faithful followers of tradition cannot avoid innovating, for time's erosions alter all original structures
and outdate all previous meanings.").
113 See, e.g., James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("I am not so naive (nor do I think our forbears were) as to be unaware that judges in a real
sense 'make' law. But they make it as judges make it, which is to say as though they were 'finding'
it-disceming what the law is, rather than decreeing what it is today changed to, or what it will
tomorrow be."), superseded on other grounds, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 476, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.);
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989) ("I hasten to confess
that in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist."); see also DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA
SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
FOUNDATIONS 38-44 (2002) (suggesting that Scalia's jurisprudence is designed to perpetuate noble
myths which he does not believe, but which are, in Duncan Kennedy's words, "a beneficial illusion,"
and that all will be better off ifjudges pretend to believe in them).
14 See Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (Scalia, J.) (explaining that
it is the Supreme Court's prior decisions describing the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment, rather
than the literal meaning of words of the amendment, that are controlling).
I's LANE COOPER, THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE 17 (1932); see also Walter V. Schaefer,
Prospective Rulings: Two Perspectives, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2 ("Courts normally look back. They
apply rules to conduct that has already occurred.").
6 ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 306-07 (1941) (quoting
Jeremy Bentham) (internal quotation marks omitted).
17 Brett G. Scharffs, The Character of Legal Reasoning, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 733, 758
(2004); see also Jeffrey Abramson, Ronald Dworkin and the Consequence of Law and Political
Philosophy, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1201, 1221 (1987) (reviewing RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986))
("Judicial decisions, therefore, must be backward-looking" because pre-existing provisions of the
constitution or statutes are the primary sources of law).
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that "[t]he very notion of planning is alien to adjudication."' ' 18
In actuality, however, the question whether adjudication is forward-
looking or backward-looking is a matter of degree. "[T]he adjudicative
context is not entirely backward-looking; concern for the future and the
present may be relevant to judicial choice." ' 19 In addition, future litigants
are affected by the outcomes of past cases, whether they participated in
them or not.120 Finally, adjudication is retroactive in the sense that the law
announced in a case is usually applied to that case, and to any other case
that is not final because it is still pending in a trial court or on direct
appeal.' 21  Such adjudicative retroactivity is thought to be legitimate
because of the historically-based view that courts find existing law rather
than create new law.
122
Common law adjudication is decision-making by courts based not on
the constitution or on a statute, but instead on reasoning by analogy from
precedents. 23  A precedent is "a decision of a court that furnishes an
example or authority for a similar case or a similar question of law arising
later in time.' 24  In performing common law adjudication, courts are
118 DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 51 (1977).
19 Scharffs, supra note 117, at 758; see also MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE
COMMON LAW 7 (1988) ("The function of resolving disputes faces toward the parties and the past. The
function of enriching the supply of legal rules faces toward the general society and the future."); Beryl
Harold Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (1960) ("One
function is to decide the instant case; another is to lay down a rule which may afford some guidance in
the future.").
120 Anthony D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 51-52 (1983) ("Legislators look
forward; courts look backward. Yet the impact of judicial dispute resolution looks forward; future
potential litigants are affected by a case they did not participate in.").
121 See Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on Commentaries, in A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES
AND A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 3, 50 (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1977) (c. 1774-76) ("[T]he
common law.., is but a series of ex-post facto laws."); Robert Rantoul, Oration at Scituate, in
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 317, 317 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1991) ("Judge-made law is ex post
facto law .. "). But see Meir Katz, Note, Plainly Not "Error": Adjudicative Retroactivity on Direct
Review, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1979, 1981 (2004) ("Although courts act as if retroactivity
anachronistically reconfigures past decisions as trial error, the doctrine does not address the past at all,
but is a statement about the present: Current law must be equally applied to currently open cases.
'Retroactivity' in adjudication is thus a misnomer, and, contrary to its literal definition, is not actually a
backwards-reaching process.") (footnotes omitted).
122 See MICHAEL ZANDER, THE LAW-MAKING PROCESS 393 (6th ed. 2004) ("When a court
delivers a ruling which is perceived to change the law the effect is not only for the future. It also
affects the past. This is because of the fiction that when it states the law a court is stating the law as it
always has been.").
123 EISENBERG, supra note 119, at 1 ("Much of our law derives from rules laid down in
constitutions, statutes, or other authoritative texts that courts must interpret but may not reformulate.
The common law, in contrast, is that part of the law that is within the province of the courts themselves
to establish. In some areas of law... common law rules predominate.... In all areas, even those that
are basically constitutional or statutory, they figure at least interstitially."); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 247 (1990) (defining common law as "any body of law created
primarily by judges through their decisions rather than by the framers of statutes or constitutions").
124 Rebecca R. French, Time in the Law, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 663, 667 n.15 (2001).
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constrained by the doctrine of stare decisis. The doctrine of stare decisis is
"a policy of the courts to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled
points.' 25 Stare decisis tethers law's future to its past. In its strictest form
it means that a later court must follow the decision of an earlier court. 26
Strict forms of stare decisis are highly past-oriented. 27 As one scholar
has observed, "the effect of the rigid English doctrine of precedent is that
our judges frequently do have to try to see the law through the eyes of their
predecessors. 128 The court is supposed to be bound by precedent, and it is
supposed to look backward, focusing on the case before it and that case's
predecessor cases. It is not supposed to look ahead, or to purport to create
rules to govern future cases. 129  Future-oriented adjudication is typically
regarded as illegitimate. "For a court to decide in advance a case or
question not before it would be an exercise of legislative power, binding
other courts before which such cases or questions might properly arise
later."'130 Under classical common law doctrine, then, determination of
future rules is reserved to future courts, and present courts are supposed to
stay out of their way. The attitude traditionally required of judges has been
described as, "[tihe grace to drudge away on today's problem and the
refusal to foreclose tomorrow's issues., 1
31
The doctrine of stare decisis, however, is inherently less past-oriented
than it seems. To start with, even though judges arguably should be
focusing only on the particular case before them, they often do think about
what rule would be best for the future when they decide cases. They
understand that their decision will be relied upon by other judges in the
future, and they do not want to cement an unsound brick of legal doctrine
125 id.
126 See JAMES ET AL., supra note 22, at 585 ("The doctrine of stare decisis is a mandate that courts
should give due weight to precedent. It holds that an already established point of law should be
followed without reconsideration, provided that the earlier decision was authoritative.").
121 See A. L. Goodhart, Precedent in English and Continental Law, 50 LAW Q. REv. 40,41 (1934)
(explaining that in English law, when a prior case is directly on point, "[i]t is more than a model; it has
become a fixed and binding rule"). Some question whether stare decisis was ever as strict in America
as it has been in England. John Chipman Gray, Judicial Precedents-A Short Study in Comparative
Jurisprudence, 9 HARV. L. REV. 27, 40 (1895) ("Naturally, considering the character of the people and
of institutions, the weight attached to judicial precedent [in America] is somewhat less than in
England .... "). However, stare decisis historically has exerted powerful force on American courts and
has frequently been relied upon to justify decisions. See Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C.
L. REv. 367, 367 (1988) ("[R]eliance on precedent is one of the distinctive features of the American
judicial system.").
128 SIR RUPERT CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 207 (1961).
129 EUGENE WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES 8 (2d ed. 1894) ("[Tlhe court making the
decision is under a duty to decide the very case presented and has no authority to decide any other.").
130 Charles W. Collier, Precedent and Legal Authority: A Critical History, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 771,
774.
131 Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71, 75 (1928).
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into the masonry wall of the law.132
In addition, because judges must decide what prior decisions are
sufficiently similar to the present case to qualify as precedents, the
responsibility for determining what a prior decision means always rests
with the precedent-following court rather than with the precedent-setting
court. 133  The earlier court can no longer speak; only the voice of the later
court is heard. 134  "It is not what the prior judge intended that is of any
importance; rather, it is what the present judge, attempting to see the law as
a fairly consistent whole, thinks should be the determining
classification.' 35  In common law adjudication, then, the "most recent
exposition by a court of last resort is always the controlling one.' 36 Rather
than being rigidly bound by past decisions, "[a] judge blends old and new
to reach her decisions-the current controversy sheds light on past cases
and vice versa.
1 37
Finally, past decisions are not really as old as they seem because while
in one sense they remain unchanged, in another sense they evolve over
time. "People other than the initial decisionmakers use and talk about, and
in the process recharacterize, the decisions of yesterday .... Past decisions
132 See LLEWELLYN, supra note 70, at 159 ("Every opinion must be directed forward, it must
make sense and give guidance for tomorrow for the type of situation in hand."); Joseph P. Nadeau,
What It Means to a Judge, in HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES 21, 23 (Kathleen M. Sampson ed., 2004)
("Judges must see the present through the lens of the past, but view it with an eye to the future.");
Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 572 n.4 (1987) ("Considering the future
implications of today's decisions is central to the notion of adjudication according to principle.");
Roger J. Traynor, No Magic Words Could Do It Justice, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 615, 625 (1961) (citing
Professor Clarence Morris, who notes that "a judge should have at least the day after tomorrow in
mind").
133 Richard B. Cappalli, The Common Law's Case Against Non-Precedential Opinions, 76 S. CAL.
L. REV. 755, 773 (2003); see also Gillette, supra note 11, at 824-25 ("Judicial decisions have
characteristics ... that allow subsequent judges substantial discretion in deciding whether to apply
potential precedents. There may be multiple relevant precedents, the selection of one of which leads to
different results than if another selection is made from the same plausible set.").
134 Gillette, supra note 11, at 825 ("Linguistic imprecision can prevent the judge in an initial case
from characterizing the grounds of her decision in a way that clearly includes or excludes subsequent
cases, thus giving judges in those subsequent cases significant latitude to apply or ignore that initial
decision.") (footnote omitted).
135 LEVI, supra note 101, at 2-3; see also Adrian Vermeule, Judicial History, 108 YALE L.J. 1311,
1313 (1999) ("Federal courts do not consider the judiciary's internal records as interpretative sources
bearing on the meaning of published opinions or judicially-promulgated rules.") (footnote omitted).
136 Baade, supra note 1, at 339; see also LLEWELLYN, supra note 70, at 47 ("[T]he true rule of the
case, to wit, [is] what it will be made to stand for by another later court."); Bradley Scott Shannon, The
Retroactive and Prospective Application of Judicial Decisions, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 811, 850
n.193 (2003) ("[Wlhat a precedent-setting court might say is never fully 'binding' on a later court, at
least in the sense that the later, interpreting court always gets the last word.").
137 Linda Meyer, "Nothing We Say Matters ": Teague and New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 476
(1994); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 374 (1996)
("Realistically, a precedent is the joint creation of the court that decides the case later recognized as a
precedent and the courts that interpret that case in later cases.").
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thus come to the present encrusted with society's subsequent
characterizations of and commentary on those decisions., 3 8 Accordingly,
prior decisions often already have been "updated" even before a later court
attempts to apply them, and that "updating" colors the later court's
understanding of their meaning.
The doctrine of precedent has also suffered a significant erosion in
power. Formerly, precedents were followed by courts and extremely
difficult to change.1 39  Subsequently, precedents came to be viewed as
flexible guidelines, which courts of equal rank could alter when necessary
to fix past mistakes, 141 or abandon to help law to grow and to adapt.
14
'
Eventually precedents came to be seen by some merely as objects of
strategic manipulation employed by skilled judicial craftspersons-a
workbench of tools used to conceal the true mechanism for reaching his or
her desired result beneath a veneer of legitimacy.1 42 Now, precedents are
138 Schauer, supra note 132, at 574.
139 See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at 69-70 ("For it is an established rule to abide by former
precedents, where the same points come again in litigation[,] ... because the law in that case being
solemnly declared and determined, what before was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become
a permanent rule, which it is not in the breast of any subsequent judge to alter or vary from, according
to his private sentiments.... Yet this rule admits of exception, where the former determination is most
evidently contrary to reason; much more if it be clearly contrary to the divine law."); LORD DENNING,
THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW 285 (1979) ("In the latter part of the 19th century, the law held firmly to the
doctrine of stare decisis .... ").
140 See Posner, supra note 8, at 585 ("By rejecting strict stare decisis American judges have
empowered themselves to alter doctrine to keep abreast of changing circumstances."); see also
Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 28 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the age of the
rule announced in a previous case "does not justify its continued existence. Stare decisis certainly does
not require a court to perpetuate a wrong for which it was responsible .... "); Lord Wright of Durley,
Precedents, 4 U. TORONTO L.J. 247, 276 (1942) ("No Court will be anxious to repudiate a precedent. It
will do so only if it is completely satisfied that the precedent is erroneous. If the Court is so satisfied, it
is a humiliation which ought not to be put upon it to reproduce and to perpetuate the error.").
141 Indyka v. Indyka, [1966] 3 All E.R. 583, 591 ("It is the function of courts to mould the
common law and to adapt it to the changing society for which it provides the rules of each man's duty
to his neighbour."); United Australia, Ltd. v. Barclays Bank, Ltd., [1941] A.C. 1, 29 (Lord Atkin)
("When these ghosts of the past stand in the path ofjustice cranking their mediaeval chains the proper
course for the judge is to pass through them undeterred.").
142 See ARTHUR R. HOGUE, ORIGINS OF THE COMMON LAW 11 (1985) ("Courts resort to a legal
fiction or grasp at a mere hint of an analogy-anything to avoid open confession that they are pouring
new wine into old bottles."); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES, at
x (1929) ("Every lawyer knows that a prior case may, at the will of the court, 'stand' either for the
narrowest point to which its holding may be reduced, or for the widest formulation that its ratio
decidendi will allow."); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
75-91 (1960) (presenting a taxonomy of the tools for analyzing precedent); JULIUS STONE, THE
PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 193 (1950) (describing precedents as "pegs on which to hang [a]
judgment," rather than as the actual basis for a decision). The profusion of case law may have made
this easier. 1 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW, at ix (1904) ("A judge may decide almost any question any way, and still be supported by an
array of cases.").
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overturned more frequently than before. 43 In fact, stare decisis has been
so weakened that some have proclaimed it dead.' 44 While that may be a bit
of an exaggeration-precedent still determines the outcome of many cases,
especially below the Supreme Court level-most observers agree that "the
doctrine of stare decisis has appreciably eroded."'
145
One development that has contributed to undermining stare decisis is
courts' increasing reliance on dicta, rather than holding, in applying
previous decisions. Strictly speaking, the holding of a case is limited to the
facts plus the outcome. Dicta, on the other hand, is anything in a judicial
opinion that is not part of the holding.146 Dicta can help future courts by
clarifying a complicated subject or signaling the future direction of the
law. 147 Unfortunately, however, courts have lapsed into regularly elevating
dicta into holding. 148 The potential diminution in quality this causes is a
concern,149 but the practice also makes the common law process more
future-oriented in two ways. First, establishing prospective rules in dicta
frees courts from limits imposed by the facts and questions presented by a
particular case, thus enabling them to set their own agenda and quasi-
legislate. 150  Second, by relying on dicta rather than holding, a later court
permits the earlier court to determine the effect of the earlier court's
decision. That function, however, is supposed to be the responsibility of
the later court.'51
Another factor sapping the strength of stare decisis is an uptick in
overruling. The United States Supreme Court furnishes a striking example
of how much more willing courts are to overrule past decisions than they
used to be. Of 219 Supreme Court cases overruled from 1789 to 1999, a
' See EISENBERG, supra note 119, at 135 ("It is widely perceived that the pace of overruling has
dramatically increased in the last forty years."); Jim Chen, Judicial Epochs in Supreme Court History:
Sifting Through the Fossil Record for Stitches in Time and Switches in Nine, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 677,
730 (2003) ("[O]verruling is primarily a phenomenon of the twentieth century.") (footnote omitted);
Fred W. Catlett, The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which It Should
Be Applied, 21 WASH. L. REV. & ST. B.J. 158, 168 (1946) ("Nor can it be denied that there is apparent
in the courts of last resort, at the present time, less regard for precedent and prior decision and a greater
inclination to examine a question anew in the light of present day conditions ....").
1"See Earl M. Maltz, Commentary, Some Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in
Constitutional Law, 1980 WIs. L. REV. 467, 494-96 (listing forty-seven pairs of overruled and
overruling decisions from 1960 through 1979).
145 JAMES ET AL., supra note 22, at 680; SCALIA, supra note 90, at 12.
146 MORRIS L. COHEN ET AL., How To FIND THE LAW 16 (9th ed. 1989); Judith M. Stinson, Why
Dicta Becomes Holding and Why It Matters, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 219, 223 (2010).
147 Pierre N. Leval, Lecture, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1249, 1253 (2006).
148 Stinson, supra note 146, at 221; Leval, supra note 147, at 1269.
149 Stinson, supra note 146, at 221; Leval, supra note 147, at 1255.
'so Stinson, supra note 146, at 228.
151 See United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 69 n.2 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J.) ("A judge's power
to bind is limited to the issue that is before him; he cannot transmute dictum into decision by waving a
wand and uttering the word 'hold.'").
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period of 210 years, just twenty-eight overrulings occurred during the first
105 years (1789-1894). During the second 105 years (1895-1999), by
contrast, there were 191 overrulings, nearly seven times (6.82) as many.
Similarly, while the overall average was 1.04 overrulings per year, the
average number of overrulings per year during the first fifty years of the
period (1789-1838) was just 0.06, while the average number of overrulings
per year during the most recent fifty years of the period (1950-1999) was
2.46.52 Other courts have displayed a similar pattern.'
53
When a court overrules a precedent, it adopts a more future-oriented
perspective. It looks to the needs of the future, rather than to the decisions
of the past, to determine what the law "is." Because overruling has
become more frequent, the common law has become more future-oriented.
Some recent forms of judicial decision-making, however, are even
more future-oriented than overruling. In the last fifty years or so, courts
have occasionally engaged in a practice called "prospective overruling."
At least three variations of this practice have been identified. "Pure
prospective overruling" occurs when a court announces a new rule, but
does not apply it in the case before it. "Prospective overruling" occurs
when a court announces a new rule, but makes it applicable only to
incidents which occur after a specified future date. "Explicit signaling"
occurs when a court applies the old rule in the case before it, but describes
the new rule and states its intention to apply the new rule in future cases.
15 4
When courts engage in any form of prospective overruling, they
announce that a precedent is overruled, but they decline to apply the new
rule of law to the case before them.15 5 Prospective overruling allows a
court to quickly promulgate general, forward-looking rules like a
legislature, rules that a court might be reluctant to announce if it had to
apply them retrospectively to the parties before it (even though the change
might represent a badly needed reform) because doing so might punish
152 See Chen, supra note 142, at 721, 722 tbl.7; Amy L. Padden, Note, Overruling Decisions in
the Supreme Court: The Role of a Decision's Vote, Age, and Subject Matter in the Application of Stare
Decisis After Payne v. Tennessee, 82 GEO. L.J. 1689, 1715 (1994) (noting that the Supreme Court
overruled eighty-four cases between 1970 and 1993).
1 See, e.g., Charles N.W. Keckler, The Hazards of Precedent: A Parameterization of Legal
Change, 80 MiSS. L.J. 1, 123 & tbl.l (2010) (reporting that the Illinois Supreme Court overruled 504 of
its prior decisions from 1819 to 2005, a period of 186 years, and that 360 (or 71.4%) of these
overrulings occurred during the period 1951 through 2005, the last 54 years of that span).
"' See EISENBERG, supra note 119, at 127-28 (explaining prospective overruling and explicit
signaling).
5 See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622, 628 (1965) (prospectively overruling a
previous decision, and acknowledging that "[a]t common law there was no authority for the proposition
that judicial decisions made law only for the future," but stating that "in appropriate cases the Court
may in the interest of'justice make the rule prospective").
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those who relied in good faith on the stability of the pre-existing law. 156
This practice has been criticized on the ground that it "crosses the Rubicon
that divides the judicial and the legislative powers."' 57  Putting aside
questions about its legitimacy,158 by freeing the common law from the
prohibition on making rules for the future, prospective overruling
represents another way in which common law adjudication has become
quasi-legislative, and thus more future-oriented in character.
59
Courts also increasingly engage in "anticipatory overruling." A lower
court utilizing this technique declines to follow an apparently binding
precedent of a higher court because the lower court believes that the higher
court will overrule the precedent as soon as it has the opportunity to do
so.
160 In employing this arguably illegitimate technique,'16 the lower court
is essentially predicting what the higher court eventually will do, and
conforming its decision to that prediction rather than to precedent.
162
" 
6 See Kenneth Diplock, The Courts as Legislators, in THE LAWYER AND JUSTICE 281, 281
(1978) (noting that the retrospective application ofjudicial decisions was one reason why courts were
reluctant to correct past errors or adapt to changing circumstances).
157 Lord Devlin, Judges and Lawmakers, 39 MOD. L. REV. 1, 11 (1976); see also EISENBERG,
supra note 119, at 131 ("[l]f the court adopts the technique of pure prospective overruling and refuses
to apply the new rule even to the immediate transaction, it breaks the intimate tie between the dispute-
settlement and rule-enrichment functions."); Shannon, supra note 136, at 841 ("[P]rospectivity-based
approaches are quite inconsistent with [a] basic understanding of the nature of the adjudicative
function."). But see Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1080 (1997) ("[N]o independent constitutional authority [exists] for the
proposition that retroactivity is a definitive component of the judicial power.").
158 Compare Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 105 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("Prospective decisionmaking is the handmaid of judicial activism, and the born enemy of
stare decisis."), with Albert Kocourek & Harold Koven, Renovation of the Common Law Through
Stare Decisis, 29 ILL. L. REV. 971, 996 (1935) ("If overruling a prior decision has not been condemned
as amounting to judicial legislation, it is difficult to see how giving an overruling decision prospective
effect only, would be any more a matter of legislation.").
159 See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 536 (1991), superseded on other
grounds Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 476,
105 Stat. 2236 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (observing that prospective overruling
"tends to relax the force of precedent, by minimizing the costs of overruling, and thereby allows the
courts to act with a freedom comparable to that of legislatures").
16o See Margaret N. Kniffin, Overruling Supreme Court Precedents: Anticipatory Action by the
United States Courts of Appeals, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 57 (1982) ("Anticipatory
overruling... occurs when a lower court departs from a higher court's decision embodying a rule of
law that the higher court has not repudiated either explicitly or by implication.").
161 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) ("[flt is this Court's prerogative alone to
overrule one of its own precedents."). But see United States v. Girouard, 149 F.2d 760, 765 (1st Cir.
1945) (Woodbury, J., dissenting) (claiming that judges sometimes have the duty of prophesy thrust
upon us because "[n]othing is to be gained by our deciding a question contrary to the way we think the
Supreme Court would decide it"), rev'd 328 U.S. 61 (1946); Maurice Kelman, The Force of Precedent
in the Lower Courts, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 3, 28 (1967) ("Judges must be alert to the fact that a rule can
lose its force without formal repudiation .... [T]he lower courts should not shrink from declaring that
an implied overruling has taken place and should in that event give full effect to the change.").
162 See DWORKIN, supra note 9, at 36 (explaining that according to the prediction model, lawyers
try to predict what judges will do and judges try to predict what the "path" of the law is); Evan H.
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Accordingly, this practice tends to diminish the force of stare decisis and
makes the lawmaking process more predictive in nature.163  Of course,
calling this "overruling" is a misnomer because a lower court cannot
actually "overrule" a decision of a higher court, but the practice does
eviscerate the precedential effect of the higher court decision unless and
until the higher court revives it.
Common law updating usually proceeds slowly and haphazardly,
164
partly because courts cannot initiate litigation, but instead must wait for a
suitable case to happen along. 65  Therefore, if a court makes a bad
decision, it may be decades before the unsound legal principle it
established can be erased. Prospective overruling and anticipatory
overruling help to mitigate this shortcoming. These tools allow courts to
change course more quickly when altered circumstances require it, or to
correct mistakes as soon as they are recognized as such. They partly free
courts from dependence on happenstance and the initiative of private
litigants.
A related development was the Judges' Bill of 1925, which gave the
Supreme Court the discretionary power to choose which cases it would
decide. t66 Prior to that time, the Supreme Court had to decide whatever
cases came to it within the bounds set by Congress. 67 The Judges' Bill of
1925 made the Supreme Court a bit more like a legislature than a
traditional court because it empowered the Supreme Court to set its own
agenda. As one commentator has observed:
How different the judicial function has become since
the Judges' Bill created a power to choose which matters
Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking,
73 TEx. L. REV. 1, 78 (1994) ("The understandable desire to avoid such psychological and professional
costs [of reversal] might well influence inferior court judges to decide cases in accord with their
expectations about appellate court behavior.").
163 Compare Caminker, supra note 162, at 82 (endorsing this technique and arguing that "[t]he
orthodox view that prediction is inherently incompatible with the judicial function must be revisited"),
with Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 715 (1995) (criticizing
this technique because "the prediction model undermines the rule of law by over-emphasizing the role
of individual judges").
164 See HOROWITZ, supra note 118, at 39 ("[A]djudication proceeds by fits and starts, now too
early, now too late, only occasionally well timed."); M. D. A. Freeman, Standards of Adjudication,
Judicial Law-Making and Prospective Overruling, 26 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 166, 179 (1973)
("[J]udges develop the law incrementally.").
165 Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 385 (1978)
(quoting an unnamed German socialist critic as stating that "courts are like defective clocks; they have
to be shaken to set them going").
66 Judiciary Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, § 237, 43 Stat. 936,937.
167 Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the
Judges' Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1649 (2000); see also Kathryn A. Watts, Constraining
Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7-14 (2011) (chronicling the
evolution of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction from obligatory to almost entirely discretionary).
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our highest court would hear! Decision is no longer a
necessity, nor new law merely its by-product. A court
with certiorari authority is not merely able, but is expected,
to choose its targets with reference to what law seems
most important to enunciate. Having thousands of
petitions from which to select, say, one hundred
controversies for decision enables judges to have agendas.
It encourages them to speak more broadly than the
particular facts before them require, counsel against that as
we may. It permits them to defend themselves against the
inconvenience of facts that might appear to compel
movement opposite to the direction they prefer. And, thus,
it inevitably heightens our sense that in appointing judges
we are appointing lawmakers and should be concerned
with the kind of law they are likely to make. Freed from
the discipline of the unavoidable call of justice, lured by
the opportunity, perhaps even felt as responsibility, to
speak broadly, the judge can shape her agenda as she
chooses. 168
The Judges' Bill of 1925, then, was a significant step toward liberating
Supreme Court justices from some of the traditional restraints on common
law adjudication. It also encouraged them to see themselves more as
legislators than as judges. And lower courts have tended to emulate their
example.
Taken together, these developments have caused confusion about what
precedents mean and how long they last. As Roscoe Pound explained:
The layman seems to think a certain number of cases were
decided back in the time of the Plantagenets and were laid
down in a fossilized state in the Middle Ages and from
time to time are dug up and are used as the measure of
decision in controversies of Twentieth Century America.
Now, the fact is, as far as rules are concerned, the life
of a rule of law in the strict sense is relatively short. I had
occasion in 1924, at the request of a committee of the
American Bar Association, to investigate the reports
beginning in 1774, at intervals of fifty years, down to
1924, and the thing that struck me as I went on with that,
and could be shown conclusively as I had finished it, was
168 Peter L. Strauss, Lecture, Courts or Tribunals? Federal Courts and the Common Law, 53
ALA. L. REv. 891, 896-97 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
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that the general run of rules of law.., had a life of simply
169one generation. Fifty years is a long life for a rule ....
Thus, the law's memory of precedents is actually rather brief-typically no
more than twenty to thirty years.
Even this, however, may exaggerate the durability of precedents. The
precedential value of a decision erodes rapidly as time passes. One
measure of the transience of precedent is the length of the period of time
during which particular precedents are cited. 170 As it turns out, most cases
cited by courts are less than ten years old. According to one study, the
probability that the California Supreme Court will cite one of its prior
decisions as a precedent is reduced by fifty percent every seven years. The
half-life of precedent, then, is short. 71  "[Als with people, the life
expectancy of a statute, and of a judicial decision too, is relatively low
right after birth, becomes very high after the rule has survived for a few
years, and then diminishes as it ages." 172 Because the pace of legal change
and the degradation of the value of precedents have continued to accelerate
since those studies were performed, it is reasonable to assume that the
common law's long-term memory of itself has gotten even worse. What is
most telling on that score, of course, is not just whether courts prefer to cite
more recent cases, but whether their preference for more recent cases
became stronger from, say, 1900 to 2000. Empirical studies indicate that it
169 Roscoe Pound, Address, Survey of the Conference Problems, 14 U. CIN. L. REV. 324, 328-29
(1940).
170 Simply because recent cases are cited does not mean that the old ones are no longer good
authority. Some old cases may live on because whether they are cited in more recently decided cases
or not, the rule that they established is followed in the most recently decided cases. Thus, the
overruling of an old case may be a better measure of obsolescence of a legal rule than is a diminishing
rate of citation. Nevertheless, a diminishing rate of citation is one indication of depreciation in the
value of a precedent.
171 See John Henry Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation
Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50S. CAL. L. REV. 381,395 & n.l 1
(1977) (concluding that "there is a predictable property that might be called the 'citation half-life' of
earlier California Supreme Court decisions, i.e., that the statistical probability of citation of a case by
the court is reduced by 50% (at least from 1880 forward) every x years." And noting that "x has, on the
average, an approximate value of 7 years. That is to say, the probability that any decision of the
California Supreme Court will be cited by that court as an authority is reduced by one-half every 7
years or so."). More recent studies of courts in other states have demonstrated that the phenomenon is
widespread. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 255 (1976) ("In the 1974-1975 court of appeals sample, half
of the citations to Supreme Court and other-court decisions were less than 9.8 and 4.3 years old,
respectively .... In the 1974 Supreme Court sample, the half lives of Supreme Court and other-court
decisions were 13 and 5.4 years respectively ...."); Richard A. Mann, The North Carolina Supreme
Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 44 (1979) (explaining that a study of
North Carolina case citation practices revealed that "47.2% of the cases cited ... were no more than
seven years old and 69.6% were seventeen years old or less").
172 CALABRESI, supra note 21, at 132 (footnote omitted).
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Often, the law's memory of its history is determinative of common law
legal doctrine, 174 but sometimes it is merely window-dressing, a style of
discourse adopted to justify and legitimize a decision that it is actually
based on something else, such as forward-looking notions of public
policy.175 As an example, scholars have concluded that the Supreme Court
justices in both the majority and in the dissent often contend that history
supports their opposing conclusions, which miraculously usually happen to
be consistent with their preexisting policy preferences. 176  Sometimes
history really is the true basis of decision, but sometimes it simply provides
a convenient rationalization.1
77
As an example, when the Supreme Court overrules a previous
interpretation of the Constitution, it usually is predicting rather than
remembering, even if it justifies the outcome by providing historical
reasons in its opinion. There may have been advances in the discipline of
history during the past two hundred years, but they have not been dramatic.
With every passing day we become further removed from the
circumstances and the world view of the Founders. There is no reason to
believe that we are any better at divining their intent today than we were
ten years ago, much less 150 years ago. When the Supreme Court changes
its interpretation of the Constitution, it is almost always updating its
173 See A. Michael Beaird, Citations to Authority by the Arkansas Appellate Courts, 1950-2000,
25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 301, 319, 338 (2003) (stating that from 1950 to 2000, "the total
percentage of Arkansas Supreme Court citations less than twenty years old increased from 50% to
85%" and from 1980 to 2000 "Arkansas Court of Appeals citations show the same pattern-recent case
citations increased from 66% to 82%"); William H. Manz, The Citation Practices of the New York
Court of Appeals, 1850-1993, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 121, 136 (1995) ("[T]he court's preference for its own
most recent opinions has existed since its inception. In every sample year since 1850, cases from the
immediately preceding decade outnumbered those from any other period. This practice has become
more pronounced in the 1980 and 1990 sample years, in which over 50% of all cases cited in the
court's opinions dated from the past ten years.").
174 See ZANDER, supra note 122, at 215 ("It is difficult to conceive of a legal system in which
precedent plays no part at all."); Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the
Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 60 (1965) ("[lt is certainly true that courts in
general handle the vast bulk of cases by application of preexisting law.").
175 See CARDOZO, supra note 14, at 66 ("Logic and history and custom have their place. We will
shape the law to conform to them when we may; but only within bounds. The end which the law serves
will dominate them all."); LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 9 (1993) (noting "the
pressures that operate on judges to write decisively and to limit what they say to certain acceptable
argumentation").
1
76 See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 75 (1997) ("[B]oth Rehnquist and
Brennan tended to reach results compatible with their ideological positions when they employed
historical arguments.") (summarizing John B. Gates & Glenn A. Phelps, Internationalism in
Constitutional Opinions, 49 POL. REs. Q. 245,257 (1996)).
"'See Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1373 (1990) ("The
dominant rhetoric ofjudges, even activist judges, is originalist, for originalism is the legal profession's
orthodox mode ofjustification.").
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understanding of the meaning of the text based upon its perception of what
will be best for the nation in the future in light of the changes in
circumstances since the founding or since its previous decision containing
the interpretation which it is modifying or repudiating. Very rarely can it
honestly be said that something new has been discovered-such as
additional notes taken during the debates on the Constitution-that shed
fresh light on what the Founders (or the citizens who ratified the
Constitution) had in mind.171
As the needs of society have evolved, the role of courts has shifted.
Among other things, courts have become increasingly involved in
institutional reform litigation, an arena that thrusts the judge into a role that
differs from the traditional model of adjudication. For example, a lawsuit
that arises out of a persistent failure to meet constitutional standards in
schools or prisons, and aims to reshape those institutions by means of a
permanent injunction or consent decree designed to ensure that such
standards will be met in the future. In such a lawsuit the judge acts not
only as a judge, but also (in some respects) as the administrator of a
government entity. While traditional litigation is retrospective in the sense
that it is tied to the parties before the court and to facts that happened in the
past, institutional reform litigation is more future-oriented. Although it
springs from dissatisfaction with past conduct, and may focus on
preventing its re-occurrence, its explicit goal is to establish rules to govern
the future conduct of an institution. As a result, in institutional reform
litigation "the trial judge has passed beyond even the role of the legislator
and has become a policy planner and manager."' 7 9 Because the litigation
focuses more on an ongoing process of institutional change than upon the
contours of a biparty dispute about past events, institutional reform
litigation is more forward-looking than is traditional litigation.' 80 Although
178 See Emil A. Kleinhaus, Note, History as Precedent: The Post-Originalist Problem in
Constitutional Law, 110 YALE L.J. 121, 141 (2000) ("Justices who lived closer in time to the Framers
were surely in a better position to interpret the Framers' language and grasp the Framers' worldview
than their successors.") (footnote omitted). But see Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of
Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 633 n.17 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Supreme Court's
1868 interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause should be abandoned because the author of the
earlier opinion "seems not to have had in his arsenal many of the historical materials cited above" and
because "our appreciation of[] such documents has increased over time").
179 Abraham Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1281,
1302 (1976); see also HOROwITz, supra note 118, at 7 ("Litigation is now more explicitly problem-
solving than grievance-answering. The individual litigant, though still necessary, has tended to fade a
bit into the background.").
180 David Zaring, National Rulemaking Through Trial Courts: The Big Case and Institutional
Reform, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1015, 1019 (2004) (stating that institutional reform litigation "create[s] a
forward-looking relationship involving both the court and the litigants, rather than a backward-looking
resolution by a court regarding a dispute between litigants"); see also id. at 1077-78 ("Institutional
reform litigation can create trends and links across cases that may result in the widespread adoption of
2012]
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institutional reform litigation comprises only a small percentage of all
litigation, its scale makes its consequences highly significant, and its
increasing frequency in recent years has contributed to making law more
future-oriented.
Another consequence of changing societal needs is that judges have
been spending larger amounts of time on so-called "untraditional
activities."''81 The ascendency of so-called collaborative, therapeutic, or
problem-solving courts provides an example of this expansion of the
judicial role. 182  These include such quasi-judicial fora as drug courts,
juvenile delinquency courts, and the like.183  In these settings, trial court
judges work closely with social services agencies in an ongoing attempt to
fashion long-term changes in a party's future behavior. The creation of
these courts represents a revolution in the way in which the judiciary
conducts its business.
84
Finally, the increasing globalization of the legal community has
increased the pace of legal change. Courts all over the world are creating
new legal doctrine, and their work is rapidly available to courts in other
countries. The result is a cascade of cross-fertilization, 185  which-
whatever its other advantages or disadvantages 186 -tends to accelerate the
common approaches to governance that, if patchy in spots, would look to any outside observer like
national standards.").
181 JUDICIAL COUNSEL OF CAL., JUSTICE IN Focus: THE STRATEGIC PLAN FOR CALIFORNIA
JUDICIAL BRANCH 2006-2012 14 (2007), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/
strategic_plan 2006-2012-full.pdf ("Court users increasingly look to the courts to do more than resolve
legal issues or dispose of cases. Instead, they expect court decisions to promote effective outcomes that
help them resolve underlying problems. These expectations demand innovations in programs and
services, including problem-solving and treatment-oriented courts.").
182 See Susan Daicoff, Law as a Healing Profession: The "Comprehensive Law Movement," 6
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 33-34 (2006) (presenting a chart summarizing the differences between
traditional and "transformed" court processes); Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, Drug Treatment
Court: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Applied, in JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS 106, 106 (Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler eds., 2003)
(describing therapeutic jurisprudence as an effort to develop "a more comprehensive, humane, and
psychologically optimal way of handling legal matters").
183 Wendy Lindley, Collaborative Courts: The Model For Therapeutic Justice, 20 CAL. LITIG. 28,
35 (2007).
18 See Frank V. Williams, HI, Reinventing the Courts: The Frontiers of Judicial Activism in the
State Courts, 29 CAMPBELL L. REv. 591, 594 (2007) ("Judges and a variety of activists working with
them are effectively redefining the judicial power in response, they argue, to the changing social
context by adding an expanded repertoire of therapeutic techniques to solve a broad range of social,
economic and political problems among individuals and entire communities. Judges are transitioning
from decision makers to life changers, employing new techniques to manipulate individuals and entire
communities for the purpose of modifying individual and collective life.").
185 Noga Morag-Levine, Judges, Legislators, and Europe's Law: Common-Law Constitutionalism
and Foreign Precedents, 65 MD. L. REv. 32, 32 (2006) ("With the rise of powerful judiciaries outside
the United States, court opinions have emerged as a novel avenue for cross-national importation of
law.").
186 See Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Law, LEGAL AFFAIRS, July-Aug.
2004, at 40-41 (detailing the problems that arise when a foreign legal decision is relied on as
precedent).
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rate of legal change.18
Therefore, common law adjudication always has been less past-
oriented than is widely thought, and it has become even less so in recent
decades. 88 But as future-oriented as common law adjudication turns out to
be, it is inherently less future-oriented than a form of lawmaking that has
been rapidly crowding it out: namely, legislating.
t8 9
D. The Multiplication of Statutes
Statutory law lies at the opposite end of the lawmaking spectrum from
common law. It is inherently future-oriented. Aristotle said that "[a]
member of a democratic assembly is an example of one judging about
future happenings."' 90 Plato added that "[w]hen we legislate, we make our
laws with the idea that they will be advantageous in time to come.
More recently, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. jokingly described statutes as
"scattered prophecies of the past upon the cases in which the axe will
fall." 
92
Consistent with their future-orientedness, statutes are almost never
retroactive. 193 Statutes also are not "precedents" for future statutes. 194 No
one would argue that a legislature is forbidden from modifying or
repealing a statute simply because the statute had previously been enacted.
A later legislature is free to make whatever changes it wishes, regardless of
attempts by an earlier legislature to tie its hands, subject only to relatively
187 See Thomas L. Friedman, It's a Flat World, After All, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 3, 2005, at 33
("[W]e are now in the process of connecting all the knowledge pools in the world together.... T]he
upside is that by connecting all of these knowledge pools we are on the cusp of an incredible new era of
innovation ...').
188 See Jay M. Feinman, Un-Making Law: The Classical Revival in the Common Law, 28
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) ("Contracts, torts and property have ancient origins, but most of their
history is barely relevant to understanding modem law."); Thomas Healey, Stare Decisis as a
Constitutional Requirement, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 43, 73 (2001) (arguing that American courts "from
their earliest years... demonstrated a marked preference for adaptability over certainty").
189 See J.A.G. GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF THE JUDICIARY 327-28 (4th ed. 1991) ("Judges are
concerned to preserve and to protect the existing order. This does not mean that no judges are capable
of moving with the times, of adjusting to changed circumstances. But their finction in our society is to
do so belatedly.").
190 ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 1.3.1358a36-b5; see also Scharffs, supra note 117, at 758 (stating that
in "the legislative context ... the emphasis is upon deliberating about the future").
191 Plato, Theaetetus 178a.
192 Holmes, supra note 30, at 461.
193 Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 311-12 (1994) ("The principle that statutes
operate only prospectively, while judicial decisions operate retrospectively, is familiar to every law
student .. ") (quoting United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79 (1982)).
114 DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 109 (1994) ("Statutes exert no precedential force on
legislators whatsoever, and the attitude of respect for past decisions ... is wholly absent."); Holmes,
supra note 5, at 444 ("As soon as a legislature is able to imagine abolishing the requirement of a
consideration for a simple contract, it is at perfect liberty to abolish it . . . without the slightest regard to
continuity with the past.").
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loose constitutional restrictions concerning retroactivity. 195
Unlike courts, which are designed primarily to apply or interpret
existing law, legislatures are designed to create entirely new law or to
modify existing law. This distinction in theory leads to a difference in
performance.
The institutional framework within which a legislature
operates may facilitate transitions more easily than is the
case with judicial efforts, simply because the act of
making change is less likely to be perceived as antithetical
to the enterprise in which the rule-maker is engaged. The
very fact that our common law system is defined as one
predicated on precedent and horizontal equity suggests that
deviation from established rules requires substantial
justification. Judges who engage in too much distinction
of precedent face the risk that they will be considered as
operating contrary to the objectives for which the system is
created.
Legislatures, on the other hand, are expected to reform
and revise law, and the fact that their rules apply
prospectively means that their changes do not easily
offend the principle of treating similar cases
similarly.... The signal implicit in this arrangement is
that legislatures are supposed to adapt to new
circumstances and adjust legal doctrine when alternatives
superior to the status quo arise. Thus, we can expect that
those institutional features of a precedential system that
might promote lock-in in the common law will be reversed
in the legislative arena.'
96
Even with respect to legislation, however, past or future-orientedness
is a matter of degree. "Legislative deliberation is not limited to
deliberating about the future; past experience and present perspectives will
be relevant."' 97 Moreover, statutes usually are not written on a perfectly
clean slate. Instead, they are written by people who have learned
something about previous problems and previous attempts at solving those
problems, and their experience inevitably affects what they write.
195 See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 135 (1810) ("[Olne legislature cannot abridge the powers of a
succeeding legislature."); I BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at *90 ("Acts of parliament derogatory from
the power of subsequent parliaments bind not.").
196 Gillette, supra note 11, at 827.
197 Scharffs, supra note 117, at 758.
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Nevertheless, it is fair to say that legislation is primarily future-oriented.' 9t
During the past century, American lawmaking spurned the common
law and embraced statutory law. As Guido Calabresi explained: "The last
fifty to eighty years have seen a fundamental change in American law. In
this time we have gone from a legal system dominated by the common law,
divined by courts, to one in which statutes, enacted by legislatures, have
become the primary source of law."' 99 His view is widely shared.200 As a
,,201consequence of this tectonic shift, now, "we live in a world of statutes.
In fact, some have warned that because of the proliferation of statutes, the
"death of the common law is near at hand.,
20 2
As an example, consider the unannotated version of the United States
Code. It grew from two volumes (six inches wide) to twenty-nine volumes
(six feet wide) between 1928 and 1988.2o3 This means that as of 1988,
198 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 513 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) ("Legislatures are primarily policy making bodies that promulgate
rules to govern future conduct."); EISENBERG, supra note 119, at 9 ("[T]he primary function of the
legislature is to make rules to govern the future."); LUBAN, supra note 194, at 109 ("[T]he attitude of
legislatures is properly forward-looking and consequentialist, not traditionalist."); Scharffs, supra note
117, at 758 ("[T]he focus of legislation is on the future.").199 CALABRESI, supra note 21, at 1; JOHN V. ORTH, How MANY JUDGES DOES IT TAKE TO MAKE
A SUPREME COURT? AND OTHER ESSAYS ON LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIoN, at x-xi (2006) ("Although
statutes have been known almost (but not quite) since the beginning of the common law 800 years ago,
they became a predominant part of the common-law system only in the last century or two.").
200 Allan C. Hutchinson & Derek Morgan, Calabresian Sunset: Statutes In the Shade, 82 COLUM.
L. REv. 1752, 1753 (1982) (reviewing CALABRESi, supra note 21) ("The distinguishing feature of
twentieth century legal history has been the shift from the common law to statutes as the major source
of law."); Ellen Ash Peters, Common Law Judging in a Statutory World: An Address, 43 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 995, 996 (1982) ("[B]y the end of this century, our legal landscape will be one in which statutes
of one kind or another will be, not just occasional landmarks, but the dominant features on the map.");
Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REV. 863, 863 (1930) ("Anglo-American law is in a
fair way of becoming statutory [as a result of] the relentless annual or biennial grinding of more than
fifty legislative machines.").
201 Strauss, supra note 62, at 239.
202 Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., 177 N.W.2d 513, 523 (Wis. 1970) (Hallows, J., dissenting).
203 Robert C. Ellickson, Taming Leviathan: Will the Centralizing Tide of the Twentieth Century
Continue into the Twenty-First?, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 101, 105 (2000). Of course, the volume of court
decisions has been increasing as well. James W. Torke, Lecture, What is This Thing Called the Rule of
Law?, 34 IND. L. REV. 1445, 1452 n.38 (2001) ("In 1926, six volumes of approximately 1000 pages per
volume of the Federal Reporter were published. In 1997, twenty-seven volumes at 1600 pages per
volume were issued."). These data arguably understate the growth in case law, because a growing
percentage of appellate court decisions are not published. Cappalli, supra note 133, at 757-58 ("[T]he
number of non-precedential opinions currently outnumber by far the ones that count as authority,
reaching a four-to-one ratio in the federal circuits as a whole."). The growth in the number of
published court decisions does not undercut this Article's thesis for at least three reasons. First, court
decisions themselves are becoming more future-oriented. See discussion supra Section II.C. Second,
legislation is a more efficient way of creating legal rules. See Frank I. Michelman, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
431,442-43 (1980) (using the Uniform Commercial Code as an example of statutory efficiency and
arguing that "[w]henever there is no reasonably clear competing interpretation of a statute, self-
interested judges can hardly do better than support that the community of legislative traders has acted
on its shared interest in the efficiency of the legal background"). Third, most cases decided by courts
20121
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Congress had created about twelve times as much statutory law during the
last fifty years as it had created during the preceding 150 years. The same
trend is apparent in individual states,2°4 and the United Kingdom. °5
As a result of this "orgy of statute making,'
20 6
the relationship between statutes and common law cases
has taken a turn of nearly 180 degrees from the point at
which we appear to have started at the beginning of the
century. Statutes are now central to the law in the courts,
and judicial lawmaking must take statutes into account
virtually all of the time.2 °7
In short, law has become "statutorified.
' 208
This is a drastic departure from the past. Originally, legislatures were
designed not as devices to enact good laws, but rather to prevent the
enactment of bad laws.20 9 In more recent eras, legislatures were thought to
be doing too little, and to be leaving excessive latitude to the courts.
2 0
When statutes became more common, they were initially viewed (at least
by judges) as clumsy intrusions into the lawmaking prerogatives of the
courts. 2 11  Today, the relative positions of the courts and the legislature
are based upon statutes rather than common law. Peters, supra note 200, at 996 (estimating that only
ten percent of the cases filed in the Connecticut Supreme Court are "purely common law" and that
statutes are "relevant [to] if not determinative of" the remaining ninety percent).
204 See Torke, supra note 203, at 1452 n.38 ("In 1947, Indiana Acts amounted to 1800 pages; in
1997, 4500 pages.").
205 See DENNING, supra note 139, at 9 ("In almost every case on which you have to advise you
will have to interpret a statute. There are stacks and stacks of them. Far worse for you than for me.
When I was called [to the Bar] in 1923 there was one volume of 500 pages. Now in 1978 there are
three volumes of more than 3,000 pages.").
206 GILMORE, supra note 21, at 95.
207 Peters, supra note 200, at 998.
20s CALABRESI, supra note 21, at 7 (terming this trend "statutorification").
20 9 See Richard Neeley, Obsolete Statutes, Structural Due Process, and the Power of Courts to
Demand a Second Legislative Look, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 271, 273 (1982) (reviewing CALABRESI, supra
note 2 1) (noting that the motto of primitive English legislatures was "traditionally translated, 'the laws
of England shall never change').
210 2 JOHN AUSTIN, Lecture XXXVI: Jus Praetorium and English Equity Compared, in LECTURES
ON JURISPRUDENCE 625, 632 (Robert Campbell ed., 3d. ed. 1869) ("In almost every community, such
has been the incapacity, or such the negligence, of the sovereign legislature, that unless the work of
legislation had been performed mainly by subordinate judges, it would not have been performed at all,
or would have been performed most inefficiently: with regard to a multitude of most important
subjects, the society would have lived without law; and with regard to a multitude of others, the law
would have remained in pristine barbarity.").
211 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 316 (1973) ("Legislation, whatever
its subject, was a threat to... [judge's] primordial functions, molding and declaring law. Statutes were
brute intrusions, local in scope, often short-sighted in principle or effect. They interfered in a legal
world that belonged, by right, to the judges. Particularly after 1870, judges may have seen themselves
more and more as guardians of a precious and threatened tradition.").
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have been reversed.
While common law decision-making proceeds incrementally and
typically is retroactive-at least to the extent that the rule announced in a
case is usually applied in that case, as well as in any other cases still open
on direct appellate review--statutory change, though more difficult to
achieve, can be avulsive,212 and usually operates entirely prospectively. A
statute can erase in a day legal doctrine that required centuries to evolve.
The difference between lawmaking by common law adjudication, on the
one hand, and lawmaking by legislation, on the other hand, is reminiscent
of changes that might occur in the contours of a sandy peninsula like Cape
Cod. Usually the shape of a beach changes slowly and imperceptibly, a
few grains of sand at a time. No change may be detected for years, or even
for decades. Eventually someone asks: "Doesn't the beach seem a little
wider here than it used to be?" It is still recognizable as the same beach,
but its shape has been subtly altered. This is the sort of change that
typically results from common law adjudication.213  Occasionally,
however, there is a dramatic change in the beach, such as the collapse of
gigantic cliff of sand onto the shore during a storm. The transformation is
immediate and unmistakable, and the new beach may seem like a different
place, entirely disconnected from the old beach. This is the sort of change
that typically results from legislation.
Courts do continue to play an important role in the interpretation and
application of statutes, especially since the constitutionality of nearly every
statute of any importance is now challenged in the courts.214  The
legislature, however, reigns supreme over statutory law, and usually can
215quickly overturn what it views as a judicial misinterpretation of a statute.
Obviously, then, "courts are less free in applying a statute than in dealing
212 See Norman Marsh, Law Reform in the United Kingdom: A New Institutional Approach, 13
WM. & MARY L. REV. 263, 269 (1971) ("Clearly there is less scope, at least for rapid change, where
that principle [i.e., stare decisis] prevails than by clean-sweeping enunciation by the legislature of some
new general principle.") (footnote omitted).
213 CARDOZO, supra note 14, at 25 ("[The common law] goes on inch by inch. Its effects must be
measured by decades and even centuries. Thus measured, they are seen to have behind them the power
and the pressure of the moving glacier.").2 14 See RICHARD A.L. GAMBITA, MARILYN L. MAX & JAMES FOSTER, GOVERNING THROUGH
COURTS 141 (1981) ("Courts make law more directly and boldly than simply through interpretation.
American courts make law by exercising the power ofjudicial review, scrutinizing the constitutionality
of legislative and executive actions.").
215 Congressional overrides of statutory judicial decisions are relatively infrequent. See William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331,
337, 338 tbl.l (1991) (listing the number of congressional overrides of federal statutory decisions
between 1967 and 1990). One recent empirical study, however, suggests that at least in the modem era,
each Congress typically overrides several of the Supreme Court's statutory decisions. See id. at 338
tbl. I (reporting that 124 of the Supreme Court's statutory decisions were overridden during the twelve
Congresses assembled between 1967 and 1990); see also id (estimating that the same Congresses
overrode or modified 220 statutory decisions by lower courts).
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with case law. 2 16  The degree of freedom, however, depends upon the
specificity of the statute.217 The more specific the statute, the less latitude
is left for courts. One scholar has explained the difference between
common law adjudication and adjudication involving statutory
interpretation and application as follows: "Where case law is considered,
there is a conscious realignment of cases; the problem is not the intention
of the prior judge. But with a statute the reference is to the kind of things
intended by the legislature. 218 It is as if the court is respectfully restoring
an ancient vase, rather than creating a vase of its own from scratch.219
Moreover, because the legislature can update a statute itself, if necessary,
courts feel less responsibility to update statutes than to update common law
precedents.22 °
Ironically, although statutory law is more future-oriented than is
common law adjudication, the predominance of statutory law over
common law may entrench the past more firmly than was true when
common law adjudication predominated. Even though statutes are more
future-oriented, and can effect change avulsively, they also are resistant to
change. Thus, some statutes possess greater durability than some common
law precedents, 221 especially if courts previously have provided the statute
with a definitive interpretation, in which case its meaning is fixed unless
altered by new legislation.222 As a consequence, some statutes outlive the
evils they were enacted to address.223 While this is true, this difference
between adjudication and legislation should not be exaggerated.
216 LEVI, supra note 101, at 7.
217 ZANDER, supra note 122, at 191-92 ("If the statute is a Bill of Rights with broad, open-
textured provisions, the scope for judicial legislation will be vast compared with the opportunities
offered by the tight provisions of, say, an income tax Act.").
2 1 LEVI, supra note 101, at 30.
219 
REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 26-27 (1975).
2 20 
ZANDER, supra note 122, at 441 ("[C]ourts do not see it as their functions to mould statute-law
or to adapt it to our changing society.").
221 See CALABRESI, supra note 21, at 2 (describing statutory obsolescence); Eric A. Posner &
Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, Ill YALE L.J. 1665, 1705 (2002)
(describing a variety of ways in which legislators attempt to secure statutes against future
modification).
222 See Douglass v. Cnty. of Pike, 101 U.S. 677, 687 (1879) ("After a statute has been settled by
judicial construction, the construction becomes.., as much a part of the statute as the text itself, and a
change of decision is to all intents and purposes the same in its effect ... as an amendment of the law
by means of a legislative enactment."); LEVI, supra note 101, at 32 ("Therefore it seems better to say
that once a decisive interpretation of legislative intent has been made, and in that sense a direction has
been fixed within the gap of ambiguity, the court should take that direction as given. In this sense, a
court's interpretation of legislation is not dictum. The words it uses do more than decide the case.
They give broad direction to the statute."); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents,
76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1362 (1988) (describing the stare decisis effect of statutory precedents as "super-
strong").
223 See CALABRESI, supra note 21, at 6.
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Precedents also are somewhat resistant to change.224 In addition, the extent
to which it is true depends upon whether one views the meaning of statutes
as static or dynamic. If the former, then a statute always means what it
meant on the day of its enactment;225 but if the latter, then a statute might
mean what it means on the day of its interpretation in light of what has
226happened since its enactment.
E. The Expansion ofAdministrative Regulation
As the complexity of life and the rate of change increased, particularly
during the industrial revolution227 and the New Deal,228 the President and
Congress found their resources and institutional structures unequal to the
demands placed upon them.229 Beginning earlier, 230 but accelerating in the
late nineteenth century, administrative agencies were created to fill the gap.
In part, they "sprang from a distrust of the ability of the judicial process to
make the necessary adjustments in the development of both law and
regulatory methods as they related to particular industrial problems.
23 1
Initially, courts resisted, insisting that Congress lacked the power to
224 HOLMES, supra note 56, at 31 ("[J]ust as the clavicle in the cat only tells of the existence of
some earlier creature to which a collarbone was useful, precedents survive in the law long after the use
they once served is at an end and the reason for them has been forgotten.").
225 See Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 290 (1996) ("While acknowledging that the
Commission's expertise and the design of the Guidelines may be of potential weight and relevance in
other contexts. .. principles of stare decisis require that we adhere to our earlier decision.").
226 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at li, cxxix (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
227 See Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv.
437, 439 (2003) ("Beginning in the late nineteenth century, legislatures created railroad commissions
and other regulatory agencies to deal with the consequences of industrialization.").
228 See Peters, supra note 220, at 996 ("[T]he New Deal... accelerat[ed] the rate of change in the
law .... ); Stewart, supra note 227, at 440 ("The New Deal Congress created a raft of new federal
regulatory agencies and endowed them with very broad powers through open-ended statutes.").
229 Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787-
1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1266 (2006) (arguing that "as it was written ... there was a hole in the U.S.
Constitution. The Constitution provided a legislature, a Supreme Court, and two executive officers.
Administration was missing.").
230 See id. at 1268 ("Early Congresses delegated broad policymaking powers to the President and
to others, combined policymaking, enforcement, and adjudication in the same administrative hands,
created administrative bodies outside of executive departments, provided for the direct responsibility of
some administrators to Congress itself, and assigned 'nonjudicial' business to the courts."); id at 1260
("From the earliest days of the Republic, Congress delegated broad authority to administrators, armed
them with extrajudicial coercive powers, created systems of administrative adjudication, and provided
for judicial review of administrative action."); id. (arguing that "the first independent agency at the
national level was not the ICC, but the Patent Office, created ninety-seven years earlier").
231 JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 30 (1938); see also Elihu Root, Address of
the President: Public Service by the Bar, 39 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 355, 369 (1916) ("[A]gencies furnish
protection to rights and obstacles to wrong doing which under our new social and industrial conditions
cannot be practically accomplished by the old and simple procedure of legislatures and courts as in the
last generation.").
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delegate its responsibilities to the Executive Branch.232 The need for
administrative agencies, however, eventually forced the abandonment of
the judiciary's non-delegation doctrine, 33 and fundamentally altered
American law. "This change was the advent of the administrative state
itself, the transition from a system of rules elaborated and implemented by
the judiciary to a system of comprehensive regulation elaborated and
implemented by administrative agencies. '234 As a result, administrative
235agencies have become a de facto "fourth branch" of government.
Some have argued that this explosion of bureaucracy was an "epochal
transformation" of American government.236 The Supreme Court itself has
said that "[t]he rise of administrative bodies probably has been the most
significant legal trend of the last century. ,,237 That may be right. In
fact, it has made an enormous difference in the way much of American law
is created. Among other things, it partly replaced common law
adjudication by courts with a combination of agency rulemaking and
administrative adjudication.238
The degree to which agencies have replaced courts is striking. For
example, courts have traditionally exercised great power in the area of
criminal law, especially with respect to sentencing. For many years,
legislatures merely set a broad sentence range for each crime, leaving the
232 See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) ("That Congress cannot delegate legislative
power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of
the system of government ordained by the Constitution.").
233 See Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 397 (1940) ("Delegation by
Congress has long been recognized as necessary in order that the exertion of legislative power does not
become a futility."); Root, supra note 231, at 368 ("Before these agencies the old doctrine prohibiting
the delegation of legislative power has virtually retired from the field and given up the fight."); Stewart,
supra note 227, at 438 (stating that administrative agencies were created in response to the
"demonstrated inadequacies of private and criminal law" to prevent the ills resulting from increased
economic activity). Some contend that the non-delegation doctrine is not dead, but that instead a broad
non-delegation doctrine has been replaced by a set of more specific non-delegation rules with a
narrower aggregate scope. E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315
(2000) (stating that contrary to some overexaggerated reports, the nondelegation doctrine is "alive and
well"). In either case, any residual ban on delegation is narrower than it was previously.
234 Edward Rubin, It's Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89
CORNELL L. REv. 95, 96 (2003).235 PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE WITH STUDIES OF
ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 39-40 (1937) ("They are in reality
miniature independent governments .... They constitute a headless 'fourth branch' of the
Government .... ); see also FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(describing administrative agencies as "a veritable fourth branch of the Government, which has
deranged our three-branch legal theories").
236 Rubin, supra note 234, at 96.
237 Ruberoid, 343 U.S. at 487 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
238 See Roscoe Pound, Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 ANN. REP.
A.B.A. 331, 339 (1938) (warning of "the tendency of administrative bureaus to extend the scope of
their operations indefinitely even to the extent of supplanting our traditional judicial regime by an
administrative regime").
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courts considerable leeway to fix the actual sentence within the range that a
particular defendant would receive. In more recent decades, by contrast,
sentencing commissions have been created to limit judicial sentencing
discretion by confining it to a much narrower scope. 239  The guidelines
promulgated by these sentencing commissions are quasi-legislative in
character. This approach possesses advantages-for example, it may
reduce the magnitude of distortions caused by certain types of cognitive
error24 -- but it also shifts decision-making from courts to agencies,
especially sentencing commissions (and, indirectly, to another
administrative agency, namely, prosecutors),24' in an important area in
which courts traditionally had exercised enormous power.
Administrative agencies perform two basic functions.242 First, they
promulgate regulations, a process known as rule-making. 43 Second, they
adjudicate disputes between private parties, or between a private party and
the government. 2 "
When promulgating regulations, administrative agencies act like
narrowly specialized legislatures, 245  conducting investigations and
soliciting input from those to be regulated and the public before creating
rules to govern future conduct.246 Like statutes, regulations seldom operate
239 See Rachel B. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REv. 715, 715, 722 (2005) (stating
that administrative agencies-including state and federal sentencing commissions-are the "dominant
force in criminal law today").
240 Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of
Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1251, 1328-29 (2005) (noting that sentencing guidelines
can reduce the effect of arbitrary or irrelevant numerical anchors on sentences); see also Chris Guthrie
et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 793-94 (2001) (suggesting that similar
guidelines might be adopted to improve estimation of damages in civil cases).
241 James B. Bums et al., We Make the Better Target (But the Guidelines Shifted Power from the
Judiciary to Congress, Not from the Judiciary to the Prosecution), 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1317, 1317-18
(1997) (arguing that the federal sentencing guidelines shifted power from judges to the Congress and
the U.S. Sentencing Commission); Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PiTT. L. REV.
393, 418 (1992) (arguing that the federal sentencing guidelines shift discretion from judges to
prosecutors).
242 Obviously, this is an oversimplification. Agencies also make policy in many other ways. See,
e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 1383, 1386 (2004)
(referring to agency-initiated judicial enforcement actions).
243 Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(4)-(5), 553 (2006).
244Id. §§ 551(7), 554.
245 See Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J.
381, 383 ("A legislative rule is essentially an administrative statute .... "); Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretative Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 547, 552 (2000) ("A
legislative rule binds the public and courts in a manner indistinguishable from a statute.").
2465 U.S.C. § 551(4) (defining a "rule" as "an agency statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect") (emphasis added); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Policymaking by the
Administrative Judiciary, 25 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 49, 52 (2005) ("Rulemaking is a quasi-
legislative process, and its goal is to make general pronouncements with future effect.").
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retroactively. 247  Their emphasis is on guiding or controlling future
conduct. When making rules, administrative agencies are frequently filling
gaps or implementing legislation at a more detailed level than the
legislature was able to do or felt it had the time or expertise to do.24 8 In
essence, administrative agencies are assuming part of the legislative
function when they promulgate regulations. It is not surprising that
administrative regulations promulgated on the basis of explicit legislative
authorization following compliance with notice and comment requirements
are termed "legislative regulations. 249
Replacing common law adjudication with administrative regulation
changes the character of lawmaking.
Because judges are merely "discovering" law, in the
medieval and common law conception, they must proceed
on a case-by-case basis as the specifics of each case reveal
a new aspect of the pre-existing legal rules. The
administrative state displaces this approach. Its defining
feature is conscious policy intervention in the economic
and social system by various means, among them the
promulgation of explicitly new laws. While incremental
decision making is not necessarily precluded, the
hallmarks of the administrative state-4he rationale behind
the creation of administrative agencies-are its
comprehensive programs and long-term planning in
210pursuit of these policy objectives.
Thus, when administrative regulations crowd out common law
adjudication, a fundamentally backward-looking process is replaced by a
247 See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) ("[A] statutory grant
of legislative rulemaking authority [to an administrative agency] will not, as a general matter, be
understood to encompass the power to promulgate retroactive rules unless that power is conveyed by
Congress in express terms.").
248 CALABRESI, supra note 21, at 45 n.5 ("Agencies were thought to have greater institutional
capacity than legislatures to examine technical, specialized problems and to frame an appropriate
response."); see also HENRY FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR A
BETrER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS 166-67 (1962) (explaining that Congress cannot carry the full
weight of its legislative responsibilities); Louis L. Jaffe, Administrative Procedure Re-Examined: The
Benjamin Report, 56 HARV. L. REV. 704, 725 (1943) (stating that Congress has "other fish to fry").
249 Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The
Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 476-77 (2002) ("Agency rules come in several types. A
basic distinction is between 'legislative' rules and 'nonlegislative' rules. Legislative rules are those
that have the force and effect of law. From the perspective of agency personnel, regulated parties, and
courts, these rules have a status akin to that of a statute. Nonlegislative rules do not have the force and
effect of law; rather, they are simply statements about what an agency intends to do in the future.")
(footnotes omitted).
250 Rubin, supra note 234, at 105 (footnotes omitted).
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fundamentally forward-looking one.25'
The increase in administrative rulemaking has been stunning. As one
commentator noted:
In the decades immediately following the passage of the
APA in 1946, most agencies relied on adjudicatory, case-
by-case methods to make policy. This began to change in
the 1960s .... [T]here is little doubt that a shift occurred
such that, by the mid-1970s, rulemaking was the primary
and preferred mode of making policy for many
agencies.252
The trend was so dramatic that by 1974, Circuit Judge Skelly Wright
proclaimed that the country had entered the "age of rulemaking." '253
One measure of the magnitude of this change is the enormous quantity
of regulations that agencies promulgate. The Code of Federal Regulations
contains the formal rules adopted by all federal agencies, organized by
subject matter. By one estimate, the number of pages in the Code of
Federal Regulations increased from less than 60,000 to 140,000 between
1970 and 1995.254 This means that it took agencies about 180 years to
adopt 60,000 pages of regulations, but just twenty-five years to adopt
80,000 more. By this measure then, the quantity of administrative
regulations more than doubled in just twenty-five years.
Another measure of agency activity is the Federal Register, a daily
251 Bowen, 488 U.S. at 221 ("Adjudication deals with what the law was; rulemaking deals with
what the law will be.").
252 Magill, supra note 242, at 1398. Some have argued that agencies may be shifting back toward
case-by-case policy-making by a new emphasis on litigation, negotiated settlements, and ad hoc
waivers of rules. Id. at 1398-99. That may or may not be true, but it does suggest an important
advantage of administrative agencies as lawmakers, namely, the ability to shift policy-making from one
method to another method over time as evolving conditions dictate so that the lawmaking method and
the conditions that law needs to address remain optimally matched.
253 j. Skelly Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59
CORNELL L. REv. 375, 375-76 (1974).
254 J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory Accretion
in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 775 fig.5 (2003); see also I RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.3 (4th ed. 2002) ("The size and scope of federal administrative
activity has increased during every period in the nation's history."); JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND
SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES 40-41 (1977) ("Our chart will show no great contribution to the
body of law from executive offices or administrative agencies until the 1890's.... We can plot major
executive-administrative contributions from the decade of 1905-1915, which first saw the grant of
substantial rule-making, rule-enforcement, and adjudicative powers to executive offices and
independent administrative agencies .... [B]y the 1950's lawyers with business clients and individuals
with demands on the increasing service functions of government had to turn more to administrative rule
books than to statute books to locate the legal frame of reference for their affairs."); Torke, supra note
203, at 1452 n.38 ("The original Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) published in 1930 totaled 3450
pages. In 1999, the CFR occupied seven shelves.").
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record not just of adopted niles, but also of proposed rules and other
agency actions. During 1936 just 2620 pages were added to the Federal
Register; by 2010, the number of pages added had risen to 82,590.255
While there have been occasional fluctuations, the overall trend is plain. 6
Truly, as Felix Frankfurter observed, "our Administrative Law has largely
'growed' like Topsy., 25 7
Although major agency policy shifts are typically subject to the
somewhat cumbersome formal procedures applicable to notice and
comment rulemaking, 258 as well as deferential judicial supervision,
agencies can sometimes change course more quickly and easily than
legislatures can.259  This nimbleness may be a desirable characteristic of
government in an era of rapid change, but it contributes to the diminishing
role of the past in law. Operating within the broad scope of discretion
conveyed by the legislature, and unconstrained by the non-delegation
doctrine, the Executive Branch can alter policy by modifying regulations
(and to some extent, the interpretation of the statute underlying them
pursuant to the Chevron doctrine)260 rapidly. Under the Chevron doctrine,
courts must defer to an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute if it
is based on a reasonable interpretation of a statute administered by the
261
agency. Since judicial interpretation of agency regulations is
common, 262 the result is a narrowing of the already limited judicial power
to interpret statutes.
The volume of formal legislative rules promulgated by administrative
agencies is dwarfed by the even larger amount of informal regulations,
guidelines, policy statements, letter rulings, and the like. Most agencies
255 LAW LIBRARIANS' SOCIETY OF WASHINGTON, D.C., FEDERAL REGISTER PAGES PUBLISHED
ANNUALLY, available at http://www.llsdc.org/attachments/wysiwyg/544/fed-reg-pages.pdf (charting
the number of Federal Register pages published each year from 1936-2010 based on information
supplied by the Office of the Federal Register and the year end Federal Register).
256 See Stewart, supra note 227, at 437 ("The century just concluded witnessed a dramatic rise in
the scope and intensity of administrative regulation.").
257 Felix Frankfurter, Foreword: Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on
Administrative Law, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 585, 586 (1941).
2"6 See Magill, supra note 242, at 1390 ("[T]oday, promulgating an important legislative rule is a
labor-intensive enterprise."); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385 (1992) ("During the last fifteen years the rulemaking process has
become increasingly rigid and burdensome.").
259 Joel Brinkley, Out of Spotlight, Bush Overhauls US. Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2004,
at Al ("The administration can write or revise regulations largely on its own, while Congress must pass
laws. For that reason, most modem-day presidents have pursued much of their agendas through
regulation.").
260 Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).
261 Id. at 861-66 (stating that the agency's interpretation need only be "reasonable" or
"permissible" to be upheld by the courts).
262 SCALIA, supra note 90, at 13-14 ("By far the greatest part of what I and all federal judges do is
to interpret the meaning of federal statutes and federal agency regulations.") (emphasis added).
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issue such materials,263 and their quantity is staggering.264  These devices
allow agencies to develop policy more quickly and inexpensively than
promulgating formal regulations because the notice and comment
procedural requirements do not apply.265 Although not binding in the same
way that formal legislative rules are,266 informal regulations nonetheless
indicate how agencies intend to exercise their discretionary power in
implementing their enabling statutes and their formal regulations. As a
practical matter, they shape future agency outcomes, and they may receive
some judicial deference.267 Because of their volume and pervasiveness,
along with less formal policy statements, agency regulations now occupy
268
an important place in our jurisprudence.
The other major function that agencies perform is adjudication. In
fact, the number of adjudications conducted by administrative agencies is
vast, much larger than the number of adjudications conducted by courts. 2 69
In the Social Security Administration alone, administrative law judges
263 Michael Asimow, Guidance Documents in the States: Toward a Safe Harbor, 54 ADMIN. L.
REV. 631, 632 (2002) ("Virtually every administrative agency produces guidance documents
expressing its view about the meaning of language in statutes or regulations.").
264 Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1468-69 (1992) (stating that
agency staff produce informal rules "in a profusion that overwhelms the more formal output"). For
example, the ratio of the volume of informal regulations (such as policy statements, technical
guidelines, and staff manuals) to formal regulations is about 20 to I for the Internal Revenue Service,
and about 240 to I for the Federal Aviation Administration. Id. at 1469.
265 See Magill, supra note 242, at 1391-92 (stating that guidance documents allow agencies to
develop policy cheaply and easily); see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006) (providing that notice and
comment procedures do not apply to guidance documents).
266 Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 903-05
(2001) (discussing the different legal effects of legislative and interpretative rules); see also United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (limiting Chevron deference to agency interpretations
of statutes to formal regulations promulgated based on notice and comment procedures).
267 Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 232 ("[I]nterpretive rules may sometimes function as
precedents .... "). When interpretive rules informally adopted by agencies serve as "precedents," as
Mead suggests they can, they are really operating more like forward-looking rules than precedents in
the common law sense because they are future-oriented rules of general application, not a decision
confined to a particular set of historical facts. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c) (2010) (identifying some INS
adjudications as precedential); see also KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 102-03 (1969) (discussing the role of policy statements and informal
administrative agency rules); Asimow, supra note 245, at 385-88 (describing the role of non-legislative
rules in the administrative process).
268 FRIEDMAN, supra note 211, at 686 ("The rules of the countless administrative agencies [are]
themselves an important, even crucial, source of law.").
269 See 1 PIERCE, supra note 254, § 8.1 ("Agencies dwarf courts in terms of the proportion of
adjudications resolved by the two types of institutions."); Judith Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and
Vanishing: The Empirical and Normative Puzzles of Declining Trial Rates in Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 783, 799-800 figs.1 & 2 (2004) (estimating that during 2001, four federal administrative
agencies-the Social Security Administration, INS, the Board of Veterans' Appeals, and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission-conducted approximately 722,000 adjudicatory proceedings,
while federal courts (including proceedings before district judges, magistrate judges, and bankruptcy
judges) conducted just 80,000).
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decide more cases each year than all federal and state courts combined.27°
As the Supreme Court concluded half a century ago, "perhaps more values
today are affected by their decisions than by those of all the courts .... ,271
When adjudicating, administrative agencies act like courts.272 Agency
adjudication, however, differs from court adjudication in some respects.
Among other things, it usually is quicker and less formal.273 Sometimes
administrative trials are not really adversary proceedings.274 In addition,
agencies feel less constrained by their own previous decisions than do
courts; that is, the doctrine of stare decisis carries less weight in
administrative adjudication than it does in common law adjudication. 275
Administrative adjudication is also more goal-directed, and therefore more
future-oriented.276 Finally, agency adjudicators sometimes lack the clear-
cut independence that judges possess, 277 and frequently have their agency's
policy preferences and rulemaking agenda very much in mind.278 For
27' BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 29-30 (2d ed. 1984).
271 FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952).
272 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978) ("[T]he role of the modem federal hearing
examiner or administrative law judge... is 'functionally comparable' to that of a judge."); Thomas C.
Mans, Selecting the 'Hidden Judiciary': How the Merit Process Works in Choosing Administrative
Law Judges (Part I), 63 JUDICATURE 60, 62 (1979) (describing the corps of federal administrative law
judges as the "hidden judiciary").
273 See Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 655-56 (1990) (reasoning
that agency adjudication is informal and has only minimal requirements).
274 Frank S. Bloch et al., Developing a Full and Fair Evidentiary Record in a Nonadversary
Setting: Two Proposals for Improving Social Security Disability Adjudications, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1,
2-3 (2003) (characterizing Social Security disability hearings as informal and non-adversarial).
275 Texas v. United States, 866 F.2d 1546, 1556 (5th Cir. 1989) ("An agency... is not bound by
the shackles of stare decisis .... "); Koch, supra note 246, at 63 ("Stare decisis is not the rule in
administrative adjudications."). But see 2 PIERCE, supra note 254, § 11.5 ("[E]ach of the many federal
agencies that systematically collect and publish reasoned opinions in formal adjudications uses a
system of precedents that is comparable to the system the courts use.").
276 See Louis L. Jaffee, The Federal Regulatory Agencies in Perspective: Administrative
Limitations in a Political Setting, 11 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 565, 568 (1970) (discussing the need
for administrative agencies to make "forward-looking decisions"); Arthur S. Milller, Prolegomenon to
a Modernized Study of Administrative Law, 12. J. LEGAL EDUC. 33, 41 (1959-1960) (discussing the
goal-oriented nature of administrative agencies).
277 Michael Asimow, Toward a New California Administrative Procedure Act: Adjudication
Fundamentals, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1067, 1124-25 (1992) ('The process of administrative adjudication
superficially resembles litigation in court, but the differences between the systems are fundamental.
Trial and appellate judges are independent and isolated and perform no tasks other than judging. In
contrast, administrative adjudication is only one facet of the regulatory process by which an agency
carries out a legislative mandate. In many situations, the same people who function as adjudicative
decision-makers or their advisors also have responsibilities inconsistent with judging and which may
result in strong policy opinions."); John L. Gedid, ALJ Ethics: Conundrums, Dilemmas, and
Paradoxes, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 33, 38 (2002) (asserting that "ALJs are not impartial and neutral in
the same sense as Article Ill judges, but frequently have a role in developing and applying agency
policy" and citing the example of the NLRB, which made all of its policies by adjudication rather than
by rulemaking during the first fifty years of its existence).
278 Charles H. Koch, Jr., Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary, 29 ADMIN. & REG. L.
NEWS 2, 3 (2004) ("[A]dministrative judges have crucial roles in the development of policy in
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example, some federal agencies have adopted a practice called "non-
acquiescence," refusing to follow court decisions with which they disagree
in their administrative adjudications outside of the jurisdiction in which the
disfavored decision is controlling.279 Others have policy guidelines,
manuals, or rules of thumb that govern many of the adjudicative decisions
they make.28° Such guidelines, and the decisions shaped by them, are
forward-looking in ways that common law adjudication by courts is not.
F. The Proliferation of Treaties
There are at least three basic types of international agreements:
treaties, congressional-executive agreements, and sole executive
agreements. They have been defined as follows:
A "treaty" is an international agreement approved by a
two-thirds vote in the Senate. A "congressional-executive
agreement" is an international agreement approved by
majority vote in both Houses of Congress. A "sole
executive agreement" is an agreement concluded by the
President on the basis of his Article II powers, without
explicit authorization or approval by any legislative
body.2
81
A further distinction may be drawn between treaties that are self-
executing and treaties that are not. Self-executing treaties become law as
soon as they are adopted. Non-self-executing treaties become law only
after they are both adopted and implemented by legislation.282 The former
adjudication."); id. at 2 ("Administrative agencies usually have significant policymaking
responsibilities, and they may use their adjudicative processes as well as rulemaking and other general
policy pronouncements to develop that policy.").
279 See, e.g., 1 PIERCE, supra note 254, § 2.9 (discussing agency nonacquiescence in circuit court
decisions); Joshua I. Schwartz, Nonaquiescence, Crowell v. Benson, and Administrative Adjudication,
77 GEO. L.J. 1815, 1816 (1989) ("'Nonaquiescence' denotes the deliberate refusal of an administrative
agency, exercising adjudicatory authority, to follow relevant judicial precedent in deciding another
matter presenting the same question of law.").210 See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the
Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1319-27 (1992)
(cataloging the hierarchy of administrative authorities).
281 David Sloss, International Agreements and the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 55 STAN.
L. REv. 1963, 1964 (2003) (citing Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
175-230 (2d ed. 1996)). For simplicity, as used in this Article, the term "treaty" refers to any sort of
formal written agreement between two or more sovereign states. See Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332, 333 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
282 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 491-92 (2008) (holding that a treaty "is not binding domestic
law unless Congress has enacted statutes implementing it" or it "conveys an intention that it be 'self-
executing' and is ratified on that basis"); Carlos Manuel Viquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-
Executing Treaties, 89 AM J. INT'L L. 695, 695 (1995) (stating that a non-self-executing treaty cannot
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make new rules more quickly and decisively because their effectiveness
cannot be postponed by delay in enacting implementing legislation.
Treaties are notoriously difficult to characterize.283 They may be
viewed either as contracts between sovereign states, or as laws analogous
to domestic statutes but possessing transnational application.284 With the
passage of time, the latter characterization has gained wider acceptance.285
Treaties possess many of the features statutes possess. They have been
described as "a sort of international legislation where states explicitly agree
to make rules to govern their own conduct, as well as the activities of their
individual and corporate [counterparts]. ' '286 The analogy is apt.287 Once a
be enforced in the courts without prior legislative implementation). There are actually four categories
of non-self-executing treaties. Carlos Manuel Vizquez, Treaties As The Law of the Land: The
Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 629-32 (2008).
283 See David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REV. 953,
1026, 1034 (1994) (stating that treaties are "sui generis species of law"); Alex Glashausser, What We
Must Never Forget When It Is a Treaty We Are Expounding, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1243, 1245 (2005)
(arguing that treaties are "a unique species of document. They are law but not legislation; they rest on
promised exchanges but are not contracts.") (footnote omitted).
284 Compare Medellin, 552 U.S. at 491 ("While a treaty may constitute an international
commitment, it is not binding domestic law unless Congress has enacted statutes implementing it or the
treaty itself conveys an intention that it be 'self-executing'...."), and THE FEDERALIST No. 75
(Alexander Hamilton) ("The power of making treaties ...relates neither to the execution of the
subsisting laws nor to the enaction of new ones; ... Its objects are contracts with foreign nations which
have the force of law, but derive it from the obligations of good faith. They are not rules prescribed by
the sovereign to the subject, but agreements between sovereign and sovereign."), with U.S. CONST. art.
VI, cl. 2 ("[A]nd all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the Supreme Law of the Land ... "), and The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)
("International law is part of our law . ), and William Davie, 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 158 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d
ed. 1888) ("It was necessary that treaties should operate as laws on individuals. They ought to be
binding upon us the moment they are made.").
285 Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829) ("A treaty is in its nature a contract between two
nations, not a legislative act. . . . In the United States a different principle is established. Our
constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land [by the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI,
cl. 2]. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature,
whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision."), overturned on other
grounds United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 52 (1833); see also Michael P. Van Alstine,
The Judicial Power and Treaty Delegation, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1263, 1274 (2002) ("Contrary to the
sovereign contract paradigm . . . self-executing treaties are properly viewed as the formal and
functional equivalent of Article I legislation."); John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties,
Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1958 (1999)
("International agreements are becoming more like the permanent statutes and regulations that
characterize the domestic legal system, and less like mutually convenient, and temporary, compacts to
undertake state action.").
286 MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (4th ed. 2003); see also
Ernest A. Young, Treaties As "Part of Our Law," 88 TEx. L. REV. 91, 124 (2009) ("[T]he nature of
international law has changed, so that treaties increasingly regulate traditional domestic concerns and
thus overlap with the legislative prerogatives of both Congress and state legislatures."); id. at 139 ("A
congressional executive agreement, of course, simply is a statute ....").
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treaty goes into effect, it is regarded by courts as equivalent to an act of the
legislature. 288 Like statutes, treaties are forward-looking. They are usually
designed to create rules to regulate the future or to promote future
cooperation among nations, rather than to resolve particular past
disputes. 28 9 Typically, they are not retroactive. 290 Finally, especially when
self-executing, treaties can cause avulsive changes in law. Their effect on
even domestic substantive law can be dramatic. They can alter or sweep
aside statutes and administrative regulations.291  For example, treaties
entered into by the United States during the past two decades have
radically transformed many aspects of U.S. copyright law. 292 Their scope
can even exceed the bounds of Congress's Article I legislative power.293
On the other hand, like statutes, treaties can become entrenched. Since
amending them 294 or withdrawing from them295 is difficult or awkward,
287 Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867, 1885
(2005) ("The treaty power is somewhat analogous, textually and structurally, to the legislative power
vested in... Congress by Article 1, Section 1 [of the U.S. Constitution].").
288 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States ... and all
Treaties made... under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land .... "); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) ("By the constitution, a treaty is placed
on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation."); JANIS, supra note 286, at
92 ("[B]etween treaty law and federal statutory law there is thought to be a virtual equivalence.").
289 See Glashausser, supra note 283, at 1296 ("With treaties, there is usually no 'mischief to
eradicate; the aim is cooperation."); see also Jeremy Waldron, The Half-Life of Treaties, Waitangi,
Rebus Sic Stantibus, 11 OTAGO L. REV. 161, 169 (2006) ("Presumably it is the point of treaties to
protect expectations against change."), In this respect, treaties may be even more future-oriented than
statutes. This does not mean, however, that treaties are entirely uninfluenced by the past. See
Glashausser, supra note 283, at 1325 (noting that countries "have a history with everyone-a history
that includes previous treaties. That past cannot help but color the meaning of a treaty.").
290 See JANIS, supra note 286, at 29 ("Treaties may, by their terms, apply retroactively, but the
presumptive rule is that treaty provisions are not retroactive.") (footnote omitted).
291 See Stewart, supra note 227, at 456 (predicting that "the regulatory policies and rules applied
at the domestic level in the United States and other countries will increasingly have been established
through extranational processes not directly subject to domestic administrative law").
292 See CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 25 (7th ed. 2006) ("The pressure[] of operating in
an increasingly interconnected world . . . has forced upon U.S. lawmakers the necessity of making
rapid, and quite fundamental, changes in this ancient body of [copyright] law.").
293 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432-34 (1920).
294 See Glashausser, supra note 283, at 1292 ("Overall, treaties are considered harder to amend
than contracts or statutes. In fact, treaty amendment has been called even harder than constitutional
amendment.") (footnote omitted); see also Elk v. United Arab Airlines, 360 F.2d 804, 812 n. 18 (2d Cir.
1966) (stating that statutes are easier to amend than treaties because legislators regularly schedule
meetings).
295 See JANIS, supra note 286, at 36 ("A treaty may be terminated or a party [may] withdraw from
it either 'in conformity with the provisions of the treaty; or at any time by consent of all of the parties
after consultation with the other contracting [parties]."') (quoting Vienna Convention, supra note 281,
at art. 54); Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
1492, 1561 (2004) ("'[L]egislators may have less freedom to alter or repudiate [an international]
proposal than they do with respect to domestic measures."') (alterations in original) (quoting Paul
Stephan). Unilateral termination of or withdrawal from treaties, though not uncommon, is theoretically
regulated by the concept of rebus sic stantibus. JANIS, supra note 286, at 37-38; Laurence R. Heifer,
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they are resistant to change. Even assuming that they can be modified or
296
abrogated if relevant circumstances change, treaties may be subject to
forms of entrenchment stronger than those applicable to legislation because
complex relations with other nations may be adversely affected by even a
technically legal repudiation of treaty obligations.297
"We live in a world of treaties.' 298  As time has passed, treaties have
become both more numerous and more influential.299 Moreover, the focus
of treaties has shifted and broadened to include not merely the conduct of
nations but also the conduct of individuals and private organizations. °0
Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1583, 1616-19 (2005) (discussing some of the consequences of
treaty withdrawal, including sanctions, a reputation for unreliability that may lead to fewer future
opportunities to enter into treaties or to do so on advantageous terms, and diminished influence in
future international rulemaking); id. at 1606-07 (explaining that "older multilateral agreements are
denounced more frequently than recently adopted treaties" and suggesting that there may be a
discernible 'shelf life' for treaties).
296 See JOHN STUART MILL, Treaty Obligations, in ESSAYS ON EQUALITY, LAW, AND EDUCATION
341, 346 (John Robson ed., 1984) ("Nations cannot rightfully bind themselves.., beyond the period
to which human foresight can be pressured to extend [because of] the danger which, to some extent,
always exists, that the fulfillment of the obligation may, by change of circumstances, become either
wrong or unwise."); Waldron, supra note 289, at 162 ("[T]reaties are not required to survive all the
changes that time has wrought ...parties may be freed from their treaty obligations when things
change in some fundamental relevant respect.").
297 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 221, at 1701 ("Treaties raise significant entrenchment
issues.... In the United States, because a treaty requires a two-thirds vote of the Senate, the Senate
cannot abrogate an earlier treaty by consenting to an inconsistent treaty with a simple majority; nor can
a majority in both houses--through ordinary legislation-abrogate the international effect of treaty
obligations. As a consequence, the Senate (with the President) can reach beyond its 'temporal
mandate' and entrench policies against the interest of future majorities.") (footnote omitted). This may
be inaccurate because the President could simply withdraw from the previous treaty, thereby leaving
the field clear for the new one. See JANIS, supra note 286, at 40 ("In the United States, the power to
suspend or terminate a treaty or to decide not to suspend or terminate a treaty is vested in the
President."); see also Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) ("[Ain Act of Congress ... is on full
parity with a treaty, and.., when a statute which is subsequent in time is inconsistent with a treaty, the
statute to the extent of conflict renders the treaty null.") (internal quotations omitted). Since, as a
practical matter, a country can terminate or withdraw from a treaty at will, and since in the United
States the President can do it alone, it actually may be easier to abrogate a treaty than it is to abrogate a
statute.
298 Yoo, supra note 285, at 1956.
299 See JANIS, supra note 286, at 8 ("[T]he fact is that there is more international law today than
ever before. [In addition,] the role it plays in world affairs-political economic, social, and
humanitarian-has never been greater."); see also id. at 13 ("Virtually every human activity is to some
degree the object of some treaty."); Scott M. Sullivan, Rethinking Treaty Interpretation, 86 TEx. L.
REV. 777, 781 (2008) ("The latter half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first
have demonstrated remarkable growth in international connectedness . . . .The result has been a
dramatic proliferation of international treaties, both bilateral and multilateral, purporting to
[cover] ... diverse subject matters ... ").
3
o See Rosenkranz, supra note 287, at 1869-70 (referencing "the explosion of the United States's
commitments under international law [on matters of distinctly local concern]"); Yoo, supra note 285, at
1958 ("[T]he real object [of such a] treaty... is not to affect state behavior but to regulate the activities
of individuals and private entities.") (quoting ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 14 (1995)).
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This trend has been apparent for some time, but it has accelerated
during the past fifty years. 3 1 For example, the treaties concluded between
1648 and 1919 fill 226 weighty books, those concluded between 1920 and
1946 fill 205 more volumes, and those concluded between 1946 and 1999,
fill 204 more volumes. °2 In addition, between 1920 and 1946, 4834
treaties were registered with the League of Nations; while between 1946
and 1999, 35,426 treaties were registered with the United Nations.
30 3
Similarly, while just eighty-six multilateral treaties were concluded
between 1751 and 1850, more than 2000 were concluded between 1951
and 1975. 304 Further, from 1960 to 2000, the United States alone entered
into 12,446 treaties, 305 an increase aptly described as an "explosion.'
30 6
Finally, the number of self-executing treaties entered into by the United
States is also increasing.30 7 In short, "[r]ecent decades have witnessed a
striking proliferation in treaties.,, 3 8  Non-treaty international agreements
have proliferated as well.309
301 See JANIS, supra note 286, at 11 n.4 (showing the increase in treaties from 1944 to 1999);
David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist
Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1304 (2000) ("[Ilntemational treaty practice
has greatly expanded in the past half century and promises to expand further ...as globalization
proceeds.").
302 JANIS, supra note 286, at 11.
303 Id. at II n.4.
304 Charlotte Ku, Global Governance and the Changing Face of International Law, 2 ACUNS REP.
& PAPERS 5 (2001), available at http:/lwww.reformwatch.net/fitxers/22.pdf.
305 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 106TH CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 39 tbls.II-1 & 11-2 (Comm. Print 2001); see
also Richard B. Graves III, Globalization, Treaty Powers, and the Limits of the Intellectual Property
Clause, 50 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y USA 199, 249 (2003) ("Both the number of treaties to which the
United States is a party, and particularly the scope of those treaties, have sharply increased in recent
decades ...").
306 Rosenkranz, supra note 287, at 1869-70 (describing "the explosion of the United States's
commitments under international law [on matters of distinctly local concern]" as one of "the two most
dramatic trends in American law").
307 See Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law in an Age of Treaties, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
892, 921-22 (2004) ("Perhaps the most striking observation that emerges from a comprehensive
examination is the sheer number of existing self-executing treaties. The number of treaties that contain
self-executing provisions is now over four hundred (even excluding treaties with Native American
tribes) .... Equally remarkable is their substantive law coverage.").
308 Jose E. Alvarez, The New Treaty Makers, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 213, 216 (2002)
("Recent decades have witnessed a striking proliferation in treaties .... ); Daniel W. Drezner, On the
Balance Between International Law and Democratic Sovereignty, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 321, 322 (2001)
(concluding that "the number of treaties deposited in the United Nations" has more than doubled in the
past twenty years); Glenda J. Pearson, Rohn's World Treaty Index: Its Past and Future, 29 INT'L J.
LEGAL INFO. 543, 548 (2001) ("[B]ilateral and multilateral agreements have multiplied in increasing
numbers over the last three decades.").
309 Sloss, supra note 281, at 1968 ("Between 1789 and 1989, the United States concluded more
than 12,000 non-treaty international agreements.") (citing CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 103RD CONG.,
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 14
(Comm. Print 1993)).
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As a result of these developments, the expanding role of treaties may
soon rival that of statutes. "Now, . . . with the continuing transition from
interstate to international integration, the law is increasingly entering a new
phase in its maturation., 310  Because of the proliferation of treaties and
other consequences of globalization,3 1 this era of lawmaking is likely to be
even more future-oriented than its predecessor.312
III. Is LAW'S INCREASING FUTURE-ORIENTEDNESS GOOD OR BAD?
A. Framing the Issue
Whether the changes in lawmaking described above are good or bad
depends upon two sets of considerations. The first set-the temporal
one-asks whether it is better to employ more future-oriented methods of
lawmaking than in the past. The second set-the institutional one-asks
whether, apart from their greater future-orientedness, the newly dominant
methods of lawmaking are better or worse than the old ones. On both
dimensions, better or worse must be determined in relation to the demands
of the environment, namely, an increasingly complex, interrelated, and
rapidly evolving world. Just as it makes little sense to ask whether reptiles
or fish are better than mammals in the abstract, because the answer
depends in part on the nature of the environment in which they are situated,
it also makes little sense to ask whether judges are better lawmakers than
legislators, administrators, or diplomats in the abstract. If, in the long run,
we migrate from one method of lawmaking to another it may be because
the one we consistently prefer meets our actual needs better than the one
we consistently reject.
B. Temporal Considerations
1. Why Increasingly Future-Oriented Lawmaking Might Be Good
From a temporal standpoint, several considerations weigh in favor of
310 Van Alstine, supra note 307, at 900; see also MANFRED B. STEGER, GLOBALIZATION: A VERY
SHORT INTRODUCTION 64 (2003) ("At the outset of the 21st Century, the world finds itself in a
transitional phase between the modem nation-state system and postmodern forms of global
governance."); Young, supra note 286, at 124 ("[M]odern treaty making often delegates legal authority
to supranational institutions ....").
311 See THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 7-8 (1999) (describing
globalization as involving "the inexorable integration of markets, nation-states and technologies to a
degree never witnessed before .... "); STEGER, supra note 310, at 11 (stating that "globalization
involves the intensification and acceleration of social exchanges and activities."); Golove, supra note
301, at 1304 ("[I]nternational treaty practice has greatly expanded in the past half century and promises
to expand further in the decades ahead as globalization proceeds.").
312 See JANIS, supra note 286, at 8 ("As trade, transport, culture, and communications link the
people of the globe ever closer together, so are we likely to rely more upon international law in the
future.").
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the increasing future-orientedness of lawmaking. First, we generally
encourage people to try to anticipate the future, plan ahead, and invest in
an attempt to transform their present goals into future realities. We do this
because of an optimistic belief that "[d]isciplined and valid prospective
thinking can help people shape their environments and their futures
effectively and responsibly., 313  Proverbs such as "planning your future
saves you from regretting your past,, 314 express a widely-shared view that
attempting to anticipate the future is essential to achieving good results.315
Second, our knowledge of the past is imperfect. Although we know
more about the past than we know about the future, that does not mean that
our view of the past is accurate. The difficulty of discerning the past is
widely recognized: time has been described by Alfred Tennyson as "a
maniac scattering dust, '316 and by William Shakespeare as a dark,
bottomless pit.317  Sophocles said that "Great Time makes all things
dim,, 318 and Robert Grudin observed that "[n]o darkness obscures things as
effectively as time., 319 There are several reasons why people speak of time
in this way.
To start with, although there are traces of portions of the past, the
available recording devices-memory, documents, photographs, tape
recordings, etc.,-are not entirely reliable, 320  and are employed
selectively.32' Even worse, some of the devices used to record the past do
not just passively decay, but actively reconstruct. 322  As a result,
313 Wendell Bell, Making People Responsible: The Possible, the Probable, and the Preferable, 42
AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 323, 323 (1998).
314 A DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN PROVERBS 467 (Wolfgang Mieder et al. eds. 1992); see also
WORDS OF WISDOM: MORE GOOD ADVICE 285 (William Safire & Leonard Safir eds., 1990) ("If you
fail to plan, you plan to fail.").
315 See, e.g., JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, MAXIMS AND REFLECTIONS 119 (Elisabeth Stopp
trans., 1998) ("He who looks ahead is lord of the day.").
316 ALFRED TENNYSON, IN MEMORIAM, verse 50 (Robert H. Ross ed., 1973).
317 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST, act 1, sc. 2 ("[T]he dark backward and abysm of
time....").
318 Sophocles, Ajax, in SOPHOCLES II 1, 37 (David Grene & Richmond Lattimore eds., John
Moore trans., 1957).31 ROBERT GRUDIN, TIME AND THE ART OF LIVING 82-83 (1982).320 See ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION 15
(1976) ("Every journey into the past is complicated by delusions, false memories, false naming of real
events."); JOHN H. ARNOLD, HISTORY: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 72 (2000) ("Sources are not
transparent and innocent documents. They are written in particular circumstances, for particular
audiences.").
321 See RICHARD J. EVANS, IN DEFENSE OF HISTORY 77 (1999) ("The record left us by the past is
fragmentary, and the process of selection has not always been arbitrary.").322 See FREDERIC C. BARTLETr, REMEMBERING: A STUDY IN EXPERIMENTAL AND SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 213 (1932) ("Remembering is not the re-excitation of innumerable fixed, lifeless and
fragmentary traces. It is an imaginative reconstruction, or construction, built out of the relation of our
attitude towards a whole active mass of organised past reactions or experience, and to a little
outstanding detail which commonly appears in image or language form."); EDMUND BLAIR BOLLES,
REMEMBERING AND FORGETTING: AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF MEMORY 23 (1988) ("We
remember what we understand; we understand only what we pay attention to; we pay attention to what
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information about the past tends to deteriorate with the passage of time.
Many have confirmed the existence of this phenomenon, 323 and it has not
escaped the notice of the courts.324
In addition, interpretations of the past unavoidably occur in the present
and look toward the future. For that reason, they over-emphasize the
things about the past that seem to possess significance for the present or
the future, and under-emphasize those things that do not. Of course, as
time passes our notion about what parts of the past are significant
changes. 32' The hindsight bias-a cognitive illusion that causes people to
overstate their ability to have predicted the past, and to believe that others
should have been able to predict events better than actually was
possible326-exacerbates this distortion. Learning an outcome causes
people to update their beliefs about the world, but in doing so, people
overlook the change in their beliefs that learning the outcome inspired. 27
When courts evaluate conduct after the fact, retroactively assessing the
predictability of what has occurred since the litigants acted, they are
vulnerable to the hindsight bias.328
we want.").
323 ARNOLD, supra note 320, at 12 ("[H]istorians always get things 'wrong.' We do this first
because we cannot ever get it totally 'right.' Every historical account has gaps, problems,
contradictions, areas of uncertainty.").
324 See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487 (1980) ("The
process of discovery and trial which result in the finding of ultimate facts for or against the plaintiff by
the judge or jury is obviously more reliable if the evidence or testimony in question is relatively
fresh."); see also Richard A. Epstein, The Temporal Dimension in Tort Law, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1182 (1986) ("The longer the period between operative fact and legal judgment, the more likely it is
that error will creep in: memories will fade, evidence will disappear or become unreliable.").32
1 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (A. M. Sheridan Smith trans.,
Pantheon 1972) (1969) (explaining that history is written about the past from a particular present, and
therefore history tends to emphasize the events that appear to have caused the present or to have
mattered in the present); Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and
Biases in Hindsight, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 335, 341 (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).326 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI.
L. REV. 571, 571-72 (1998) (quoting Baruch Fischoff's description of the "hindsight bias"); see also
BERNARD BAILYN, ON THE TEACHING AND WRITING OF HISTORY 53 (Edward Connery Lathem ed.,
1994) ("This is one of the great impediments to a truly contextual history. Somehow one has to
recapture, and build into the story, contemporaries' ignorance of the future."); Arthur M. Schlesinger,
Jr., The Historian as Participant, 100 DAEDALUS 339, 350 (1971) ("The present, as historians well
know, re-creates the past. This is partly because, once we know how things have come out, we tend to
rewrite the past in terms of historical inevitability.").
327 Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judgments of Past Events After the
Outcomes Are Known, 107 PSYCHOL. BULL. 311, 312-13 (1990) (describing the process of "creeping
determinism" where "outcome information is immediately and automatically integrated into a person's
knowledge about the events preceding the outcome").
321 Chris Guthrie et al., The 'Hidden Judiciary': An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch
Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1512-15 (2009) (describing a study evaluating the role of hindsight bias in
the decision-making of administrative law judges); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 777, 799-80 (2001) (describing a study evaluating the role of hindsight bias in
judicial decision-making); Rachlinski, supra note 326, at 588-90 (describing studies evaluating the role
of hindsight bias in determinations of legal culpability).
[Vol. 44:737
THE EVOLVING TEMPORALITY OF LAWMAKING
Finally, human beings are susceptible to what might be called
"temporalcentrism." We find it difficult to understand why people did the
things they did in the past.329  We unavoidably measure the past against
contemporary standards, 330 and, when we do, the past frequently suffers by
comparison.331 Of course, this is unfair.332 We know that, but we cannot
help doing it all the same. This means that, like the future, the past also
provides an unstable foundation on which to base laws and other choices.
A third reason future-oriented lawmaking might be good is that
excessive preoccupation with the past can be a burden that hinders our
ability to deal with new challenges in the innovative manner necessary to
achieve optimal results.333 This is especially problematic when technology
and culture are rapidly evolving. In that circumstance, simply relying on
our knowledge of the past is no longer enough.33 4 Accordingly, such
sentiments as "the earth belongs to the living, and not to the dead," 335 and
,,336
"[o]ur relation with the past should be that of a student, not a mortician,
are even more apt today than when they were uttered.337 At least to some
329 L.P. HARTLEY, THE Go BETWEEN 9 (1953) ("The past is a foreign country; they do things
differently there."); Henry David Thoreau, A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers, in I THE
WRITINGS OF HENRY DAVID THOREAU 162 (Houghton Mifflin 1906) (1867) ("Critical acumen is
exerted in vain to uncover the past; the past cannot be presented, we cannot know what we are not.").
330 See Charles A. Beard, Written History as an Act of Faith, 39 AM. HIST. REV. 219, 221 (1934)
("[Any written history inevitably reflects the thought of the author in his time and cultural setting.").
331 J.T. Fraser, The Problems of Exporting Faust, in TIME, SCIENCE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA AND
THE WEST: THE STUDY OF TIME V 1, 14 (J.T. Fraser et al. eds., 1986) ("[T]o every epoch its own
understanding of the world appears to be obvious and just about complete."); Posner, supra note 8, at
5 75 ("The concept of moral progress, which is definitionally historicist, invariably makes us look good
in comparison to our predecessors because it is assessed from the standpoint of the present; it is our
values that determine what is to count as progress.").
332 See MARK TWAIN, PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS OF JOAN OF ARC, at vii (Harper & Bros. 1896)
("To arrive at a just estimate of a renowned man's character one must judge it by the standards of his
time, not ours.").
333 See NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE ENGLISH NOTEBOOKS 294 (Randall Stewart ed., Russell &
Russell, Inc. 1969) (1941) ("The present is burthened too much with the past ... I do not see how
future ages are to stagger onward under all this dead weight, with the additions that will continually be
made to it."); LOWENTHAL, supra note 7, at 69 ("[T]radition is a brake on progress."); KARL MARX,
THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF LOUIS BONAPARTE 9 (Daniel De Leon trans., 3rd ed. 1913) (1852)
("The tradition of all past generations weighs like an alp upon the brain of the living.").
334 See DE JOUVENEL, supra note 38, at 10 ("[T]he fewer changes we anticipate, the more we can
continue to rely on our knowledge for the future. If society tends on the whole to conserve the present
state of affairs, our present knowledge has a high chance of being valid in the future. On the other
hand, the future validity of our knowledge becomes increasingly doubtful as the mood of society
inclines toward change and the changes promise to be more rapid.").
335 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 392, 396 (Julian P. Boyd & William H. Gaines, Jr. eds., 1958); see also LUBAN,
supra note 194, at 118 ("The framers of past laws enacted them to put out their own fires, and their
time horizons were not necessarily long enough to envision the fires that we now confront."); Holmes,
supra note 30, at 469 ("It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV.").
336 Meyer, supra note 137, at 471.
337 See ADAM & GROVES, supra note 18, at I ("Change rather than stability is the order of the
day. In this dynamic world of universal mobility, standing still means falling behind.").
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extent, law and lawmaking must evolve.338 Adapt or die is a maxim that
339
applies as well to legal rules as to species.
Fourth, as the human population of the earth has grown, and as
technology has advanced, our ability to influence the future has
increased.34° Unlike just a few generations ago, we now possess the
capability to drastically affect the lives of people who may exist hundreds
or even thousands of years from now, and even to destroy humans as a
species or to render the earth uninhabitable. 341  The future we are
shaping-or, in some instances, taking-is the present of unborn
generations.342 Unless we are careful, we may find that we are unfairly
"exploiting the future in the narrow interests of the present., 343
Accordingly, we have a responsibility to care about the future we are
creating. 344  Otherwise, we may emulate the Greek titan Kronos, who ate
his children.345
2. Why Increasingly Future-Oriented Lawmaking Might Be Bad
On the other hand, several temporal considerations weigh against the
increasing future-orientedness of lawmaking. First, we would be foolish to
338 See Gallimore v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 617 N.E.2d 1052, 1056 (Ohio 1993) ("Times
have changed and so should the law."); Lord Reid, supra note 78, at 25 ("Common sense is not static.
What passed for common sense three hundred or even one hundred years ago sometimes seems
nonsense today."). As one scholar has said, "consistency with past institutional decisions has only
limited value for its own sake; it has substantial value only if it serves some fairness or policy goal. We
may sometimes accept, but we never treasure, consistency with bad past decisions." EISENBERG, supra
note 119, at 144.
339 See Seto, supra note 111, at 2013 ("Humans dominate Earth because our behaviors evolve
more quickly than those of any other species."); 2 BLAISE PASCAL, PENSEES 271 (Ernest Havet ed.,
1881) (1651) ("The whole succession of human beings throughout the course of the ages must be
regarded as a single man, continually living and learning; and this shows how unwarranted is the
deference we yield to the philosophers of antiquity.").
340 ADAM & GROVES, supra note 18, at 33 ("[O]ur actions in contemporary society reach into ever
more distant futures and cast ever longer shadows."); AURELIO PECCEI, ONE HUNDRED PAGES FOR THE
FUTURE: REFLECTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE CLUB OF ROME 10 (1981) ("The future will no
longer be a mere continuation of the present, but a direct consequence of it.").
341 See ADAM & GROVES, supra note 18, at 110 ("What differentiates these new genetic
techniques from established traditions of selective breeding is the capacity to effect change in the
present where conventional breeders had to await results over many generations of reproductive
subjects."); id. at 167 (stating that "the future is approached as a realm where poisons can be deposited
for thousands of years, where resources evolved over millennia can be used up or depleted in a single
life time, and where our atmosphere and stratosphere can be altered").
312 Id. at 13 ("[O]ur future is the present of others.").343 Id. at 143.
344See Oren Lyons, An Iroquois Perspective, in AMERICAN INDIAN ENVIRONMENTS:
ECOLOGICAL ISSUES IN NATIVE AMERICAN HISTORY 171, 173 (Christopher Vecsey & Robert W.
Venables eds., 1980) ("We are looking ahead, as is one of the first mandates given to us as chiefs, to
make sure and to make every decision that we make relate to the welfare and well-being of the seventh
generation to come."); id. at 174 ("What about the seventh generation? Where are you taking them?
What will they have?").
345 See Hesiod, Theogony, in THEOGONY WORKS AND DAYS TESTIMONIA 1, 39, 41 (Glenn Most
trans., 2006).
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ignore the past, even if we could. By ignoring the past, we would forfeit
potentially useful information. William Shakespeare was right when he
wrote "[w]hat's past is prologue, 346 at least to some degree. Presumably
there is a sort of natural selection at work that retains the best of human
knowledge (or at least the most suitable for present and short-term future
conditions) and discards the worst as time passes.3 47 Thus, focusing too
much on the future could unduly discount what we have already devised.
As Nobel Prize-winning physicist Richard Feynman put it, "[t]o listen to
the ideas of the past and the experience of people for a long time might be
a good idea. It's only a good idea not to pay attention to the past when you
have another independent source of information that you've decided to
follow." 3
48
Second, law can be viewed as a sort of collective social memory, "a
cultural endeavor.., requiring the collaboration of many
generations .... , On this account, the present generation has a moral
obligation to respect the past because if it does not, the work of past
generations will have been wasted, and its own work will be more likely to
be ignored in the future.35° Forgetting the past may be immoral as well as
3" WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST, act 2, sc. 1; see also MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE
WORDS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 83 (Coretta Scott King ed., 1983) ("The past is prophetic .... ").347 See ALGERNON SIDNEY, DISCOURSES CONCERNING GOVERNMENT 459 (Thomas G. West ed.,
Liberty Fund Inc. 1996) (1751) ("Men are subject to errors, and 'tis the work of the best and wisest to
discover and amend such as their ancestors may have committed, or to add perfection to those things
which by them have been well invented."); Kronman, supra note 9, at 1057 (noting that the
achievements of culture are cumulative and the product of generations of collaboration). But see
Ronald A. Heiner, Imperfect Decisions and the Law: On the Evolution of Legal Precedent and Rules,
15 J. LEGAL STUD. 227, 256-57 (1986) (questioning whether the analogy to natural selection processes
is appropriate because, in human society, less harsh natural selection processes and much shorter time
scales are at work, and concluding that, as a consequence, "the law may not comprise a set of uniformly
functional doctrines and procedures. Rather, at any point in time it may embody a mixture of practices,
some highly functional and others not.").
348 RICHARD P. FEYNMAN, Richard Feynman Builds a Universe, in THE PLEASURE OF FINDING
THINGS OUT 225, 243 (Jeffrey Robbins ed., 1999).
349 Kronman, supra note 9, at 1057; Gregory A. Caldeira, The Transmission of Legal Precedent:
A Study of State Supreme Courts, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 178, 183 (1985) (describing the common law
as "the collective and collected wisdom amassed over decades, of an appellate bench"); see also
Mashaw, supra note 229, at 1343 ("We look to the past to understand who we are, to justify our
normative commitments, and to give meaning to the present. The past is the repository of our cultural
and intellectual resources.").
311 WILLIAM HAZLITT, On Reading New Books, in 12 COLLECTED WORKS OF WILLIAM HALITr:
FUGITIVE WRITINGS 161, 171 (A.R. Waller & Arnold Glover eds., 1904) ("By despising all that has
preceded us, we teach others to despise ourselves."). A similar argument has been made for the
proposition that judges should respect precedents; otherwise, the doctrine of stare decisis will be
weakened and their own decisions will have no staying power. Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges
and Justices Maximize? (The Same Things Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 14-15
(1993) (stating that judges do not like to be "reversed" but noting that this aversion to reversal does not
figure largely in the judicial utility function as such reversals have become rare at the appellate level
and are nonexistent at the Supreme Court level).
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shortsighted.35'
352Third, adherence to precedent promotes inter-temporal equity.
"Since the past cannot be undone, the only way to treat later cases like
(identical) earlier ones is to conform the later cases to them; this is a
consequence of the rather obvious fact that time flows in one direction
only., 35 3  Maintaining fairness among litigants, then, may compel us to
respect, and to repeat, what we have previously done, even if we now
believe that what we did was suboptimal. For this reason as well,
forgetting or ignoring past decisions and rules seems wrong.
Fourth, humans are not particularly adept at predicting the future.354
"The future," it has been said, "is a sealed book,, 355 the contents of which
are "hidden from us., 356 Since ancient times, humans have recognized the
limits of foresight.357 More recently, it has been observed that "[e]very
prediction contains an element of irreducible uncertainty,"358 and even that
351 See SIMONE WELL, THE NEED FOR ROOTS: PRELUDE TO A DECLARATION OF DUTIES TOWARD
MANKIND 51-52 (Arthur Wills trans., 1952) ("The past once destroyed never returns. The destruction
of the past is perhaps the greatest of all crimes.").
352 See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN.
L. REV. 817, 850-55 (1994) (arguing that judicial adherence to precedent promotes uniformity,
"facilitates the administration of public law, ensures that similarly situated people are treated equally,
bolsters respect for judicial authority, and provides the authority of a single voice").
353 Kronman, supra note 9, at 1041; see also Douglas, supra note 99, at 736 ("And there will be
no equal justice under law if a negligence rule is applied in the morning but not in the afternoon."). But
see JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY tN AMERICAN JUSTICE 268 (1949)
('Equality before the law' is a properly cherished principle. Yet it ought not to be pushed to ridiculous
limits. Merely because a court was outrageously unfair to Mr. Simple in 1900 is a poor reason for
being equally unfair to Mr. Timid in 1947. Thus to perpetuate a markedly unjust rule seems a queer
way of doing justice.").
354 See STEWART BRAND, How BUILDINGS LEARN: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER THEY'RE BUILT 178
(1994) ("All predictions are wrong."); see also LAURA LEE, BAD PREDICTIONS (2000) (collecting over
1000 examples of failed predictions); Roger Buehler et al., Inside the Planning Fallacy: The Causes
and Consequences of Optimistic Time Predictions, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 250 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (stating that "predicted completion times
for specific future tasks tend to be more optimistic than can be justified by the actual completion times
or by the predictors' general beliefs about the amount of time such tasks usually take"). Even the
Supreme Court has made embarrassingly poor predictions. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681,
702 (1997) (predicting that respondent Jones's lawsuit against President Clinton was "highly unlikely
to occupy any substantial amount of [the President's] time").
3 5 A DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN PROVERBS, supra note 314, at 244.
356 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 223e (G. E. M. Anscombe trans.,
3d ed. 1958).
357 DE JOUVENEL, supra note 38, at 5 ("[T]he expression 'knowledge of the future' is a
contradiction in terms."); Sophocles, Ajax, in SOPHOCLES 111, 62 (David Grene & Richmond Lattimore
eds., John Moore trans., 1957) ("What men have seen they know/But what shall come hereafter/No
man before the event can see/Nor what end waits for him.").
358 Thomas R. Stewart, Uncertainty, Judgment, and Error in Prediction, in PREDICTION: SCIENCE,
DECISION MAKING, AND THE FUTURE OF NATURE 41 (Daniel Sarewitz et al. eds., 2000) (stating that
although it is undisputed that every prediction necessarily has at least some degree of uncertainty, the
implications of this uncertainty are generally not appreciated).
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predicting the future is simply "impossible., 359 "Foresight," as one French
poet commented, "is a dream from which the event awakes US.
360
Predicting what other people, whether singly or in groups, will do is
especially challenging because the connection between future human
behavior and the past is tenuous. As Barbara Adam has explained:
[M]uch of human futurity is not of the kind that can be
extrapolated from a known past. Rather, it is open-ended,
rooted in being unto death and irreducibly tied to human
freedom. Our futurity, in other words, is marked by
anticipation, fear, hope and desire; by the capacity to use
our imagination, calculate and speculate, plan and make
choices; by entering contracts, honoring obligations, taking
responsibility and acting on trust; by being guided by
ideals, passions and ambitions as well as ethics, morals,
faith and visions of how the world ought to be. In
everyday life, it seems people (including scientists) bracket
past-based causality, casting aside its restrictions by living
futurity and practicing protention.36'
The quality of legal rules cannot help but be adversely affected by our
inability to predict other people's behavior.362
Our inability to reliably predict the future even extends to our forecasts
of our own future preferences.363 For example, people who buy food for
two weeks at a time, rather than one day at a time, usually are less satisfied
with their choices because they fail to accurately predict what they will feel
like eating even a few days later.364 Similarly, "human beings are
359 ARTHUR C. CLARKE, PROFILES OF THE FUTURE, at xi (1962) ("It is impossible to predict the
future, and all attempts to do so in any detail appear ludicrous within a very few years.").
360 PAUL VALERY, MAUVAISES PENSEES ET AUTRES 98 (15th ed. 1942).
361 Barbara Adam, Memory of Futures, 4 KRONOSCOPE 297, 302 (2004) (describing human
futurity as open-ended, unpredictable, and often unable to be extrapolated from the past).
362 As an example, predictions of recidivism by violent criminals or the mentally ill frequently
prove to be inaccurate when tested by data rather than by intuition. John F. Edens et al., Predictions of
Future Dangerousness in Capital Murder Trials: Is it Time to "Disinvent the Wheel, " 29 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 55, 81 (2005) (reporting that "in the current sample of Texas inmates, only 5% of capital
defendants predicted by experts to constitute 'continuing threats to society' in fact committed
subsequent serious acts of violence in prison over a relatively long follow-up period"); id. at 60-61
(summarizing research revealing that clinicians' "predictions that an individual would engage in a
violent act in the future were correct only about one-third of the time").
363 Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting, 80 IND.
L.J. 155, 162 (2005) (stating that "people are ... unable to accurately predict their own or others'
emotional states").364 See BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS 51-52 (2004) (arguing
that "neither our predictions about how we will feel after an experience nor our memories of how we
did feel during the experience are very accurate reflections of how we actually do feel while the
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remarkably bad at predicting how various experiences will make them
feel. 365 Young college professors asked to anticipate how they would feel
if they were awarded or denied tenure, correctly predicted the valence of
their feelings, but overestimated how good a positive decision would make
them feel and how bad a negative decision would make them feel. 3 66 If we
cannot predict even relatively simple matters like this about ourselves, it is
difficult to imagine how we can expect to accurately predict the
preferences of others.
Fifth, an obsession with looking to the future means that we cannot
dwell comfortably in the present. Our hopefulness and drive to improve
and adapt our law make it difficult for us to accept our law as it is and to
adjust to it.367  Excessive future-orientedness makes our law seem
contingent and provisional, rather than like a treasured heirloom handed
down to us by our ancestors.368 Increasingly, precedents seem like "a
restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only., 369  This
appearance may breed cynicism about law and lead to an underinvestment
in making law work.
Sixth, pre-commitments are frequently useful and value-maximizing.
Binding contractual promises facilitate planning and optimal deployment
experience is occurring"); see also Daniel Read & George Loewenstein, Diversification Bias:
Explaining the Discrepancy in Variety-Seeking Between Combined and Separate Choices, I J. Exp.
PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 34, 34-35 (1995) (arguing that human consumers engage in "diversification bias,"
a process by which they select many goods of the same kind, thus creating "much more diversity for
themselves than they will subsequently want"); Itamar Simonson, The Effect of Purchase Quantity and
Timing on Variety-Seeking Behavior, 27 J. MARKETING RES. 150, 150 (1990) ("[C]onsumers'
preferences when making purchases may be poor predictors of their preferences in a future
consumption period because of possible changes in state of mind and tastes.") (internal citation
omitted).
365 SCHWARTZ, supra note 364, at 173.
366 See Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective
Forecasting, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 617, 617-24 (1998) (stating that recent positive
experiencers were "not as happy as forecasters believed they would be after becoming recent positive
experiencers themselves" and that recent negative experiencers were "happier than forecasters
estimated they would be after becoming recent negative experiencers themselves").
367 FRASER, supra note 5, at 186 ("Contemporary legal scholars tend to view laws as forms of
community discourse subject to continuous revision."); see also BROOKS, supra note 45, at 273 ("The
hopeful person is always chasing the grapes of Tantalus, which remain always out of reach. The
hopeful person has trouble living in the present and savoring the moment, for she is imprudently
distracted by the mirages of the future. She doesn't appreciate what she has, because she is consumed
by the thought of what she might have."); cf S. G. F. BRANDON, MAN AND HIS DESTINY IN THE GREAT
RELIGIONS 385 (1962) ("Man's awareness of time renders him incapable of complete immersion in
present experience; it causes him ever to be looking ahead beyond the immediate moment .... ").
368 BROOKS, supra note 45, at 275-76 ("In the land of the future, one's relationship to a place, to a
job, to a lifestyle is provisional, because at any juncture, you might move on in pursuit of the
horizon.").
369 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 666, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Supreme Court's tendency to overrule previous decisions "indicates an intolerance for what those who
have composed [the] court in the past have consciously and deliberately concluded").
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of resources.370  Tying our hands also can prevent us from taking action
that is contrary to our long-term best interest in the heat of a crisis.
371
Seventh, "future-orientedness" might give a single generation or a
small number of generations too much lawmaking power in the long run.
372 hecBroadly speaking, generations collaborate in making law, with each
generation contributing new doctrine to the pile of law heaped up by its
predecessors. But once law is created it acquires inertia that makes it
difficult to change.373 A burst of lawmaking, such as America underwent
during the twentieth century, may be problematic. Society may be better
off if law develops at a more even rate so that law can keep pace with
societal change rather than sporadically lagging behind it and leaping
ahead of it. More gradual lawmaking also helps prevent one era-which
may be an unfortunate one in terms of the quality of the law made, or
which may possess idiosyncrasies unrepresentative of conditions and needs
generally prevailing in the long run-from dominating the legal landscape
for a long period of time.
For these reasons, some have argued that it is a mistake to try to make
law for the future, especially the distant future. Thomas Jefferson thought
that all constitutions and laws should expire after a generation, which he
calculated to be nineteen years.374 John Maynard Keynes believed even
that was too long:
We cannot expect to legislate for a generation or more.
The secular changes in man's economic condition and the
liability of human forecast to error are as likely to lead to
mistake in one direction as in another. We cannot as
reasonable men do better than base our policy on the
evidence we have and adapt it to the five or ten years over
370 Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1063 (2011) ("[The] ability
to precommit is vital to planning the organization of a complex economy and culture, such as our own,
throughout a number of years.").
371 ELSTER, supra note 17, at 7 ("When we act under the influence of passions, they may cause us
to deviate from plans laid in a cooler moment. Knowledge of this tendency creates an incentive to
precomit ourselves, to help us stick to our plans.").
372 See Gerard N. Magliocca, Preemptive Opinions: The Secret History of Worcester v. Georgia
and Dred Scott, 63 U. PITT. L. REv. 487, 587 (2002) ("Each generation seeks to place its unique stamp
on our fundamental law, and in so doing comes into collision with the collective wisdom of the past.").
373 CALABRESI, supra note 21, at 2 (noting that "a statute is hard to revise once it is passed");
HOROWITZ, supra note 118 at 53 ("[T]here is no mistaking the singular lack of judicial machinery to
detect and correct unintended consequences after they have occurred."); Stewart, supra note 227, at 447
("The inflexibility and rapid obsolescence of the detailed conduct blueprints issued by federal agencies
make them simultaneously more burdensome and less effective.").
374 THOMAS JEFFERSON, On the Constitution, in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 351, 352
(Saul K. Padover ed., 1967).
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which we may suppose ourselves to have some measure of
prevision .... 375
Because statutory and regulatory law are essentially predictive in character
and can be difficult to change,376 by relying more heavily upon them we
may be "colonizing the future., 37 7 Worse yet, such colonizing may amount
to carving in stone legal rules based upon predictions which will turn out to
be not only erroneous, but also a far cry from what we had projected we
would want just a few years earlier.
Therefore, we should not make predictions, or base our choices on
predictions, unless absolutely necessary. 378 To the extent that law is based
upon predictions, its foundation is likely an unstable one.
C. Institutional Considerations
The quality of legal rules depends in part on the characteristics of the
mechanism used to create them. The nature of the legal rules made by
courts, legislatures, agencies, and diplomats380 differs.381  Sometimes a
judicially-created rule works best, so shifting lawmaking away from courts
and toward legislatures, agencies, or diplomats may result in the creation
of sub-optimal legal rules.382  Other times, however, a non-judicially-
375 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE 204 (1920).
376 CALABRESI, supra note 21, at 6 (observing that statutes which are "inconsistent with a new
social or legal topography," and which "could not have been reenacted and thus could be said to lack
current majoritarian support," sometimes remain in effect because the "interests served by these
outdated laws could successfully block their amendment or repeal") (footnote omitted); see also
Stewart, supra note 227, at 447 (describing a similar problem of obsolesce and obstacles to change in
the administrative rulemaking context).
377 Adam, supra note 361, at 298.
378 See OSCAR WILDE, A New Book on Dickens, in THE ARTIST AS CRITIC: CRITICAL WRITINGS
OF OSCAR WILDE 46, 47 (Richard Ellmann ed., 1969) ("[O]f all forms of error, prophecy is the most
gratuitous ... ").379 See HOROWITZ, supra note 118, at 24 (noting that "every process, every institution has its
characteristic ways of operating; each is biased toward certain kinds of outcomes; each leaves its
distinctive imprint on the matters it touches").
380 use the term "diplomat" as a proxy for all of those involved in lawmaking by treaty,
including not just diplomats, but also the president and the legislature, when applicable.
38 Because of the infeasibility of repeatedly creating a new constitution or frequently amending
an existing one, constitutional framers are not a realistic alternative to courts, legislatures, agencies, and
diplomats, as day-to-day lawmakers, so I do not discuss their strengths and weaknesses.
382 EISENBERG, supra note 119, at 5 (arguing that "in many areas the flexible form of a judicial
rule is preferable to the canonical form of a legislative rule"); Lord Reid, supra note 78, at 28 ("If you
think in months, want an instant solution for your problems and don't mind that it won't wear well,
then go for legislation. If you think in decades, prefer orderly growth and believe in the old proverb
more haste less speed, then stick to the common law."); Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional
Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1659 (2005) ("Judges
are good at answering some questions, and legislatures are good at answering others."). Lawmaking
competence also depends in part on subject matter. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 25-26 (2d ed. 1986) ("[C]ourts
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created rule works better, so shifting lawmaking away from courts and
383toward one or more of the other lawmaking institutions makes sense.
Non-judicial lawmaking is sometimes attractive because legislatures,
agencies, and diplomats possess some structural advantages as lawmakers
relative to courts. However, there are tradeoffs because those institutions
also possess some structural disadvantages.384
Some methods of lawmaking are quicker than others. Speed, however,
is a double-edged sword in lawmaking. It can be advantageous, especially
when conditions are rapidly evolving. Legislatures, agencies, and
diplomats can act more quickly than courts, even if they do not always do
so, and that may be one reason why the types of law they make have
become so prevalent. Not only does litigation have a slow gestation
period, but one case usually is not sufficient to establish a rule, especially
if it is not a Supreme Court case. 385 At common law, it typically takes not
one case, but several cases presented over a span of years, to accomplish
what a statute, treaty, or regulation can accomplish in a few months. And
386that protracted process must be repeated jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction.
Even a Supreme Court decision may not establish a rule because its
holding may be so general that lower courts must first apply the broad
principle in numerous cases before a definitive rule emerges. Although
have certain capacities for dealing with matters of principle that legislatures and executives do not
possess. . . . This is crucial in sorting out the enduring values of a society .... "); Michael W.
McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, Ill HARV. L. REV.
153, 156 (1997) ("[A] rigorous judicial examination of effects on commerce would entail making
economic judgments of a kind ill-suited to courts.").
383 CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 300-01 (7th ed. 1964) ("[A]ncient doctrines of
the common law are constantly undergoing adaptation .... But the process is slow and uneven, and it
would be an exaggeration to suppose that the Common Law always keeps abreast of changing
conditions. Sometimes, out of excessive deference to precedent, it singularly fails to do so.").
384 Stephenson, supra note 64, at 1070 (explaining that "court decisions exhibit more stability
over time but more ideological heterogeneity across issues, whereas agency decisions are more
ideologically consistent within a given time period but more likely to vary across time"); Giacomo
A.M. Ponzetto & Patricio A. Fernandez, Case Law Versus Statute Law: An Evolutionary Comparison,
37 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 411 (2008) ("The evolution of case law is beneficial because it generates a
sequential interaction between a series of judges with different preferences whose idiosyncrasies then
balance one another .... [T]he evolution of case law provides better outcomes [than statutes] in the
long run, unless the efficient rule is changing over time. When the optimum is highly mutable,
common law should include a role for statutes to correct the rigidity of binding precedent.").
385 LLEWELLYN, supra note 70, at 48 ("[N]o case has meaning by itself. Standing alone it gives
you no guidance."); Edouard Lambert & Max J. Wasserman, The Case Method in Canada and the
Possibilities of its Adaptation to the Civil Law, 39 YALE L.J. 1, 15 (1929) ("The practice of the courts
does not become a source of law until it is definitely fixed by the repetition of precedents which are in
agreement on a single point."); Alan Watson, Aspects of the Reception of Law, 44 AM. J. CoMP. L. 335,
342 (1996) ("When law is created by judicial precedent it has to wait on the course of events. A
doctrine may emerge from a line of cases over a considerable period of time; and the judges in the first
case may be quite unaware of the parameters of the resulting doctrine.").
386 Frank M. Coffin, The Problem of Obsolete Statutes: A New Role for Courts?, 91 YALE L.J.
827, 834 (1982) (book review) ("Courts in the hey-day of common law rules were not notoriously
energetic about updating. Sometimes centuries passed without more than glacial movement.").
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legislatures can act more quickly, broad language in a statute or treaty may
sometimes require similar elaboration before a clear rule is born.387
Regulations are usually more detailed, so that they may not need
elaboration to acquire the requisite specificity, but when they do, agencies
can readily supply guidelines and policy statements to fill the gaps. On the
other hand, the administrative rulemaking process can be slow.
Fast lawmaking comes at a cost, however. Avulsive changes in law
resulting from the adoption of treaties, the enactment of statutes, and the
promulgation of administrative regulations undercut the important interests
promoted by stare decisis (such as stability, predictability, legitimacy, and
efficiency).388 As an example, if law changes quickly, it may fail to
achieve one of its central purposes, namely, providing effective incentives
for future behavior. People who attempt to follow the law may have the
rug pulled out from under them often enough that eventually they may
simply stop trying to comply-thereby rendering incentives ineffectual. At
first glance, abrupt changes in law made by legislators, administrators, or
diplomats (who are directly or indirectly subject to legislative or popular
control) seem less troubling than similar changes by undemocratic
courts.3 89 But, in reality, all abrupt legal change undercuts the notion that
justice system outcomes should be based on "rules of law and not merely
the opinions of a small group of men who temporarily occupy high
office."3 90 Only if law evolves slowly over time does it seem to have
direction of its own, independent of the particular people who happen to
make it. Changes that are too rapid or too frequent undercut the perceived
legitimacy of law.
387 See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) ("Not every principle essential to the
effective administration of a statute can or should be cast immediately into the mold of a general rule.
Some principles must await their own development, while others must be adjusted to meet particular,
unforeseeable situations."); Jerome Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory
Interpretation, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 1259, 1264 (1947) ("The legislature is like a composer. It cannot
help itself: It must leave interpretation to others, principally to the courts.").
388 See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970); HART & SACKS, supra note
226, at 568-69 (summarizing the policies promoted by stare decisis); Seto, supra note 11, at 2025-26
("The requirement that courts adhere to precedent serves to preserve the cultural learning embodied in
that precedent . . . .Legislatures have no comparable mechanism. As a result, it is easier for
legislatures to discard cultural leaming in the heat of the moment.").389 See Jones v. Sec'y of State for Soc. Servs., [1972] A.C. 944 (H.L.) 1026 (appeal taken from
Eng.) ("Nevertheless, the theory [that judges were not makers of law but merely its discoverers and
expounders], however unreal, had its value-in limiting the sphere of lawmaking by the judiciary
(inevitably at some disadvantage in assessing the potential repercussion of any decision, and
increasingly so in a complex modem industrial society), and thus also in emphasizing that central
feature of our constitution, the sovereignty of Parliament."). Of course, many judges are elected and
thus, theoretically subject to popular control. See AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL
SELECTION IN THE STATES (2004), available at http://www.judicialselection.us (providing state-specific
information on judicial selection).
390 Malts, supra note 127, at 371 (footnote omitted).
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The slower pace of courts, and the characteristic lag between the
events precipitating a lawsuit and adjudication, gives courts an edge over
legislatures, agencies, and diplomats in this respect. As Alexander Bickel
put it, "the marvelous mystery of time give[s] courts capacity to appeal to
men's better natures, to call forth their aspirations, which may have been
forgotten in the moment's hue and cry."'39' In a sense, law made by courts
is like the hundred-day moving average of a stock price392 because courts
make law by blending the past, present, and future. This measured pace
dilutes or dampens fluctuations in common law relative to more volatile
legislative law,393 but it also makes judicial lawmaking more ponderous.
On the other hand, courts can implement change more quickly than
legislators, administrators, or diplomats in one limited sense: courts can
apply their decisions retroactively, at least to cases remaining open on
direct review.
394
Different lawmaking institutions make law at different times relative to
events. Courts make law reactively ex post, after harm has been done, and
only after an alleged victim has initiated legal proceedings. By contrast,
legislators, administrators, and diplomats make law proactively ex ante,
before harm has been done, and without having to wait for a complainant
to rouse them to action. Because it is difficult to predict the future, a court,
with the benefit of hindsight, may more easily determine the optimal rule
than a legislator, administrator, or diplomat acting in foresight.395 On the
other hand, judgments made in hindsight may be distorted and unfair to
litigants, providing an unsound basis on which to rest future law.3
96
Some lawmakers have better access to information than others. As
compared to the information-gathering resources of courts, "the
information-gathering resources of administrators are vastly superior; those
of legislators, modestly superior. ' 397 In particular, "courts suffer from an
unusual poverty of resources to minimize the incidence of unintended
consequences in advance and especially to detect and correct them once
they occur.,398 This drawback is a serious failing where future-oriented
391 BICKEL, supra note 382, at 26.
392 See Magliocca, supra note 372, at 498 (observing that in common law adjudication "judges
pull their values from a consensus built up over time").
393 See Schauer, supra note 132, at 604-05 (describing precedents as "stabilizers and brakes,
rather than engines and accelerators").
394 See, e.g., Shannon, supra note 136, at 812 ("Today, the retroactive application of judicial
decisions remains the norm.") (citing Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 114 (1993)).395 See ELINOR RICE HAYS, MORNING STAR: A BIOGRAPHY OF LUCY STONE 1818-1893 312
(196 1) ("Those most dedicated to the future are not always the best prophets.").
396 Rachlinski, supra note 326, at 571, 596 ("The hindsight bias is a systematic error with the
capacity to distort the legal system in undesirable ways.").
397 HOROWITZ, supra note 118, at 55 (footnote omitted).
398 HOROWITZ, supra note 118, at 52.
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lawmaking is concerned. 399  However, the legislature's information
advantage should not be exaggerated. "For every judge who acts on
imperfect information, students can produce three legislators. ' '4°°
Diplomats also possess an advantage in this respect. Treaties benefit
from an unusually rich information base because they emanate from
multiple cultures and legal traditions and may require the endorsement of
two branches of government.40' In addition, because treaties transcend
national boundaries, the solutions they offer can be more comprehensive
than those offered by domestic legislation or regulations. On the other
hand, treaties also possess weaknesses.40 2
Sometimes the way in which an institution makes law fails to take
advantage of its institutional strengths and leaves it vulnerable to its
institutional weaknesses, especially with respect to the information at its
disposal. Courts engaging in prospective overruling and other forms of
"judicial legislating" are not basing their decisions on the narrow
circumstances before them. 40 3  Therefore, their inability to engage in the
sort of wide-ranging fact-finding that legislatures are capable of
performing may generate legal rules that are based upon insufficient
information.4 °4 Similarly, the size and complexity of many statutes, and
399 RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 80 (2003) ("What the judge has
before him is the facts of the particular case, not the facts of future cases. He can try to imagine what
those cases will be like, but the likelihood of error in such an imaginative projection is great.").
400 HOROWITZ, supra note 118, at 293.
401 JAN1S, supra note 286, at 95 (stating that of all international agreements entered into by the
United States between 1946 and 1972, 6% were sent to the Senate for advice and consent pursuant to
Article II, § 2, 86.7% were agreements made by the President pursuant to authorizing legislation passed
by both houses of Congress, and just 7.4% were agreements made by the President without any
congressional participation) (citing L. K. JOHNSON, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 13
(1984)). Since either the full Congress (86.7%) or the Senate (6%) is involved in authorizing or
approving a treaty about 92.7% of the time, the information on which treaties are based is usually no
worse than that on which statutes are based, and it may in fact be better because the knowledge of other
nations informs the drafting process.
402 For example, transplanted law may not properly take root in foreign soil to which it is ill-
suited, and generalized law designed to be acceptable to many nations may not fit any nation optimally.
See MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 8 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds., 1989) (arguing that "[lI]aws
should be so appropriate to the people for whom they are made that it is very unlikely that the laws of
one nation can suit another"); David Berkowitz et al., The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163,
189 (2003) ("Where law develops internally through a process of trial and error, innovation and
correction .... legal institutions tend to be highly effective. By contrast, where foreign law is imposed
and legal evolution is external rather than internal, legal institutions tend to be much weaker.").
403 Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REv. 847, 858-69,
895-904 (2005) (describing a variety of doctrinal changes-e.g., the weakening of the political
question doctrine, the erosion of the mootness doctrine, and the ban on providing advisory opinions-
which have resulted in the Supreme Court deciding constitutional questions that formerly would have
been avoided as unnecessary).
4o4 HOROWITZ, supra note 118, at 44 ("Because courts respond only to the cases that come their
way, they make general law from what may be very special situations."); see also Freeman, supra note
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the haste with which they are enacted by busy legislatures (sometimes
without hearings or meaningful debate), means that legislatures often do
not fully utilize the fact-finding procedures available to them (or even have
the opportunity to read the entire text of the bills they are enacting).40 5
Some have suggested that legislatures too often act precipitously, lurching
from crisis to crisis, and acting hastily because of intense short-term
political pressure rather than on the basis of careful long-term study.40 6
That may be partly true. Attempts to streamline the legislative process to
enable it to respond to social change even more rapidly may exacerbate
this problem.
407
One reason common law rules may work better than legislative rules in
some situations is that they are created in small increments and can be fine-
tuned if they prove unsuitable. °8 Courts usually make law piecemeal,
164, at 178 (noting that legislators have a wider array of options available than do judges when
deciding how best to achieve a goal).
405 United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 118-19 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that an
unclear text may be "'the consequence of a legislative accident; perhaps caused by nothing more than
the unfortunate fact that Congress is too busy to do all of its work as carefully as it should"') (quoting
Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 97 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); SCALIA, supra
note 90, at 32 ("In earlier days, when Congress had a smaller staff and enacted less legislation, it might
have been possible to believe that a significant number of senators or representatives were present for
the floor debate, or read the committee reports, and actually voted on the basis of what they heard or
read. Those days, if they ever existed, are long gone."); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and
the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L.
REv. 1295, 1311-12 (1990) ("It strains credulity to argue that members of Congress read the text of all
the bills they vote upon, or that the President carefully reads each bill he signs. The sheer volume of
statutes and the numerous commitments placed on members make it impossible for them to read all
bills.").406 See Jack Davies, A Response to Statutory Obsolescence: The Nonprimacy of Statutes Act, 4
VT. L. REv. 203, 228 (1979) ("The fundamental fact about any legislature is that it responds rather than
leads.").
407 THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that in the legislature, "promptitude
of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit"); WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND
THE SOCIAL ACCELERATION OF TIME 54-55 (2004) (explaining how legislatures might attempt to adapt
to social acceleration, but arguing that by doing so they might be abandoning their institutional
advantages as lawmakers).
408 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up Versus Top-Down Lawmaking, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 933, 933-
34 (2006) ("Democratic societies make law in two ways: case-by-case adjudication by courts or
adoption of general principles by legislatures. Case-by-case adjudication produces law when courts
adopt general principles to decide the outcome of individual disputes. Legislation, in contrast, involves
an abstract declaration of general principles to apply to some future set of disputes. Only rarely is
legislation designed specifically to resolve a particular dispute.... Adjudication thus builds law from
the group up, one dispute at a time. Legislation builds law from the top down by creating general
principles that cover future disputes.") (footnotes omitted). Whether this actually produces higher
quality legal rules is debatable. Compare Omychund v. Barker, 1 Atk. 21, 33, 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 22-23
(Ch. 1744) (Lord Mansfield) ("A statute can seldom take in all cases, therefore the common law that
works itself pure by rules drawn from the fountain of justice is for this reason superior to an Act of
Parliament."), and Lum v. Fullaway, 42 Haw. 500, 502-03 (1958) ("[T]he genius of the common law,
upon which our jurisprudence is based, is its capacity for orderly growth .... The vehicle by which
such growth is accomplished is what may be described as judge-made law."), with Frederick Schauer,
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generalizing only after a lengthy period of trial and error, while legislators,
administrators, and diplomats typically attempt to create a comprehensive
scheme.
Common-law courts face many institutional limitations,
but one constraint they do not face is time. There is no
pressure for ordinary judges to rush in and develop a
comprehensive doctrinal synthesis or establish clear
standards for society's difficult problems. Instead, courts
are expected to resolve cases based on intuitions of equity
for years, sometimes decades, before the bar might expect
them to pull the cases together and announce THE
PRINCIPLE .... 409
This feature of the common law may be especially valuable when, as is the
case with the future, information is scarce.410  For example, a court may
make a tiny exception to an established rule and then expand or narrow
that exception depending upon how well the exception worked, assuming
that it is not confronting a deadline.41  Although legislatures might
approximate this technique by means of temporary legislation,4 2 or by
The Failure of the Common Law, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 765, 777 (2004) ("To believe that the common law
works itself pure is to believe that subsequent cases correct the errors of earlier ones far more than they
add errors to previously sound doctrines, and that new cases present opportunities for refinement rather
than occasions for mistake."), and Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common
Law: A Supply-Side Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1551, 1552 (2003) (arguing that the common law is
neither inevitably nor systematically self-correcting).
409 Magliocca, supra note 372, at 502-03.
410 HOROWITZ, supra note 118, at 35; Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative
Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 98 (1983) (arguing that incremental changes in legal rules are most conducive
to optimal content and precision); see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MrNIMALISM
ON THE SUPREME COURT 57 (1999) (stating that minimalism in common law adjudication may be best
where "factual or moral uncertainty and rapidly changing circumstances" undermine confidence in
identifying the best rule for the future).
411 See Magliocca, supra note 372, at 502-03 ("A strategy of avoiding decisions or rendering
exquisitely narrow rulings, which is integral to both the passive virtues and minimalism, works only if
there is no immediate need to answer the issues under considerations. If a court had a deadline by
which a particular set of issues had to be resolved, then a broader decision-perhaps made in a single
burst-would be required to beat that deadline.").
412 Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 247, 273-75 (2007) (identifying
three types of temporary legislation: (1) legislation "used to fill gaps in existing law or as placeholder
legislation enacted to cover interim time periods while the legislature considers permanent legislation";
(2) legislation "enacted to respond to policy problems that are themselves believed to be temporary";
and (3) legislation to "implement policy as a short-term basis as a means of generating information that
can be subsequently incorporated into the policymaking process"). Temporary legislation allows us to
learn from our experience-i.e., if a seemingly sound approach is not working--something that is
discouraged by permanent legislation. It also allows us to act immediately, secure in the knowledge
that if we make a mistake or learn from experience we can easily undo what we have done and refine
our approach. Id. at 268 ("When uncertainty in a policy domain is high, temporary legislation produces
informational benefits that aid in the selection of optimal policy.") (footnote omitted).
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amending a statute to fix a mistake, time constraints limit their ability to do
so. This might give courts an advantage.4 3 As Learned Hand once said,
"[n]obody is so gifted with foresight that he can divine all possible human
events in advance and prescribe the proper rule for each."
414
This case-by-case model of rulemaking has drawbacks, however. One
prominent downside is that courts may not be looking at the big picture, as
other lawmakers ordinarily do, so that their view of the forest may be
obscured by the sight of a few trees. Specifically, courts may fall prey to
the availability heuristic-a tendency to assume that a highly salient event
is more common or typical than it actually is. 41 5 That cognitive error might
cause courts to believe that the situation presented by a particular case is
typical of many other cases when in fact it is an infrequent and aberrant
circumstance. Moreover, the equities of a particular case might push a
court in the direction of creating a rule of law that is either more plaintiff-
oriented or more defendant-oriented than the rule it would have crafted
based upon a sample of fifty cases in which the equities would be more
balanced in the aggregate.41 This nearsightedness might also lead to the
adoption of a rule poorly suited for the vast majority of cases. Of course,
legislatures may act on the basis of a highly salient situation rather than a
413 ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 45 (1938) ("Judicial finding of law
has a real advantage in competition with legislation in that it works with concrete cases and generalizes
only after a long course of trial and error in the effort to work out a practicable principle. Legislation,
when more than declaratory, when it does more than restate authoritatively what judicial experience has
indicated involves the difficulties and the perils of prophecy."). Some think that rules are usually
better. E.g., Antonin Scalia, Essay, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rudes, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1187
(1989) (arguing that "the Rule of Law, the law of rules, be extended as far as the nature of the question
allows"). Others disagree. E.g., Kathleen Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards,
106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 57-62 (1992) (exploring the relative advantages and disadvantages of rules and
standards).
414 LEARNED HAND, Is a Judge Free in Rendering a Decision?, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 105
(3d ed. 1977).
415 See, e.g., SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 125-26,
178-80 (1993) (discussing the availability heuristic); cf LLEWELLYN, supra note 142, at 121 (alluding
to the "power of the particular").416 See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 103-04 (1930) ("'The judge really decides
by feeling and not by judgment, by hunching and not by ratiocination, such ratiocination appearing
only in the opinion. The vital motivating impulse for the decision is an intuitive sense of what is right
or wrong in the particular case; and the astute judge, having so decided, enlists his every faculty and
belabors his laggard mind, not only to justify that intuition to himself, but to make it pass muster with
his critics.' Accordingly, he passes in review all of the rules, principles, legal categories, and concepts
'which he may find useful, directly or by an analogy, so as to select from them those which in his
opinion will justify his desired result."') (quoting Judge Hutcheson); Schauer, supra note 408, at 779
("Judges are human, and the facts of the particular case will occupy the foreground of their
phenomenology. This may at times provide useful contextualization, but it may at times provide
distortion, and it is hardly inconceivable that a contemporary reluctance to rely too heavily on case-
focused rulemaking reflects a recognition that case-based rulemaking brings as many disadvantages as
advantages.").
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broader sample as well, so this problem is not confined to courts.4 17 But a
legislature is more likely to have a wider range of situations before it than a
court, which is usually faced with one simple, bilateral dispute at a time.
Although this problem is not limited to situations in which courts are
making future-oriented rules, it is exacerbated in that situation because so
little reliable information about circumstances outside the particular case is
available. The Supreme Court's growing inclination to grant certiorari in
groups or clusters of cases418 is one way of mitigating the truncated
perspective caused by the availability heuristic. Lower courts can
accomplish a similar result by consolidating related cases or transferring
them to a single judge.419 Specialization by judges might also help.42°
The common law also may not be as effective a process for refinement
and error correction as it seems for another reason. "Courts are dependent
on litigants for ignition., 42' This has at least two implications. First, the
selection of cases that find their way to court may be unrepresentative of
the bulk of those to which a legal rule applies.422 Second, the process for
developing new rules and fixing old rules is slow and haphazard.
Slowly, through a line of cases-always interspersed in a
large pool of cases of many other kinds-the realization
that there are problems stemming from earlier decisions
may strike the judges. If so, they may turn to corrective
action, doubtless long after the initial decisions were made
417 See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 905 (2006) (citing
the example of Megan's Law); see also Schauer, supra note 408, at 778 ("Prospective rules are
necessarily generalizations, and the generalizations that best suit large classes of cases are
generalizations that ignore features-even relevant ones--of particular cases.") (footnote omitted).
418 Healy, supra note 403, at 861 n.60.
419 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006) (stating that "when civil actions involving one or more common
questions of fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings"); FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a) (stating that "if an action
before the court involves a common question of law or fact, the court may consolidate the action").420 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Inside the Bankruptcy Judge's Mind, 86 B.U. L. REv. 1227,
1229, 1257 (2006) (recognizing the advantages of specialization, and, while finding that it did not
insulate judges from some cognitive errors, ultimately concluding that specialization "does not appear
to decrease the quality of judicial decision making, even if it does not lead inexorably to improved
decision making").
421 HOROWiTZ, supra note 118, at 294; see also Richard A. Epstein, The Social Consequences of
Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1717, 1719 (1982) (arguing that courts and litigants both
maintain control over the judicial process but no one group has complete control). Some have argued
that legislatures share this characteristic. Strauss, supra note 62, at 240-41 (arguing that statutory law
also arises out of particular controversies and operates incrementally); id. ("[W]e have problems
washing up against the legislature over time, much as (through the common law) they also wash up
against the courts, and eventually acquiring an urgency that produces response.").
422 Schauer, supra note 408, at 778 ("[The incentives to litigate (or not) and the incentives to
appeal (or not) may distort the terrain of the underlying reality, such that cases that wind up in court,
the cases that go to judgment, and the cases that wind up . . . on appeal turn out to be an
unrepresentative sample of the issues or controversies that exist at the prelitigation stage.").
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and long after people have adjusted their behavior to them.
And all of this is, needless to say, very much a matter of
chance.423
This hopscotch aspect of common law decision-making by different judges
means that it may be a long time before a clear, simple, comprehensive
rule emerges.
Perhaps as the world becomes more complex and interdependent, and
as it continues to evolve rapidly, the institutional advantages of
legislatures, diplomats, and especially administrative agencies, over courts
will become more pronounced.424  All, however, face a difficult
challenge,425 and none is likely to perform very well. 426  Courts use a
microscope, legislatures and diplomats use a wide-angle lens, and agencies
use both. The problem, however, may be that the device best suited to
bringing the future into focus is a telescope.
D. Some Implications
One theme that emerges from a survey of changes in lawmaking
during the past century is the gradual whittling down of the sphere of the
common law. As Frederick Schauer pointed out:
423 HOROWITZ, supra note 118, at 54; see also DWORKIN, supra note 9, at 179-86 (arguing that
judicial lawmaking results in "checkerboard" legislation); SCALIA, supra note 90, at 8-9 ("[T]he
common law grew in a peculiar fashion-rather like a Scrabble board. No rule of decision previously
announced could be erased, but qualifications could be added to it. The first case lays on the board:
'No liability for breach of contractual duty without privity'; the next player adds 'unless the injured
party is a member of a household.' And the game continues."). Although the Supreme Court has some
ability to shape its agenda, at least to the extent of choosing which cases it will decide from among
those litigants happen to offer it, even it is hamstrung because it cannot initiate a case on its own. See
LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 18 (1998) (observing that the Supreme
Court can change public policy only in a "slow and incremental" way).
424 See Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial
Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. REV. 1, 25 (1957) (stating that the courts "will
necessarily come too late with a pound of 'remedy' where the smaller measure of prevention was
needed. Their rules, tailored to the last bit of trouble, will never catch up with the next and different
dispute."); Schauer, supra note 408, at 781 ("As societies grow, so too does the importance of the
guidance function of law, as opposed to its dispute resolution function. And thus so societies grow, the
guidance function of the law, always the comparative advantage of the civil law, has increased in
importance.").
425 See HOROWITZ, supra at 118, at 290 ("Prediction in uncertain, often intractable surroundings
remains for the courts, as for all decisionmakers, the most hazardous of enterprises."); Manning, supra
note 104, at 1749 ("Lawmaking bodies have imperfect foresight ... ").
426 See HOROWITZ, supra note 118, at 51-52 ("[A]II decisionmaking processes are unduly based
on what has happened in the past and insufficiently attuned to what might happen in the future .... ");
see also Rachlinski, supra note 408, at 963 ("Courts and legislatures alike are capable of creating
misguided laws.").
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[T]here are important features of the common law that
appear to be in rapid retreat. Insofar as it is often thought
that a prominent characteristic of the common law is the
central role of the judge in the lawmaking process, modern
legal design appears to reject such an approach with
remarkable frequency, instead substituting the kind of
highly precise canonical statement of the law much more
associated with civil law than the common law.427
This seems counter-intuitive because law must be applied and because
courts still decide large numbers of cases, even though most of those cases
do not really "make law" in a meaningful sense, but it is true. Courts are in
a competition with other lawmakers, 428 and they are not faring well. As
explained above, the erosion of stare decisis and other changes in judicial
decision-making have contributed to courts acting more like legislatures by
crafting broad, future-oriented rules. Nevertheless, statutes, regulations,
and treaties remain more efficient ways of making law than judicial
decisions. One page of statute, regulation, or treaty may affect as much
conduct as a volume of case law.
Courts have adopted a variety of measures to attempt to preserve their
role in lawmaking.429 Some of these measures have proven effective,
especially at the level of the Supreme Court, while others have not been.
But even when they work, almost all are vulnerable to legislative
overturning, except, of course, those based on the Constitution. And the
more effective these measures are, the more likely it is that the legislature
will find them sufficiently irritating to attempt to limit or to override them.
Overall, these measures have been at best temporarily or modestly
successful. For example, the interpretive principle that statutes in
derogation of the common law are strictly construeda3 -a device
employed by courts to limit legislative incursions into the judicial
427 Schauer, supra note 408, at 765 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 781 ("[U]sing the dispute
resolution function to perform the law guiding function as well is increasingly unrealistic, with the
decline of the common law model the not unexpected consequence.").428 See Arthur Corbin, The Law and the Judges, 3 YALE REV. 234, 238 (1914) ("A judge's
declared rules must compete for their lives with the rules declared by other judges and by all other
persons. In the judicial world, as in the animal and vegetable world, the ultimate law is the law of the
survival of the fittest.").
429 See Magill, supra note 242, at 1426-37 (describing the measures courts have adopted to
control agency rulemaking and adjudication, including shaping the scope or intensity ofjudicial review,
and specifying the procedures agencies must follow); see also Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 300 So. 2d
354, 357 (Ala. 1974) ("[l]t is often necessary to breathe life into existing laws lest they become stale
and shelf wom. This is not a confrontation with another branch of our government, but rather a unity
of effort in order that existing law may become useful law to promote the ends ofjustice.").
430 See Coral Gables, Inc. v. Christopher, 189 A. 147, 149 (1937); LLEWELLYN, supra note 138, at
522 app. c.
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lawmaking process and to integrate statutes smoothly into the overall
scheme of the law-has atrophied. 431  The result is that courts are less able
to protect their lawmaking role and less able to discharge their traditional
responsibility for making all sources of law blend seamlessly together.
Perhaps this result is inevitable: making law by adjudication may
simply be too slow and disjointed to accomplish the rapid change we
evidently desire, and perhaps need, today.432 Another reason for this shift
may be that, in light of the erosion of stare decisis and the move from strict
adherence to constitutional text to Supreme Court glosses on constitutional
text as the principal source of constitutional doctrine, courts are viewed as
possessing less lawmaking legitimacy than they used to. 43 3 This trend may
make law more democratic, because legislatures are, on balance, more
democratic than courts (although diplomats and agencies arguably are
not).434 It also might reduce the quality of law.435 Oddly, however, the
conventional wisdom is that courts are appropriating power to themselves,
and hence playing a larger role in the governance of America than ever
before.436 If the account of the evolution of lawmaking presented in this
Article is correct, however, then that view is wrong.
Within the common law and constitutional law, however, courts still
enjoy considerable leeway. And, even in other areas of the law, they retain
431 See REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 206 (1975)
("Except with respect to pure statutory codifications of existing common law, the rule makes little
sense, because most statutes that affect the common law are enacted for the very purpose of changing
it.").
432 See Magliocca, supra note 372, at 502 ("Since courts have limited information and must act
incrementally, they are hardly the place for quick action. People looking for an immediate policy
solution usually go to the legislature or to the executive branch."); see also HOGUE, supra note 142, at
253 ("Problems of the govemment of complex industrial societies present serious threats to the
continuance of the common-law system.").
433 See Schauer, supra note 408, at 777 ("[Olnce we have recognized that common law
decisionmaking involves empowering a group of people to make socially important and largely non-
constrained decisions, we should not be surprised to discover that society may at times be more
reluctant to do this than when the perceived constraints on judicial decision were much greater.").
434 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S 153, 175-76 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("[I]n a democratic
society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values
of the people.") (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 383 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
435 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 560 (7th ed. 2007) ("Although the
correlation is far from perfect, judge-made rules tend to be efficiency-promoting while those made by
legislatures . . . tend to be efficiency-reducing."); Kysar, supra note 370, at 1059-60 (suggesting that
statutory law is inefficient because legislators are not insulated from interest groups, and interest groups
tend to advocate their own agendas rather than efficient outcomes).
436 See, e.g., RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE
NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 1 (2004) ("Around the globe, in more than eighty countries and in several
supranational entities, constitutional reform has transferred an unprecedented amount of power from
representative institutions to judiciaries."); MARK R. LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK: HOW THE SUPREME
COURT IS DESTROYING AMERICA, at x (2005) ("[S]ince the 1960s, the judicial branch, led by the
United States Supreme Court, has accelerated its already well-honed pattern of usurping the authority
of the elected branches of government.").
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the role of interpreter and applier of what other lawmakers have written,
which reserves to them a measure of authority.437 On the other hand, it
should be remembered that others (such as agencies, lawyers, clients, etc.)
must interpret the decisions made by courts, so it is not clear that courts
really have the last word. In addition, agencies have partly taken over
another function previously allocated to courts: the interpretation and
elaboration of statutes. Here again, courts still retain some role, but much
of the work is done by means of agency adjudication or agency
rulemaking, and when courts do become involved, they often must defer to
administrative determinations. Further, the slice of the common law has
been reduced in size relative to the overall pie of law by the incursion of
statutes, regulations, and treaties into areas previously governed only by
common law-and by the creation of entirely new areas of law in which,
while the courts still play a role, their role is merely an interpretive one that
is not as large as their role as architects of the common law. 438  Finally,
even in the traditional arena of applying law to historical facts, the role of
courts has been diminished by the ascendency of alternative dispute
resolution 43 9 and the expansion of agency adjudication. 440
A second implication is that agencies may be the best lawmakers for
our era. Agencies do not have to wait for litigants; instead, they can
initiate investigations, prosecute enforcement actions, and formulate policy
on their own.441  They both adjudicate and make rules (or quasi-
437 See THEODORE M. BENDITT, LAW As RULE AND PRINCIPLE: PROBLEMS OF LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY 7 (1978) ("'Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it
is he who is truly the Law-giver to all intents and purposes, and not the person who first wrote or spoke
them."') (quoting Bishop Benjamin Hoadly); see also HART & SACKS, supra note 226, at 164 ("The
body of decisional law announced by the courts in the disposition of these [individual] problems tends
always to be the initial and continues to be the underlying body of law governing the society.").
438See Frederick Schauer, The Generality of Law, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 217, 224 (2004)
(recognizing the influence of case law, but arguing that "more often transactions are arranged and legal
advice given on the basis of statutes, rules, regulations, and regulatory practices than on the basis of
what judges are likely to do on the remote chance that the transaction actually winds up in the hands of
a judge").
439 See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 460-61 (2004) (describing a steep decline
in civil trials); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation
of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339, 1387 (1994) ("[M]ost litigation results in settlement and ... the
portion of cases settled is increasing.").
"o See discussion supra notes 268-70.
441 See, e.g., HOROWITZ, supra note 118, at 297 ("[A]dministrative enforcement is generally
stronger and more effective than judicial enforcement, partly because it can be self-starting and self-
perpetuating (it need not wait for litigants), and partly because, for some problems at least,
administrative tools are sharper and more numerous."); Magill, supra note 242, at 1383 (noting that
agencies have a flexibility in choosing among legislating, enforcing, and adjudicating that legislators,
courts, and prosecutors lack).
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legislate)," 2 and may develop facts in ways appropriate for each. They can
also switch from one lawmaking mode to another as the circumstances and
subject matter dictate," 3 and they can apply what they learn during
rulemaking to adjudication, and vice versa. Finally, agencies are not very
adept at entrenching because legislatures and courts retain some control
over what agencies do.444 However, agencies possess a flaw: they are
susceptible to "capture" by those they regulate." 5  Thus, some of what
agencies gain in information gathering and in their flexible mix of
lawmaking tools, they lose in their lack of independence. That may mean
there is a need to remedy the process deficiencies of administrative
agencies (such as their vulnerability to capture), while at the same time
"getting out of their way" by avoiding judicial engrafting of more
numerous and more exacting procedural hoops for them to jump through.
Of course, legislatures also are vulnerable to "capture" by wealthy or
powerful interests affected by their activities." 6 In this respect the greater
independence of courts gives them an advantage.
Other institutions might try to emulate agencies by attempting similar
adaptations, but they are unlikely to be equally successful. Legislatures
442 Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935) (noting that the FTC was
constituted to perform both "legislative and judicial powers"); MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L.
RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: How THE COURTS REFORMED
AMERICA'S PRISONS 327 (1998) ("The administrative agency itself represents a mixture, or indeed a
merger, of all three functions."). In a sense, all lawmakers blend the adjudication perspective and the
rulemaking perspective. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Rulemaking Versus Adjudication: A Psychological
Perspective, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 529, 532 (2005) ("No adjudication proceeds without some
attention to the broader policy implications that the decision might have, and no rulemaking proceeds
without some awareness of how individuals might be affected. Relative to a rulemaking, however, an
adjudication will focus a decisionmaker's gaze upon the individual case, rather than the sociological,
economic, or other structural aspects of the underlying issue."). Agencies, however, are unique
because they actually make law in both adjudicative and rulemaking modes. Id. at 529.
443 See 1 PIERCE, supra note 254, § 6.9 ("Most agency-administered statutes confer on the agency
power to issue rules and power to adjudicate cases, leaving the agency with discretion to choose any
combination of rulemaking and adjudication it prefers."); Magill, supra note 242, at 1386 (explaining
how agencies can "rely on an assortment of policysnaking instruments" for different situations).
4 Magill, supra note 242, at 1445-47 (explaining how courts have adapted to agencies'
procedural flexibility by developing "policymaking tools in order to respond to concerns about the
fairness, utility, or strategic possibilities associated with particular agency choices of procedure").
"5 See David Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of Democracy, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 473, 497 (1999) ("In 'captured' agencies, agency regulators do not act as 'arms-length'
representatives of some larger 'public interest' in their interactions with regulated industries. Instead,
government officials work to advance the agenda of current firms in the industry by formulating
regulations that benefit or at least do not substantially burden the industry."); Thomas W. Merrill,
Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1043 (1997) (describing the
phenomenon of agency "capture," in which an administration agency becomes "uniquely susceptible to
domination by the industry [it is] charged with regulating"); see also Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron
Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 203, 209-11 (2004) (describing
how agencies sometimes must decide matters that affect their self-interest).
446 See Dana & Koniak, supra note 445, at 497 ("[P]owerful groups sometimes can secure direct,
specific giveaways in legislation itself.").
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cannot adjudicate, partly because they are not supposed to, and partly
because they lack the necessary time and resources. 44  Courts are
forbidden from issuing advisory opinions,448 as many agencies do.4 49
Courts can try to adapt by becoming more like legislatures, but they lack
fact finding tools and breadth of vision so their efforts to combine
adjudication and rulemaking may be unsuccessful. Moreover, when courts
broaden their scope in this way, there may be some degradation in their
ability to adjudicate. Instead of focusing on the individual case, 450 they
might subordinate it to policymaking. By becoming better suited to one
sort of lawmaking (rulemaking), they could become worse suited to
another sort of lawmaking (adjudication).451 Courts historically have been
past-oriented decisionmakers, and they have adapted to that role by
evolving rules and procedures that are better suited to making past-oriented
decisions than future-oriented ones.452 Expecting them to adapt to future-
oriented lawmaking without diminishing the quality of the law they make
would be unrealistic.
Turning next to the question of what these changes mean for the future,
one must wonder if, whether for good or for ill, this trend toward future-
oriented lawmaking will continue. It is likely that it will, since the size and
complexity of the global community appears to be growing and the pace of
societal change seems to be increasing rather than slackening.453 But it is
447 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 513-14 (1989) ("It is the judicial
system, rather than the legislative process, that is best equipped to identify past wrongdoers and to
fashion remedies that will create the conditions that presumably would have existed had no wrong been
committed.") (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
448 Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues ": Rethinking the Judicial Function,
114 HARv. L. REv. 1833, 1844 (2001) ("No rule of federal justiciability doctrine is more entrenched
than the ban on advisory opinions.") (footnote omitted).
44 See Yehonatan Givati, The Optimal Structure of Tax, Policymaking: Rulemaking,
Adjudication, Advance Ruling and Licensing 5, 9-15 (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (describing how agencies use a "menu" of policymaking devices); see also David L. Dickens,
Advisory Rulings by Administrative Agencies: Their Benefits and Dangers, 2 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 3
(1980) (describing the practice of obtaining informal advice from agencies).450 See JESSE FRANKLIN BRUMBAUGH, LEGAL REASONING AND BRIEFING 172 (1917) ("Decisions
are not primarily made that they may serve the future in the form of precedents, but rather to settle
issues between litigants. Their use in after cases is an incidental aftermath.").
451See HOROWITZ, supra note 118, at 9; SCALIA, supra note 90, at 110 ("[M]any of our
interpretative ills are due to the survival of common-law habits in the world of enacted law. But it
ought to be said that those habits were good ones, even if ill-adapted to statutory and constitutional
interpretation.").
452 See HOROWITZ, supra note 118, at 284 ("[Jludicial decisions have traditionally tended to be
backward-looking, [so it is unsurprising] that the courts are well equipped to see the past and present
fairly clearly, and ill-equipped to gauge the future."); id. at 264 ("[C]ourts are better equipped with
machinery to discover the past than to forecast the future."); see also MARTIN MAYER, THE JUDGES
371 (2006) ("Courts speak with authority when they look backward. When they predict the
consequences of their decisions, they lose intellectual distinction.").
... See SCHEUERMAN, supra note 407, at 195 ("For better or worse, the fundamental structural
motors behind social acceleration will probably continue to operate for some time."); Martin A. Rogoff
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possible that, at some point, there will be an ebb. Perhaps "[1]ike its
biological analogue, legal evolution occurs in violent spurts punctuated by
long periods of relative inactivity."454  Maybe the twentieth century was a
once-a-millennium volcanic eruption of future-oriented lawmaking, and
the pace of legal change will eventually slow down. Frankly, however,
that seems doubtful. The rapid proliferation of future-oriented law is likely
to continue. Statutes, regulations, and treaties are faster ways of making
law than common law adjudication. Every time humans have been forced
to choose between faster and slower, they have always chosen faster.455
Why should lawmaking be different?
Assuming that this trend continues, what, if anything, should be done
about it? Obviously, we cannot avoid basing law at least partly on
predictions. 456 Ironically, although we often encourage long-term thinking
and discourage short-term thinking,457 we may need to reverse our
preference, at least insofar as lawmaking is concerned. If we can see
reliably for only a few feet ahead, then perhaps we should not be
legislating for miles into the future.45 8 Instead, we might be better off
crafting legal rules that apply only for as far ahead as we can see. That
way, we might reduce the risk of driving our car too fast in the dark, and
thereby out-running our headlights.
There may be no entirely satisfactory answer to the question of how
future-oriented lawmaking should be. Minimalist or incrementalist
decision-making may have desirable properties from a temporal
perspective,459 but sidestepping important doctrinal questions or providing
& Barbara E. Gauditz, The Provisional Application of International Agreements, 39 ME. L. REV. 29, 30
(1987) ("The pace of concluding international agreements is accelerating and will mostly continue to
accelerate at an increasing rate.").
454 Chen, supra note 143, at 728 (footnote omitted).
455 See JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 142 (1927) (noting society's "mania for
motion and speed"); GLEICK, supra note 41, at 277 ("The historical record shows that humans have
never, ever opted for slower.") (quoting STEPHEN KERN, THE CULTURE OF SPEED 277 (1996)).
456 See GRAHAM H. MAY, THE FUTURE IS OURS: FORESEEING, MANAGING AND CREATING THE
FUTURE 32 (1996) ("[G]overmnents are unavoidably dealing with the future because they are faced
with three distinct time lags: the information lag, the decision lag, and the policy-effect lag.").
411 See, e.g., STEWART BRAND, THE CLOCK OF THE LONG Now 2 (1999) ("Civilization is revving
itself into a pathologically short attention span."); LESTER THURLOW, THE FUTURE OF CAPITALISM 16
(1996) ("The proper role of government in capitalistic societies ... is to represent the interest of the
future to the present .... ").458 See Adam, supra note 361, at 301 (stating that "we seem to lack the knowledge and conceptual
capacity to know the future in a way that is appropriate to the temporal depth of our actions").459 See PDK Labs. Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in
part) (identifying "the cardinal principle of'judicial restraint-if it is not necessary to decide more, it is
necessary not to decide more"); SUNSTEIN, supra note 410, at 9 (stating that "minimalist" judges "seek
to avoid broad rules and abstract theories, and attempt to focus.., only on what is necessary to resolve
particular disputes") (footnote omitted); Rachlinski, supra note 408, at 934 (suggesting that
adjudication inherently encourages the development of more limited rules than does legislation or
agency rulemaking).
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vague answers makes law less clear for those who are required to conform
to it. In addition, minimalist, case-by-case incrementalism may not always
produce optimal results.460 Among other things, the intelligent practice of
minimalist common law decision-making allows courts to avoid making
certain predictions, but also requires them to make other predictions for
which they are no better suited.461 The sun-setting of constitutions,462
legislation,463 administrative regulations,46 and even judicial decisions
holds promise.465 It leaves the future open for the next generation, and that
may be a good thing.466 But even assuming that such measures are
effective,467 they also reduce the stability and predictability of law, and
460 ALPHA C. CHIANG, ELEMENTS OF DYNAMIC OPTIMIZATION 5 (1992) (proposing that "[a]
myopic, one-stage-at-a-time optimization procedure will not in general yield the optimal path").
461 See Sheldon Gelman, The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the Minimalist, 89 GEO. L.J. 2297, 2344-45
(2001) (reviewing SuNSTEIN, supra note 410) (noting that even though judges are called upon to make
predictions and future assessments, there is no evidence to suggest that judges are better at doing so
than anyone else).
462 See JEFFERSON, supra note 374, at 352 ("Every constitution then, and every law, naturally
expires at the end of 19 years.").
463 See Gersen, supra note 412, at 247 (defining "temporary legislation" as "set[ting] a date on
which an agency, regulation, or statutory scheme will terminate unless affirmative action satisfying the
constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment is taken by the legislature") (footnote
omitted); see also CALABRESI, supra note 21, at 164 (advocating that courts overrule obsolete statutes
by exercising "the judgmental function... of deciding when a rule has come to be sufficiently out of
phase with the whole legal framework so that, whatever its age, it can only stand if a current
majoritarian or representative body reaffirms it"); THE FEDERALIST No. 26 (Alexander Hamilton)
(recommending a sunset provision of two years for military appropriations).
4m See Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 387 U.S. 397, 416
(1967) ("Regulatory agencies do not establish rules of conduct to last forever; they are supposed ... to
adapt their rules and practices to the Nation's needs .... "); Lloyd N. Cutler & David R. Johnson,
Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L.J. 1395, 1408 n.43 (1975) (reporting that "[a]ccording
to Washington folklore, Justice [Hugo] Black suggested that every statute creating a new agency should
limit its life to 14 years").
465 See HOROWITZ, supra note 118, at 291 (stating that "[tihe tentative or experimental decree and
the decree that expires on a date certain unless renewed on a showing of continuing need are also useful
ways of providing automatic, timed feedback and countering the propensity to let unsatisfactory
arrangements harden into accepted habits and routines"); Neal Katyal, Sunsetting Judicial Opinions, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1237, 1244-45 (2004) (proposing that the "[Supreme] Court can hand down an
opinion and announce that its holding is entitled to the full effect of the stare decisis doctrine for a set
number of years .... After the elapse of that time period, both lower courts and the Supreme Court
would not be bound by the decision, though they could of course follow its reasoning and logic"); see
also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) ("[W]e expect that 25 years from now, the use of
racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.").
46 See FEYNMAN, supra note 348, at 149 ("It is our responsibility to leave the men of the future a
free hand. In the impetuous youth of humanity we can make grave errors that can stunt our growth for
a long time."); Gersen, supra note 412, at 261 ("In contexts where initial policy judgments are likely to
be inaccurate, temporary legislation has certain advantages over permanent litigation. In contrast,
when initial decisions are likely to be correct, the opposite is true."); John A. Robertson, "Paying the
Alligator": Precommitment in Law, Bioethics, and Constitutions, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1729, 1736 (2003)
("[W]e have good reason to limit our use of commitments so as not to unduly restrict our future
autonomy, capacity and opportunity to act on our revised values and life plan.").
467 See Kysar, supra note 370, at 1065 (arguing that, in view of the disadvantages of temporary
(Vol. 44:737
THE EVOLVING TEMPORALITY OF LA WMAKING
require the next generation to revisit a myriad of issues, some of which
proved to be intractable the first time around.468 Additionally, since we
cannot reliably foresee the future, we cannot determine ex ante whether
sun-setting would be good or bad. For example, a beneficial statute might
expire and not be reenacted, not because it has become obsolete, but
simply because a few powerful constituents of the relevant congressional
committee chair opposed it. Further, "[t]ime does not serve as a good
indicator of age ... in all statutes generally .... It does not distinguish
sufficiently between those in need of reconsideration because they have
become anachronistic and those which are in no sense anachronistic.
469
Therefore, sun-setting all statutes ten years old or older might throw out
some babies-not merely bathwater.
On balance, a combination of lawmaking minimalism coupled with
avoidance of entrenchment may be optimal, at least for now. The opposite,
a combination of aggressive prediction-based lawmaking and determined
entrenchment, could be virulent. Not only are many of our predictions
likely to be inaccurate, but we appear to lack a sense of moral obligation to
future generations. Instead, our temporal horizon seems limited to just a
few years into the future, and we blithely discount and externalize costs
that will not be realized during that period.47° Entrenching our short-
sighted perspective could thwart efforts by future generations to fix our
inevitable mistakes. While the trends noted above may allow us to make
course corrections more quickly than before, entrenchment may work in
the opposite direction. Arguing, as some have,47' that the Constitution
does not forbid most entrenchment and that we should not worry about
entrenchment unless it runs afoul of constitutional limits, is unsatisfactory.
The Constitution was not written with today's fast-paced environment in
mind. We may need to augment the Constitution's protections against
entrenchment, not merely rely on those protections crafted to deal with a
much slower-paced era.
Perhaps the best that can be recommended is simply that we remain as
flexible and open to legal change in light of new circumstances as we
legislation, "lasting legislation should be the statutory norm"); id. at 1057-58 (noting that "temporary
legislation may interfere with the future majority's ability to set its own agenda").
468 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 221, at 1686 (stating that "one Congress would hardly do
a favor to a later Congress by making all legislation expire at the end of the term, for this would impose
on the subsequent Congress the burden of renegotiating and reenacting the expired legislation.").
469 CALABRESI, supra note 21, at 62.
478 See, e.g., ADAM & GROVES, supra note 18, at 77 (explaining that "la]s the future is
progressively emptied of content and opened up to the possibilities that we might create, non-intended
consequences mushroom and planned outcomes prove ever more elusive").
471 Posner & Vermuele, supra note 221, at 1666 ("[L]egislatures should be allowed to bind their
successors, subject to any independent constitutional limits in force.").
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can.472 This recommendation does not mean that we should not plan for
the future: we should and we must. The consequences of failing to do so
might be disastrous. But it does mean that we should recognize the need
for flexibility in updating our forecasts and the desirability of avoiding
long term commitments. As Jerome Frank said: "Present problems should
be worked out with reference to present events. We cannot rule the
future. ' ,47 3 Because our world is evolving so rapidly, that statement may be
more insightful now than it was when Frank uttered it. Whatever we do in
an effort to positively affect the future might end up backfiring for reasons
we are unable to anticipate.474
For similar reasons, it might make sense to diversify our legal
portfolio. Perhaps we should reverse the present trend toward
centralization and federalization in law,475 and instead allow many
"laboratories for experimentation 'A76 to flourish. If we cannot reliably
discern which potential solution to a challenging problem will suit us best
in the future, perhaps we should experiment with several and see which
works best, thereby avoiding putting all of our eggs in one basket
prematurely. Allowing states to experiment with a variety of strategies,
and only then settling on one or a few that seem to work best as time
passes, may be a wiser course.
Adopting such an approach, however, may be difficult. Avoiding the
artificial constriction of future options may be difficult because people are
472 GILMORE, supra note 21, at 110 (arguing that the principal lesson to be drawn from surveying
the development of American law is that "the part of wisdom is to keep our theories open-ended, our
assumptions tentative, our reactions flexible"); RALPH D. STACEY, MANAGING CHAOS: DYNAMIC
BUSINESS STRATEGIES IN AN UNPREDICTABLE WORLD 26-28 (1992) (suggesting that we should
restrict ourselves to planning for the short term future, which is reasonably predictable, and that we
should adopt an open minded learning approach toward the long term future, which is not reasonably
predictable); Bell, supra note 43, at 873 ("For in the preoccupation with prediction one risks the hubris
of the historicist mode of thought which sees the future as 'pre-viewed' in some 'cunning of reason' or
other determinist vision of human affairs. And this is false.").
473 FRANK, supra note 416, at 155; see also John Harrison, Time, Change, and the Constitution,
90 VA. L. REV. 1601, 1601 (2004) ("The future is hard to predict and thus hard to control."); Alain
Levasseur, Code Napoleon or Code Portalis, 43 TULANE L.J. 762, 769 (1969) ("[H]ow can one fetter
the movement of time?").
474 Bell, supra note 313, at 323 ("[H]umans by their behavior constantly shape their natural and
social environments and, in so doing, shape their own future, although not always in ways that they
intend or understand.").
475 See, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, The Tragedy of Centralization: The Political Economics of
American Natural Resource Federalism, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 487, 487-88 (2003) (proposing that
regulatory centralization, which, in the United States, means federalization, might be just as tragic for
natural resources as the regime of local control that it is trying to replace); William P. Marshall,
Federalization: A Critical Overview, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 719, 732 n.72 (1995) (stating that the primary
values of federalism permit states to remain laboratories of experimentation).
476 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing New State
Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)) ("It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a simple courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
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driven to do just that.477 In fact, law appears to be moving in the direction
of less flexibility rather than more flexibility.478  The trend toward
"precisification" of law may be pernicious. The more precise law is, the
less room there is for its scope and content to be adjusted to unforeseen
future conditions encountered in its application. Instead, law should be
created in ways that allow for updating to occur easily as conditions
change.
V. CONCLUSION
No one would deny the importance of the past in law. Today's law
contains plenty of vestiges of past law, and it probably always will. As
Paul Kahn said, "[w]e can imagine a policy science that is wholly
unbounded by the past, but it is not law's rule. ' 47 9 Nevertheless, when we
look back on the last century, the trend is plain: the mix of lawmaking
methods actually in use focuses on the future more than ever before. The
temporality of lawmaking has been transformed. Our lawmakers have
converted themselves from Epimetheus ("the one who reflects after the
fact") to Prometheus ("the one who foresees"). 480  The common law
arguably was the one predominantly past-oriented mode of lawmaking.
Not only has it become more future-oriented, but other more future-
oriented modes of lawmaking have emerged or swelled, greatly
diminishing its importance. Because of the dramatic changes in the
character of the lawmaking process and the erosion of traditional restraints
on legal change, the role of the past in law is not as important as it used to
be.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. probably would be pleased by what has
occurred. After all, he once said: "I look forward to a time when the part
played by history in the explanation of dogma shall be very small, and
instead of ingenious research we shall spend our energy on a study of the
ends sought to be attained and the reasons for desiring them., 481 That time
appears to be at hand. For those of us who must live with the change
477 See Schauer, supra note 408, at 780 ("Just as the consumers quickly reduce the choice to a
small number, even at the cost of eliminating some potentially desirable options, so too do we see
judges and other legal decisionmakers more eager to reduce the range of their own choices than might
have been suspected.").
478 See id. at 768 (referring to "the progressive precisification of the law over time"); id. at 772
(noting that "open-ended lawmaking and mlemaking is now far more rare, with detailed statutes and
detailed regulations far more the norm now than in the past").
479 PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 45
(1999).
480 See I ROBERT GRAVES, THE GREEK MYTHS 143-45 (1960); see also ADAM & GROVES, supra
note 18, at 79 (defining "promethean" as "an awesome power to set something in motion without an
equivalent power to know and be mindful of potential consequences").
41 Holmes, supra note 30, at 474.
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Holmes eagerly anticipated, however, it may be more of a mixed blessing
than he expected. On balance, we probably are better off with a mix of law
that is more future-oriented than past-oriented at this stage of our societal
evolution,4 2 but there are perils in this increasingly prophetic style of
lawmaking we have embraced.483 In particular, we should be mindful of
our limited ability to predict what will happen-or even what we will want
to happen-in the future. As Robert Burns cautioned: "The best-laid
schemes o' mice an men/Gang aft agley/An' lea 'e us nought but grief and
pain/For promised joy! ' 484
482 See 8 HENRIK IBSEN, An Enemy of the People, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF HENRIK IBSEN,
at i, x (1907) ("[T]hat man is in the right who is most closely in league with the future.").
483 See POUND, supra note 413, at 45 (recognizing that legislation involves "the perils of
prophecy").
484 1 ROBERT BURNS, To a Mouse, on Turning Her Up in Her Nest with the Plow, in THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF ROBERT BURNS 153, 155 (1785).
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